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Abstract 
In the UK, healthcare resources are scarce and insufficient to meet all claims on them. 
Such scarcity has to be managed. Economics provides a set of principles for managing 
scarcity. However, economic methods have had limited impact on managing scarcity in 
healthcare decision-making. This thesis argues that economics must fit alongside the 
pragmatic necessities of everyday decision-making. The focus of this research was to 
work within an NHS organisation to consider how decision-making was organised and 
explore the potential for using health economics, using programme budgeting and 
marginal analysis (PBMA) as a vehicle to study how health economics can be informed 
by, and inform, the management of scarce resources in the 'real world'. 
The research was conducted using a participatory action research (PAR) framework to 
study PBMA in three phases: before, during, and after its introduction into the 
organisation. Qualitative interview, observation, and focus groups methods were used to 
examine the organisational context prior to the implementation of PBMA, record the 
implementation of PBMA, and reflect on the implementation of PBMA. Through 
thematic qualitative analyses of these data sources, this thesis presents a rich description 
of the decision-making context and the inherent constraints; an account of how PBMA 
was applied; and the challenges of implementing PBMA. 
These findings indicate that economics provides a set of principles for managing 
scarcity that are embedded in the discourses surrounding PCT commissioning. 
However, these principles are rarely borne out in the decision-making processes. Both 
strengths and weaknesses in the PBMA method, and barriers and facilitators in the 
application of PBMA were identified. More research is needed to integrate PBMA into 
the organisational culture, something that may come with further iterations of the PAR 
framework. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Value for money is not a value, it's a means to an end - better care for the 
patient. Ifyou are using money ineffectively, whichever government is in power 
and however much money you put in, you're going to be wasting some of that 
money. Every pound that you waste, that isn't spent on better patient care, is not 
spent on the values of the health service. 
Interview with Tony Blair, former British Prime Minster. (Edwards, 2006b, 
pg. 5) 
1.1 Chapter overview 
This thesis is broadly concerned with the concept of achieving value for money from 
scarce healthcare resources. Specifically, the thesis seeks to understand and develop the 
use of economics in the management of scarce healthcare resources as a means to 
delivering value for money in health services'. This chapter introduces the thesis, 
outlining the background to the research undertaken and detailing the context within 
which it was conducted. The chapter goes on to justify the research undertaken in this 
thesis and outline the research questions and design. Finally, the chapter lists the 
contributions of the thesis to research and policy and provides a summary of the 
forthcoming chapters. 
1.2 Background 
The background outlines the basic concepts and arguments that underpin the research 
conducted in this thesis. This briefly comprises an introduction to the basic economic 
problem of resource scarcity and the contributions of economics and health economics 
' Herein the generic terrn, the 'health service' is used to refer to health services in the UK National Health 
Serv ice and other healthcare systems more broadly. 
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to the management of resource scarcity in healthcare. These concepts and arguments 
and are also dealt with in further detail in Chapter 2. 
1.2.1 Economics and managing scarcity 
Economics as a discipline is founded on the notion that societal resources are scarce and 
that choices among the use of these resources have to be made. Economics is concerned 
with the study of choice under scarcity, and provides the theory and hence potentially 
some solutions to help manage such choices. As Samuelson notes: 
Economics is the study of how men and society end up choosing, with or without 
the use of money, to employ scarce productive resources that could have 
alternative uses, to produce various commodities and distribute them for 
consumption, now or in the future, among various groups in society. It analyses 
the costs and benefits of improving patterns of resource allocation. 
(Samuelson, 1976, pg 5. ) 
Given this it follows that economics, and specifically health economics ought to be able 
to play some role in aiding the management of scarce healthcare resources. In particular, 
it is argued by commentators that health economic theory and methods should be useful 
in making decisions about what health services to fund, to what extent, and, 
importantly, at what cost/sacrifice (Drummond and Donaldson, 2003). Indeed, 
promoting and teaching health economics for this purpose is widespread. 
The use of health economics in the health service has tended to focus on the national 
level, in the context of assessing health technologies and centralised drug review 
processes such as that of the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) in England and Wales (Ham and Robert, 2003, Neumann, 2005). Despite the 
widespread adoption of health economics at this level, the extent to which this aids the 
management of scarce healthcare resources is debatable (McDonald, 2002, Coast, 2004. 
Prosser et al., 2000, Miller et al., 2006, Mitton et al., 2006). Indeed, as argued in 
Chapter 2, these processes may actually lead to increases in healthcare spending (Birch 
and Gafni, 2007b). Furthermore, beyond the national level, the use of health economic 
theory and methods is limited (Hoffmann et al., 2002, McDonald, 2002, Von der 
Schulenburg, 2001, Williams and Bryan, 2007, Hoffman and von der Schulenburg, 
2000). 
In particular, research on the use of economic evaluations by local health service 
decision-makers in practice has highlighted several barriers to the adoption of health 
economic methods. These include difficulties in accessing relevant information, lack of 
interpretation skills, insufficient supply of information in a timely fashion, and the 
relevance of the information in a given decision-making context (Neumann, 2005, 
Hoffman and von der Schulenburg, 2000, Kernick, 2000, Von der Schulenburg, 2001, 
Duthie et al., 1999). This has led some to question the value of using health economic 
methods in healthcare decision-making. Notably, in her study on the use of health 
economics in practice, McDonald (2002) identified several conflicts that arose when 
attempting to adopt what she referred to as 'rational' economic models in the seemingly 
'irrational' decision-making processes at the level of the Health Authority, concluding 
that "rational health economic approaches to resource allocation are unlikely to be 
adopted widely at the local level in the NHS" (McDonald, 2002, pg. 164). 
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In her work, McDonald (2002) emphasises the apparent disparity that exists between the 
rational, simple, theoretical, academic economic world of health economics and the 
irrational, complex, applied, practical world of healthcare decision-making. Such 
disparity is often used to position the academic economic world and the practical world 
of healthcare decision-making as polar opposites that cannot be brought together (Fox, 
2006). In turn this legitimates the lack of use of health economics in the 'real world' of 
decision-making and, vice-versa, the lack of 'real world' pragmatism in health 
economics. Moreover, this disparity is further perpetuated by: health economists, who 
often seek to refine the methods they are working with, rather than consider the wider 
context into which they are being applied; and health service decision-makers, who 
often do not want to explicitly face the difficult and tough choices they have to make, 
preferring instead to do so implicitly. 
Where research has been conducted on the use of health economics in the 'real-world' it 
has tended to focus on the use of economic evaluation, and health economics has tended 
to become equated with the use of published economic evaluation studies in healthcare 
decision-making, rather than the use of economics or the economic evaluation method 
per se (Hoffman and von der Schulenburg, 2000, Honigsbaum et al., 1995, McDonald, 
2002, Neumann, 2005). However, programme budgeting and marginal analysis 
(PBMA) offers a process for decision-making that is based on the same economic 
principles and foundations as economic evaluation and thus it has been advocated as an 
alternative approach that can overcome many of the problems associated with the use of 
economic evaluation in decision-making (Mooney, 1992). Indeed, as an early proponent 
of PBMA observed, the process would not in itself "provide answers to problems or 
make decisions for managers, displace management judgement, wisdom, or experience. 
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determine objectives, not judge performance". but "will enlighten major decision issues 
and help managers to manage better" (Novik, 1965, pg. 73). 
Research on PBMA has shown that it has been used in healthcare decision-making for 
almost three decades, in at least 70 health authorities across the UK, Australia, and 
Canada (Mitton and Donaldson, 2001). In the UK, there is evidence that PBMA was 
adopted by the health service in the 1970s for making decisions over the allocation of 
healthcare resources (Bevan et al., 1980, Perrin et al., 1978), although it was not 
established as a routine practice, and interest in PBMA seemed to wane. Following the 
purchaser-provider split in the early 1990s, PBMA again came to the fore. During this 
time,, several one-off applications of PBMA were conducted in specific healthcare 
service areas and localities (Ratcliffe et al., 1996, Scott et al., 1998, Craig et al., 1995, 
Twaddle and Walker, 1995, Ruta et al., 1996, Madden et al., 1995). Since then, research 
on PBMA in the UK has been limited, although some new applications have 
accompanied the formation of PCTs, the launch of the National Programme Budgeting 
Project, and the Department of Health's continued emphasis on achieving value for 
money in the health service (Wilson et al., 2007, Wilson et al., 2006, Brambleby, 2004, 
McIver et al., 2000). However, much of the research on PBMA has tended to rely 
heavily on academic input and simply sought to implement PBMA from the academic 
perspective. As a result, many of these studies reported problems with the 
implementation of PBMA that reflected those associated with economic evaluation 
above, and were unable to demonstrate the extent to which PBMA influenced decision- 
making and thus the management of scarce resources. 
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Nevertheless,, the seeming failure of health economic methods to impact on decision- 
making does not necessarily imply the failure of economics and economic principles per 
se. This thesis argues that research on use of economics in healthcare decision-making 
should focus on studying and understanding the context of decision-making and the 
broader management and organisational environment, and that any method has to fit 
alongside the pragmatic necessities of everyday decision-making in the 'real-world' and 
support decision-making on an on-going basis. Recent research, particularly in Canada 
and Australia, has led to a number of advances in the application of PBMA, and 
attempts have been made to ensure that it is less mechanistic than in the past, thereby 
recognising the need to balance pragmatic and ethical considerations with economic 
rationality (Patten et al., 2006, Duthie et al., 1999, Gibson et al., 2006b, Mitton and 
Donaldson, 2004). The research presented in this thesis attempts to explore the potential 
for using health economics in the context of the English NHS. Specifically, the research 
adopts a population perspective to decision-making, focussing on commissioning to 
study the use of health economics in the management of scarce resources, using PBMA 
as a vehicle. This research builds on that undertaken by McDonald in the UK which 
focussed solely on economic evaluation, to study the use of health economics and health 
economic principles more broadly in decision-making, and utilises and develops the 
research design and method employed by Patten et al. (Patten et al., 2006) in studying 
the use of PBMA in Canada. As such,, the research is unique in its application, not only 
in the UK context, but also internationally. 
1.3 Context 
This section outlines the context within which the research described in this thesis was 
conducted, providing an introduction to the English NHS and its organisation and 
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structure, the concept and role of commissioning in managing scarce healthcare 
resources and its origins and evolution through health service reforms. 
1.3.1 The English NHS 
The NHS in England can be described in terms of three main functions: setting the 
strategic direction for the NFIS, commissioning or purchasing health services for the 
population in line with the defined strategy, and providing or delivering the 
commissioned health services. These functions are fulfilled by the respective 
organisations that constitute the NHS. The Department of Health (DH), through the 
Secretary of State for Health, is ultimately responsible for the NHS and determining 
strategy, whereas the Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) are responsible for 
implementing strategy at the regional level. Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) and some 
General Practices are responsible for commissioning on behalf of defined geographical 
populations; and hospitals, General Practices, and private organisations are responsible 
for providing both secondary and primary care services. The present structure of the 
NHS in England is outlined in Figure 1.1. The focus of this thesis is on the 
commissioning function of the NHS, and more specifically the role of PCTs in 
undertaking and performing this commissioning function. 
1.3.2 Commissioning in the English NHS 
Commissioning has recently been defined by the Department of Health as "the means 
by which [the NHS] secure[s] the best value for patients and taxpayers", with best value 
defined as: "the best possible health outcomes, including: reduced health 'nequalities; 
the best possible healthcare; within the resources made available by the taxpayer- 
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(Department of Health, 2006, pg. 7). In other words, commissioning involves 
undertaking a set of activities that ensure that NHS resources are allocated fairly. 
effectively, and efficiently. However, commissioning is not new. 
Initially, the concept of commissioning in the health service was introduced in the 
reforms of 1989 (the White Paper, Working for Patients) and 1990 (the National Health 
Service and Community Care Act) (Levitt et al., 1999, Ham, 2004). It was under these 
reforms that the main purchasing and providing functions of the NHS were split. 
District Health Authorities, funded through resources allocated to them from the DH, 
were responsible for purchasing secondary healthcare services on behalf of the 
populations they served from a set of providers (primarily Hospital NHS Trusts). In 
addition, GP fundholders acted as both providers and purchasers of healthcare, able to 
purchase a limited range of services from other providers and managing their own 
budgets. Under these arrangements, the quality, quantity, and cost of the services 
purchased by the Health Authorities and GP fundholders had to be negotiated and 
explicitly stated in contractual arrangements with the Hospital NHS Trusts. It was noted 
by Ham and Robert (2003) that the purchaser-provider split transformed the context for 
organising and delivering healthcare services, shifting toward more explicit decision- 
making and accountability. This shift was also accompanied by a change in rhetoric, 
with terms such as commissioning, rationing, and priority setting being used to describe 
the 'New NHS' which could not provide everything for everyone (Hunter, 1993b, 
Klein, 1993, Klein, 1995). 
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further political reforms have continued to emphasise the role of 
commissioning. The election of the Labour Government in 1997 saw the introduction of 
a series of fundamental and comprehensive changes to the NHS -a 'New, New NHS'. 
In England the purchaser-provider split was maintained but the purchasing power was 
shifted from the District Health Authorities and GP fundholders to Primary Care Groups 
(and later, Primary Care Trusts (PCTs)) as a way of retaining the primary care led 
approach to commissioning introduced through fundholding combined with the 
population focus and strong accountability adopted by the District Health Authorities 
(Ham, 1997b). Established in 2002, initially 303 PCTs covered the entire population of 
England. Through mergers, this number has since been reduced to 152. The PCTs 
control around 80% of the total NHS budget (Talbot-Smith and Pollock, 2006) and, 
with a remit wider than that of the Health Authorities they replaced, they are charged 
with commissioning primary care, hospital, community and mental health services for 
their local communities (Department of Health, 2001). In fulfilling their commissioning 
role, PCTs are expected to: assess local health needs; plan and secure health services; 
improve health, within the framework of NHS standards and guidance; and remain 
accountable, through the SHA, to the Secretary of State (Department of Health, 2001). 
Above all, PCTs are also required to fulfil this role in line with the financial duties 
stipulated in the National Health Service Act 1999 (The National Health Service Act. 
Insertion 97D to the 1977 Health Act, 1999), which specified that a PCT's expenditure 
should not exceed its income. 
The reforms were intended to produce stronger commissioning bodies and more 
effective services in the longer term (Audit Commission, 2008). However. these 
reforms have been met xvith a mixed response and the extent to , N-hich commissioning 
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has been active in PCTs has been questioned by several commentators (Smith and 
Mays, 2005, Ham, 2006, Harding, 2006, Maynard and Street, 2006, National Audit 
Office and Audit Commission, 2006, Smith et al., 2004). Indeed, this is reflected in the 
healthcare performance assessments conducted by the Healthcare Commission in 
England. In 2006,92% of PCTs scored 'fair' or 'weak' for use of resources (based on 
an analysis of PCT financial management, financial standing, and value for money); and 
no PCT achieved a score of 'excellent' (Healthcare Commission, 2006). Moreover, a 
greater proportion of lower scores was achieved by PCTs in the latest annual health 
check by the Healthcare Commission which included the PCTs use of resources derived 
from the Audit Commission's Auditors' Local Evaluation (Audit Commission, 2008). 
Despite the crudeness of this type of assessment, these figures highlight that PCTs have 
struggled to manage resources. Furthermore, at the end of the financial year of 2005/6 
the NHS recorded a gross deficit of GBPf 1.2billion which was explained by poor 
central management, lack of financial management skills, poor information, and lack of 
ownership of plans within individual organisations (King's Fund, 2006, House of 
Commons Health Committee, 2006, Bamford, 2005, Maynard and Street, 2006). 
Additionally, the struggle to manage resources has been recognised by some in the 
English NHS who have responded by calling for ways to better manage the delivery and 
organisation of healthcare services and resources whilst explicitly accounting for the 
political and structural context within which they work (Edwards et al., 2006. Goodwin, 
2006a, Goodwin, 2006b, Edwards, 2006a). Nevertheless, these concerns are not new. 
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The problem of the management of scarce resources in the NHS has existed since its 
conception some 60 years ago. However, until the recent launch of the World Class 
Commissioning initiative in late 2007 (Department of Health, 2007), there has been 
little guidance from the DH on how to manage scarce resources and, thereby, how to 
commission effectively, by achieving best value for patients and taxpayers through 
ensuring that NHS resources are allocated fairly, effectively, and efficiently. To some 
extent this is probably because there is little consensus among politicians or the 
academic community on the appropriate way to manage healthcare resources (Hunter, 
1993a, Hunter, 1995, Klein et al., 1996, Ham and Robert, 2003, McCulloch, 2003, 
Mitton and Donaldson, 2004, Klein, 1995, Klein, 1998). 
1.4 Justification for the research 
It has been argued above that health service commissioning is about ensuring that NHS 
resources are allocated fairly, effectively, and efficiently. However, PCTs responsible 
for commissioning have had little guidance on commissioning and are therefore 
struggling to take on the role, and are consequently failing to adequately manage scarce 
resources. However, health economics seemingly provides a theoretically valid, 
4 rational', and systematic set of principles for managing scarcity, but has been shown to 
be difficult to apply in practice and has had a limited impact in the 'real-world'. 
Reflecting on the uptake of health economics and the translation of health economic 
evidence into practice, Maynard concluded by suggesting that: "the health economist 
has to be the imperialist, drawing the ignorant into enlightenment... " (Maynard, 2006, 
pg. 4-10). However. if health economics is to have any impact on managint, scarcit,,,, in 
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practice, the challenge faced by health economists is surely that of translating health 
economic principles into management practices that recognise scarcit), and the 
intricacies of NHS commissioning and decision-making. This thesis therefore argues 
that the health economist should be anything but an "imperialist" and that, just as 
decision-makers may need to better understand how to apply health economic methods, 
then health economists may need to better understand the context in which these 
methods are or are not being used. Moreover, by acknowledging the importance of 
contextual factors and the pragmatics of commissioning, health economists may be able 
to identify the barriers faced by decision-makers in adopting their methods in practice 
which can then be addressed in adapting them for future use. Indeed, as Jan et al. (2003) 
assert: "because health economic analysis has tended to be largely normative, there has 
generally been a lack of appreciation of why such decision making sometimes 'fails"', 
therefore studies "that examine economic decision-making within its institutional 
context" offer "greater insight into why such failure occurs and ultimately provide a 
more realistic basis for decision-making" (Jan et al., 2003, pg. 434). As such, Mooney 
and Wiseman (1999) state that "health economists ... [need to] look into the decision- 
makers' minds and to try to understand what the objective function is with which they 
are working". Significantly, undertaking such research requires health economists to 
consider alternative research paradigms to those they have become aligned with or 
adopted, drawing heavily upon qualitative, as opposed to quantitative, research, and 
fostering an interactive and iterative approach. 
The research presented in this thesis therefore focussed on working within and 
alongside an NFIS commissioning organisation to identify and understand how 
commissioning was organised, and to explore the potential for the use of health 
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economics, using PBMA as a vehicle to study., through a range of qualitative research 
methods, how health economics can be informed by, and inform, the management of 
scarce resources in the 'real-world'. 
1.5 Research questions 
Following from above, the aim of the research was about understanding and developing 
the use of economics in the management of scarce healthcare resources, using PBMA as 
a vehicle to introduce economic principles into the commissioning process. Specifically, 
the research attempted to answer the following questions: 
1. What are the main approaches to managing scarcity in theory? 
2. How is scarcity managed in PCTs and through commissioning practice? 
3. Can economic principles to managing scarcity be incorporated into commissioning 
practice? 
In order to answer these questions, the objectives of this research are: 
To identify approaches to managing scarcity in the health services research, 
management, economics, and ethics literatures. 
To examine PCT decision-makers' views on managing scarcity and commissioning 
- specifically how commissioning is understood in principle, and how this translates 
in practice. 
To develop, implement, and observe the application of PBMA as a framework for 
managing scarcity to fit with the organisational structure of PCTs, and to account 
for the barriers and facilitators of such implementation. 
To evaluate how the PBMA framework is interpreted and reconstructed by users 
within the PCT and whether the use of the framework results in improved process 
and management of scarce resources. 
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1.6 Research design 
The first of the research objectives involved conducting a literature review to identify I 
current approaches to managing scarcity in the health services research, management, 
economics, and ethics literature. The remaining three objectives formed the substantive 
part of the research for this thesis. In order to address these objectives a qualitative 
research design was adopted, utilising a participatory action research (PAR) approach as 
a framework for conducting and presenting the research that enables the iterative 
development and implementation, and refinement of PBMA through the research 
process. The PAR consisted of three phases of research to study PBMA prior to, during, 
and after its introduction into the commissioning organisation. At each phase, 
qualitative methods of data collection and analysis were used. These phases are 
illustrated in Figure 1.2, and discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. In Phase 1, the 
current organisational context, processes, and practices into which PBMA (as the focus 
of change) was being introduced was examined using in-depth one-to-one interviews 
with decision-makers to identify how commissioning was undertaken in theory and 
practice, and to gather their reflections on current commissioning processes. In Phase 11, 
PBMA was introduced into one healthcare organisation and developed iteratively and 
interactively with decision-makers, stakeholders, and researchers. Ethnographic 
approaches were used to observe the implementation of PBMA in terms of the 
capplication and ada tation of PBMA to the organisational context, organisational 'r 
p 
dynamics, participation and motivation, and potential challenges to implementation. In 
Phase 111, focus groups with the decision-makers and stakeholders, involved in the 
research were used to gather reflections on the PBMA process, identifying specific 
challenges to implementing PBMA, suggestions for refinement of the process, and the 
prospects for the long term sustainability of PBMA in the organisation. 
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The research took place during 2004-2007 and focused on one healthcare region in the 
North of England. At the time, the PCTs in the region were responsible for 
commissioning healthcare for population of approximately 1.4 million people and, in 
2004, held a combined annual operating budget of approximately GBf 1.9 billion. 
During the research there were several on-going changes in management and policy that 
impacted upon the organisation studied. In particular, changes such as the introduction 
of performance assessment and the use of star ratings by the Commissioning for Health 
Improvement (later Healthcare Commission), affected the stability of the organisation, 
the behaviour of those working within the organisation, and the research. 
Figure 1.2 PAR Phases 
YEAR PAR PHASE POLICY AND ORGANISATIONAL EVENTS 
Identification of 
current approaches to 
C managing scarcity 
C 
ig and examination of 
C 0 
CL r- M current C14 M commissioning LU 
U) context: literature 
review and interview 
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CM (a Introduction and 
CM U observation of PBMA Ln ;4 U Cc (0 in commisisoning 0 0 0) consortium: 
Lu ethnographic 
C/) methods 
3: 0 
0) Identification of 
W 0) C challenges and 
reflections for 
04 refinement of PBMA: 
C focus group methods 
0 
IM 
C 
U 
r- LLJ Cl) Write up 
CM 
Local PCTs form Commissioning Consortium 
Introduction of patient forums 
Introduction of the Commisison for Healthcare Audit and Inspection (CHI) 
First wave of Foundation Trusts established 
Commissioning Consortium moves into own premises 
First National Programme Budget data available 
Modernisation Agency replaced by NHS Institue for Improvement and Innovation 
Introduction of Independent Treatment Centres 
Introduction of direct payments in social care 
Local Delivery Plans submitted to SHA 
General election, new health secretary appointed 
NHS financial deficit announced 
Introduction of Payment by Results National Tariffs 
Introduction of Practice Based Commissioning 
CHI replaced by the Healthcare Commission 
Commissioning Consortium Chief Execuitve leaves (interim appointed) 
Number of SHAs reduced from 28 to 9 
Number of PCTs reduced from 303 to 152 
Interim CE leaves Commissionning Consortium (another interim appointed) 
Replacement of Patient Forums with Local Invovlement Networks 
Introduction of World Class Commissioning 
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1.6.1 Methodological issues 
Although the focus of this research is on studying commissioning and the use of health 
economics frameworks (specifically PBMA) in commissioning, a number of 
methodological issues are also of interest. The use of qualitative research in the study of 
health economics is not widespread and this study is unique in its application of the 
PAR methodology to PCT commissioning. In this research, the methods of data 
collection and analysis extend beyond a simple descriptive analysis to the analytical, to 
explore underlying tensions in the use of economics in commissioning. Moreover, the 
use of PAR in this research builds upon previous work that has attempted to use 
qualitative research in the study of health economics but has stopped short of addressing 
the implications for health economics (McDonald, 2002). The focus of this research is 
on action and interaction, not just explanation. The research is therefore also concerned 
with developing PBMA methods and adapting them to meet the needs of decision- 
makers for commissioning who are collaboratively involved in undertaking the 
research. 
1.7 Contributions of the thesis to research and policy 
As a result of the research, this thesis offers the following contributions to both health 
economics and health policy: 
Development of a comprehensive thick description and a new conceptual model of 
PCT commissioning in England. 
Advancement of the use of rigorous qualitative research in health economics 
through the unique application of a participatory observation approach to study the 
use of economic principles in the context of PCT commissioning in England. 
Advancement of the PBMA literature from the use of PBMA as a method or 'tool' 
for decision-making, to the use of PBMA as a vehicle for introducing economics 
into the decision-making process in an iterative and inclusive way. 
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Development of general lessons for the application of economics and PBMA, not 
only with respect to PCT commissioning but in any context that requires the 
management of scarce resources. 
1.8 Thesis outline 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of 
economic theory as applied to the management and allocation of scarce resources, and 
critiques approaches used to manage scarcity in practice identified from the literature. In 
this chapter, PBMA is highlighted as an approach that adheres to economic principles 
and thus offers a potential vehicle through which economic principles can be applied in 
the management of scarce healthcare resources in practice. Chapter 3 outlines the 
methodology and methods adopted in studying the application of PBMA, advancing the 
use of qualitative methods in health economics. The research adopts a qualitative 
4 
approach, and is unique in its application of PAR to the context of PCT commissioning 
in England to study the iterative development of the use of economic principles, through 
the vehiclf- of PBMA. The PAR framework is conducted in three phases, studying 
PBMA prior to, during, and after its introduction into a commissioning organisation. 
Chapter 4 presents the results from the interviews undertaken in the first phase of the 
PAR. This chapter provides a thick description of the current commissioning context 
and the constraints inherent in the commissioning process, which led to the 
development of a new conceptual model for commissioning. Chapter 5 presents the 
results from the first part of the second phase of the PAR, and describes the 
implementation of the action (PBMA) as it was applied within the commissioning 
organisation. Chapter 6 reports the results from the second part of the second phase of 
PAR. This chapter draws on the analysis of the observation of the implementation of 
PBMA to build an account of how PBMA was applied, how it was received,, and how it 
Nvas adapted. In addition, this chapter also presents the results from focus groups 
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undertaken in the third phase of the PAR to reflect on the challenges of implementing I 
PBMA. Finally, Chapter 7 presents a discussion of the results of the thesis along Nvith 
the methodological limitations of the research and the implications for policy and future 
research,, identifying some general lessons for the application of economics with respect 
to PCT commissioning and in other contexts involving the management of scarce 
resources. 
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Chapter 2 Managing scarcity in theory and practice: a critical 
review of the economics and health services 
literature 
2.1 Chapter overview 
The previous chapter (Chapter 1. Introduction), introduced the notion that healthcare 
resources are scarce and that choices over the use of resources have to be made and 
managed accordingly. Furthermore, the previous chapter also advocates economics, as a 
discipline founded on the study of choice under scarcity, as providing the theory and 
hence potentially some solutions to help guide such choices. Indeed, in the words of 
Drummond and Donaldson (2003) "in the land of blind decision-making" the "one-eyed 
econornisfi may be king. 
This is not to say that economics will provide an easy solution to making difficult 
choices over scarce resources. On the contrary, the economic theory, economic 
principles, and approaches discussed throughout this chapter are not designed to replace 
such decision-making, but merely aid it. In this sense, what is being argued here is that 
economics provides an appropriate normative basis for decision-making from which 
further judgements must be made. 
The rest of this chapter focuses specifically on a review of econom1c theory and the 
inherent principles embedded xvithin it, as It applies to the management and allocation 
of scarce resources. Following this, approaches to managing scarcity are identified from 
the national and international literature in health services research, management, 
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economics, and ethics; and are critiqued with respect to whether they ftilfil these key 
principles - the logic presented here being that failure to do so will result in the failure 
to manage scarcity. This narrow focus was adopted on the basis that the thesis is 
primarily interested in examining the use of economic principles in decision-making, 
recognising the complexity of the environment in which they are applied. However. it is 
recognised that additional economic literature relating to decision-making theory more 
broadly may also be of relevance, particularly in explaining the complex environment in 
which decision-makers operate. Of interest is the literature around individual (decision- 
maker) behaviour that is explored in the theories of rational decision-making and 
agency relationships in decision-making. 
In brief, the former of these theories argues that according to classical decision-making, 
decision-makers know all the alternatives for dealing with a particular decision-making 
problem, the utilities and values of these alternatives, and are able to articulate their 
preferences for the alternatives (Sloman, 1997). However, this rational model of 
decision-making has been criticised by many who argue that individual decision- 
making (particularly in the health service) involves "satisficing" (choosing the set of 
alternatives that is good enough) (Simon, 1947) or "muddling through" (choosing 
alternatives on the basis of making incremental changes) (Lindblom, 1959, Maddox, 
197 1). In terms of agency relationships in decision-making, it is argued that agents 
(employees of the firm, or in health, decision-makers employed by health care 
organisations to act on behalf the population or citizens (Coast, 2001)) will not 
necessarily always act in the best interests of the citizens. Indeed the agent may choose 
to select alternatives in order to pursue their own goals or objectives that are different to 
those of the citizens (in other words, they maximise their own utility rather than that of 
the citizen) (Donaldson and Gerard, 2005, Lipsey, 1975, Coast, 2001). Common 
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solutions identified to tackle this problem include the use of Incentives to induce agents 
into behaving in the citizens' interests. 
The intention is not to review the theories of rational decision-making and agency 
relationships in depth in this chapter rather they are further discussed when interpreting 
and discussing the findings from the thesis in light of this literature in Chapter 7. 
2.2 Managing scarcity using economic theory 
As noted earlier (Chapter I Introduction), the basic economic problem of managing the 
allocation of resources is borne from the notion that societal resources are scarce and 
that choices about the use of these resources have to be made. In economic terms these 
choices are broadly concerned with the use of resources in terms of the production and 
consumption of goods and services, and include decisions about what goods and 
services should be produced, how they should be produced, and who should receive 
them (how they are distributed) (Morris, 1998). The standard economic response to 
resolving such decisions is rooted within market theory. This section outlines the theory 
of the market to illustrate the key inherent principles that lead to the optimal allocation 
of resources and goes on to show that market failure in healthcare results in the 
modification of these principles. Although market failure is generally accepted by health 
economists, the replacement of the market by an NFIS (in the case of the UK), does not 
eliminate scarcity and the need to make choices. As such, some market principles can be 
applied in the more social decision-making context of the NHS. It is therefore important 
to understand the market and the origin of these principles. 
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2.2.1 The market 
A market can be defined as any institution where parties can communicate with each 
other to buy and sell goods and services (Morris, 1998). The market is a mechanism 
through which society can address the basic problem of resource scarcity and solve the 
questions about what goods to produce, how, and for whom (Lipsey, 1975). Markets are 
therefore desirable as, in theory, they lead to an optimal use of limited resources. In a 
market, decisions about the allocation of resources are taken by individual agents, 
namely producers and consumers. Producers supply goods and services to consumers 
who will demand and purchase goods and services in line with their preferences (wants 
and desires). The supply and demand of goods and services is regulated through 
adjustments in the quantity and price at which goods or services are produced and 
consumed (Ison, 1996). 
In a perfect market, producers aim to maximise their individual welfare (by producing 
the goods supplied at a profit) and consumers aim to maximise their individual welfare 
(by consuming the goods that they demand at a price that they are willing to pay). At 
the point where demand equals supply, both producers and consumers are satisfied by 
the exchange of services and the market is referred to as being in equilibrium 
(Donaldson and Gerard, 2005). When demand does not equal supply, consumers and 
producers respond to this through adjustments in the quantities and price of goods and 
services produced and consumed. Where a good is in excess demand (i. e. the quantity 
demanded is greater than the quantity supplied, at a given price), this indicates that more 
consumers (than can obtain the good) value the good as equal to or in excess of the 
price. Producers, recognising this. will therefore respond to this signal by Increasing the 
price of the good, which due to an increase in the profits obtained from producing the 
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good will, in turn, lead to an increase in supply of the good and an increase in costs to 
cover production. When the price of the good increases, demand for it will decrease 
because not as many consumers as before will value the good as equal to or in excess of 
the new price. Changes in the quantities supplied and demanded continue to expand and 
contract until the two are equal and demand equals supply (Donaldson and Gerard, 
2005,, Morris,, 1998, Lipsey, 1975). 
Embedded in the theory of the market are three important economic concepts which are 
outlined in detail here and revisited throughout this chapter. These are opportunity cost, 
the margin, and efficiency. 
Opportunity cost 
The concept of opportunity cost is derived from the notion that when having to make 
choices over scarce resources certain opportunities will be taken up while others must 
be left (or forgone). A decision to use resources in one way means that an opportunity to 
use those resources in an alternative way is forgone (Mooney, 1992). The opportunity 
cost is the forgone opportunity associated with the next best use of resources (Lipsey, 
1975). 
In the market, when consumers choose to allocate resources to some goods or services 
they also pass up the opportunity of consuming other goods or services. Similarly, when 
producers choose to allocate resources to the production of some goods or services, they 
pass up the opportunity to produce other goods or services. The opportunltý- cost of a 
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decision to invest resources one way is equal to the quantity of the other good that could 
have been consumed or produced (Lipsey, 1975). In a perfect market where consumers 
strive to maximise their own welfare, and producers strive to maximise profit, 
consumers and suppliers implicitly minimise opportunity costs. 
The concept of opportunity costs emphasises the importance of considering (and 
valuing) alternative uses of scarce resources in making choices about such uses. 
The margin 
Decisions by consumers and producers about how much of good to consume and how 
much of good to produce are made at what economists refer to as 'the margin' 
(Mooney, 1992). Strictly the margin refers to the difference when one additional or one 
less unit of something is observed (Mitton and Donaldson, 2004). The decision about 
whether the extra unit is worthwhile (producing or consuming) is considered in terms of 
the opportunity costs arising through additional consumption and production (Lipsey, 
1975). Such trade-offs are, in a perfect market, made at the individual level. 
In consumption, the additional (marginal) satisfaction that consumers derive from 
consuming a good tends to fall as the quantity consumed increases. In other words, the 
satisfaction derived from consuming the first unit of a good is greater than the 
additional satisfaction derived from consuming each subsequent unit. In line with 
maximising their own welfare, consumers will therefore allocate scarce resources in 
such a way that the marginal satisfaction derived from consuming a mix of goods is 
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equal for all goods. Where the marginal satisfaction of consuming the last quantity of a 
good is lower than the marginal satisfaction that could be obtained from consuming 
another good (at the same price), the opportunity cost of consuming more of the first is 
too great and consumers will move resources in such a way to consume more of the 
second good from which more satisfaction can be derived (Ison, 1996, Morris, 1998, 
Lipsey, 1975). 
In production, the additional cost (marginal cost) of producing additional quantities of 
goods increases with each additional quantity of good produced. Producers, in line with 
achieving profit maximisation, will allocate scarce resources in such a way that they 
invest in the mix of goods where the additional costs of producing each of the goods is 
equal to or lower than the price at which it is sold. Where the marginal cost of 
producing the last quantity of a good exceeds the price of the good, the producer will 
make a loss. The opportunity cost of allocating resources in this way is too great, and 
producers will shift these resources into the production of another good where a profit 
can be made, or, where several profit-making goods are involved, where greater returns 
can be made (Lipsey, 1975, Morris, 1998, Ison, 1996). 
Efficiency 
Put simply efficiency is "about getting the most out of the resources available" 
(Mooney, 1992. pg. 8). Achieving efficiency is inextricably linked to the concept of 
opportunity cost because in order to get the most from available resources, opportunity 
costs are minimised (Donaldson and Gerard. 2005). In economics it is possible to 
distinguish between two types of efficiency: technical (or operational) efficiency - 
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concerned with whether resources are used efficiently in the production of goods and 
services; and allocative efficiency - concerned with whether resources are allocated 
efficiently across the different goods and services produced. 
Strictly, technical efficiency is about achieving a given level of output for minimum 
input (cost) or a maximum level of output for a given level of input (cost) (Mitton and 
Donaldson, 2004). Technical efficiency is achieved when it is not possible to reallocate 
resources to produce a given output with less of (at least) one input and no more of 
another (Gravelle and Rees, 1992). 
Allocative efficiency is about whether something is worth doing given its opportunity 
cost (Mitton and Donaldson, 2004). In other words, whether the benefit from the use of 
resources to produce a bundle of goods or services is greater than the best alternative 
use of those resources. Allocative efficiency is achieved when it is not possible to 
reallocate resources in such a way to make at least any individual in society better off 
without simultaneously making anyone else worse off (Lipsey, 1975). 
In the perfect market, consumers, aiming to maximise their welfare through the 
satisfaction that they derive from the consumption of goods, will allocate resources to 
the bundle of goods from which they can derive most satisfaction from the resources 
available, thus achieving allocative efficiency. At the same time, producers. seeking to 
maximise profits, will compete for consumers and respond to demand by supplying the 
goods valued by consumers at the lowest possible price. thus achieving technical 
efficiency by maximising output xvith respect to cost or minimising cost with respect to 
output. In this situation there is no waste in the system - everý-thing supplied is 
demanded and vice-versa, and what is supplied is done so at minimum cost. At 
equilibrium, the market provides an optimal solution for the allocation of scarce 
resources that minimises opportunity costs through decisions and implied 'analysis' at 
the margin, and is technically and allocatively efficient (Donaldson and Gerard, 2005). 
2.2.2 Market failure in healthcare 
In order to achieve such optimal outcomes, perfect markets require five main conditions 
to hold: several small suppliers to promote genuine competition, perfect knowledge, 
certainty, no externalities, and consumers acting free of self-interested advice from 
suppliers (Dolan and Olsen, 2002, Donaldson and Gerard, 2005). However, in the 
context of healthcare, these conditions rarely exist and healthcare markets have been 
shown to be characterised by monopolistic power, imperfect knowledge, uncertainty, 
externalities, and exploitation (Morris, 1998, McGuire et al., 1988, Evans, 1984, 
Donaldson and Gerard, 2005). Since perfect market conditions do not hold, the use of 
markets in healthcare fails as an efficient method of allocating resources. The extent of 
market failure raises issues about whether and how the basic economic theories of 
supply and demand can be applied to or modified for healthcare. 
The dominant paradigm through which these issues are constructed is that of welfare 
economics. Welfare economics is concerned with judging the desirability of a particular 
social situation. The normative propositions underlying welfare economics state that the 
desirability of situations should be judged solely upon the level of welfare attainable bv I 
the group(s) of individuals affected (Varian, 1996). Central to welfare economics are 
31 
tools for measuring welfare and judging whether such situations are desirable 
(Johansson, 1997). The basic value judgement used in welfare economics to determine 
whether one situation is more or less socially desirable than another is that of Pareto 
optimality. The principle states that a situation will be socially desirable if some 
individual(s) are made better off without making others worse off (Gravelle and Rees, 
1992). Therefore a Pareto optimal solution is one where societal resources are allocated 
in such a way that individual(s) welfare cannot be increased without simultaneously 
decreasing the welfare of other individual(s). A Pareto optimal allocation of resources is 
both technically and allocatively efficient (Donaldson and Gerard, 2005). 
However, Pareto optimality says nothing about the desirability of a situation where 
some individuals(s) in society are made better off whilst others are made worse off. The 
Pareto optimality principle was therefore revised by Kaldor and Hicks who argued that 
one state could be meaningfully judged as better than another from an economics 
perspective using the compensation principles which say that a state is considered to be 
a potential Pareto improvement if those gaining can hypothetically compensate those 
who lose and still remain better off (Gravelle and Rees, 1992, Johansson, 1997). In 
other words, welfare improvements to gainers have to be large enough to hypothetically 
compensate the welfare lost by those losing. In theory, nobody is worse off and society 
overall is better off, although in reality some individuals may in fact be made worse off. 
Therefore, some Pareto optimal allocations may not be socially desirable if we also 
assume that society is concemed with other values about what may be desirable such as 
equity and what is 'just' (Mooney, 1992, Reinhardt, 1992). These considerations require 
additional value judgements about whether equal shares are preferred to greater overall 
health gain (as an example) when deciding whether one distribution of resources is 
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better than another (Dolan and Olsen. 2002). Such equity arguments therefore 
necessarily compromise efficiency (in the Pareto sense). 
The relative weight given to these considerations depends on the extent to xN-hich 
notions of efficiency and equity can be traded-off. One way in which such trade-offs 
can be determined is through the specification of a social welfare function (of one form 
or another), which can capture the welfare effects of a particular allocation of resources 
through some interpersonal comparison of the welfare effects on individuals (as 
members of society) for that allocation and individual preferences for that distribution 
(Varian, 1996). Although it has been shown that a consistent ranking of social states is 
untenable (Arrow, 1978), social welfare functions (modified by relaxing some of the 
strict conditions on the ordering of social preferences) nevertheless provide a useful 
basis for comparing'the effects of resource allocation decisions and thus evaluating 
welfare impacts of potential state changes (decisions) upon and within society 
(Johansson, 1997). 
Welfare theory underpins all health economic approaches to evaluating decisions about 
the use and allocation of healthcare resources (Hauck et al., 2003). Welfare effects are 
captured in terms of measures of benefits and costs, benefits being what is gained (in 
the broadest sense by individuals and society overall) from meeting a particular 
healthcare need, and costs being the benefit that would have been obtained from an 
bA philosophical discussion of what constitutes benefit and how this is captured is beyond the remit of 
this thesis. Suffice to say that benefit can be broadly defined in terms of welfare or narrowly defined in 
terms of honing in on some specific attributes that constitute welfare. Different perspectives 
. are adopted 
in the various forms of evaluations conducted in health econornics. For a comprehensive summary of 
these arguments see Sloan, F. A. (1996) Valuing Health Care: costs, benefits, and effectiveness of 
pharmaceuticals and other medical technologies. Cambridge: Cambridge Unlversitý' Press. 
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alternative use of those resources - or opportunity costs (Jefferson et al., 2000, 
Drummond et al., 2005). The focus of benefit and cost measures is at the margin which 
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refers to the additional unit of benefit gained or lost (i. e., marginal benefit), or the 
additional unit of cost invested or disinvested (i. e., marginal cost), for alternative 
competing allocations of resources. This focus avoids having to measure all the costs 
and benefits of all existing healthcare activities on an ongoing basis. An efficient 
allocation of resources is one which increases social welfare by deploying resources in 
such a way so as to maximise benefit for a given level of resource input or achieve the 
same level of benefit for a reduction in the amount of resource input both within (to 
achieve technical efficiency) and across (to achieve allocative efficiency) programmes 
of healthcare (Donaldson and Gerard, 2005). Using these principles, all other things 
being equal, benefit can be maximised within the constraints of a fixed budget (i. e. an 
efficient allocation of resources can be achieved) if resources are allocated away from 
those healthcare activities where, at the margin, the opportunity costs outweigh the 
benefits gained, and towards healthcare activities where, at the margin, the benefits 
gained are equal to or outweigh the opportunity costs. 
The extent to which the economic principles of opportunity cost, the margin, and 
efficiency are realised, implicitly or explicitly, in current approaches to healthcare 
resource allocation and prioritisation decision-making is considered below. 
2.3 From economic theory to practice 
The folloxving sections examine how approaches to managing scarcity reported in the 
literature compare in terms of whether or not they adhere to the above principles. To 
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identify these approaches a number of databases were searched. The core bibliographic 
databases used were: OVID (MEDLINE) (1966-), EMBASE (1980-), science citation 
index (198 1 -), social sciences citation index (198 1 -), arts and humanities citation index 
(1981-). In addition, Cambridge Scientific Abstracts (CSA) and EconLIT were used. 
Though not a systematic review, a search strategy was used, formulated using 
combinations of controlled vocabulary (including MESH headings where available) and 
free text terms. Furthermore, bibliographic searching was supplemented by citation 
searching of key articles and reviewing references from key texts. Texts were reviewed 
with regard to their suitability and stored in the bibliographic software package Endnote 
(http: //www. endnote. com). 
Approaches in the literature were identified on the basis that they provided a method or 
set of tools or principles for guiding the management of scarcity. Approaches for 
evaluating the process of managing scarcity such as accountability for reasonableness 
(Daniels, 2000), were not included. The approaches identified could be broadly divided 
into economic approaches and health service approaches. Economic approaches were: 
economic evaluation, quality adjusted life year (QALY) league tables, and programme 
budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA). Health service approaches were: needs 
assessment, core services, national policy guidelines, and balanced score card. The 
background to and a critique of each of these approaches is presented in turn below. 
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2.3.1 Economic evaluation 
Background 
The term 'economic evaluation' encompasses the techniques of cost-effectiveness 
analysis (CEA), cost-utility analysis (CUA), and cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
(Drummond et al., 2005). When used appropriately, the primary strengths of these 
evaluations are that both costs and outcomes are considered, and that one treatment can 
be directly compared with another in terms of incremental gains for incremental 
resources expended. This ensures that changes in costs and benefits are the key 
outcomes (Donaldson and Gerard, 2005). CEA and CUA are most commonly used in 
health technology assessments to determine the 'cost-effectiveness' of medical 
interventions (Birch and Gafni, 2007b, Bryan et al., 2006). They are presented as being 
concerned with maximising health gains from the use of available resources (or getting 
'the biggest bang for the bucks' spent). The analytical tool used in such analysis is the 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) -a 'measure' of the relative cost- 
effectiveness of an intervention as compared with (usually) current practice. This is 
calculated as being the difference in costs between the intervention under evaluation and 
the current approach (the incremental cost) divided by the difference in outcomes 
(benefits (commonly assessed using QALYs)) between the intervention under 
evaluation and the current approach (the incremental benefit) (Gold et al., 1996). The 
results of such analysis are usually presented in two ways to determine the cost 
effectiveness of interventions. First, interventions can be compared by ranking them by 
ICER alongside other claims on resources. Those ranking higher are relatively more 
cost effective than those lower in the table (see reference to QALY league tables below, 
section 2.3.2) (Lord et al., 2004). Second, interventions can be compared to a critical 
threshold value which, in attempting to maximise the health benefits from available c 
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resources, should represent the marginal opportunity cost of the resources available (i. e. 
the decision-makers' budget) (Lord 2004). 
Critique 
The use of QALYs and ICERs in decision-making has been the subject of recent debate, 
renewed due to the prominence of economic evaluation in health technology assessment 
processes such as those adopted by NICE. These debates are well rehearsed in the 
literature, in particular by Neumann (Neumann, 2005), and Birch and Gafni (Birch and 
Gafni, 2006a,, Birch and Gafni, 2006b, Gafni and Birch, 2006, Birch and Gafni, 2007b, 
Birch and Gafni, 2007a) and are surnmarised here. 
First, it is argued that the objectives of the decision-maker may not be aligned with 
those that underlie the calculation of the ICER in CEA. Birch and Gafni (2006a) 
highlight that whilst 'getting the biggest bang for the bucks spent' appears to reflect the 
needs of the decision-maker, using the ICER to maximise health gains from available 
resources is restricted to certain conditions which do not hold in the settings faced by 
healthcare decision-makers. Citing Doubilet, Birch and Gafni (2006a) argue that "there 
is no theoretical justification for asserting that the strategy with the lowest cost 
effectiveness ratio (i. e. the one that yields the greatest benefits per dollars spent) is the 
most desirable one". Specifically, the assumptions underlying the ICER approach 
require that interventions are divisible and exhibit constant returns to scale. This asserts 
that interventions can be purchased in incremental units that produce a constant level of 
output (i. e. benefit) irrespective of the number of units purchased, an assumption that is 
argued to be invalid in most (if not all) decision-making settings (Birch and Gafni. 
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2006b). Therefore, when the theoretical assumptions do not hold, there is no guarantee 
that using the ICER as a basis for decision-making will result in resources being used in 
ways to maximise health benefits. 
Second,, the notion of affordability is not considered within the calculation of the ICER 
but is adjunct to it. The ICER essentially represents the average incremental cost of 
additional health gains (Birch and Gafni, 2006b). The danger of this is that study 
authors will often state that a given treatment is 'cost-effective' because of a 
'favourable' or low ICER value (one which falls below some critical threshold) 
(Donaldson et al., 2002). However, in reality, the ICER is defined by additional health 
gains that come at additional cost and if a more cost-effective treatment is also more 
costly, it cannot be simPly substituted for a less cost effective treatment. Instead, given 
that the extra resources have to come at the expense of some other treatment or service, 
an opportunity cost results. Indeed, continuing to implement 'cost-effective' 
interventions without consideration of whether they can be afforded within the 
constraints of limited resources, may actually result in an inefficient allocation of 
resources and increasing expenditure (Sassi, 2003, Gafni and Birch, 2006, House of 
Commons Health Committee, 2008). Only through further examination, comparing the 
given treatment option with other uses of those additional resources can information be 
obtained about whether or not the treatment should be implemented. Failure to go to this 
next step, and make an explicit comparison, means that opportunity costs are not 
explicitly considered. In this regard it is not clear whether resources directed to an 
intervention that is deemed to be *cost-effective' is the best of use of the available 
resources compared to other options that may have a claim on those resources. 
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Third, using QALYs in the calculation of the ICER restricts the benefits considered in 
economic evaluation to health gains only. However, it has been shown that maximising 
health output is not the single objective of decision-makers, that other objectives need to 
be taken into consideration, and other values such as distributional aspects (i. e. equity 
considerations) are important in the allocation of healthcare resources (Coast, 2004). 
As suggested earlier, the ICER approach has been adopted by decision-making bodies 
in several countries and has reportedly resulted in the institutionalisation of economics 
as a basis for decision-making - with NICE assuming the auspicious title of being the 
most discussed example (Birch and Gafni, 2007b, Birch and Gafni, 2007a). However a 
cursory review of evidence pertaining to the 'success' of this approach in terms of 
supporting decision-making and managing scarcity reveals several issues. 
First, the recommendations put forward by NICE only represent a small proportion of 
the health budget (as analysis has tended to be limited to drugs and medical devices, and 
particularly emerging, rather than existing technologies). Second, few of the 
technologies considered by NICE result in outright rejections to fund them. Lastly, the 
implementation of NICE guidance has been patchy (Buxton, 2006, Harris et al., 2001). 
Reasons for the lack of implementation of NICE guidance reflect those discussed in the 
critique above and include the argument that NICE recommendations often require 
investment, yet NICE makes no recommendations as to where the resources to fund the 
implementation of such recommendations are to come from (Barrett et al., 2006). This 
failure to explicitly recognise the opportunity costs of recommendations may therefore 
inadvertently lead to increases in expen itures and ultimately the cut back of resources 
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from healthcare activities for which there is no NICE guidance or no evidence on cost- 
effectiveness. Indeed, it has been reported that f 575million of additional NHS funding 
was absorbed by NICE recommendations in the first few years of its existence (Birch 
and Gafni, 2007b). Whether the reallocation of resources to fund NICE 
recommendations has resulted in a more efficient healthcare service is far from clear. 
Furthermore, other than at the national level such as that represented by NICE, the use 
of traditional economic evaluations generally have a poor track record of adoption in 
healthcare decision-making in practice. Research on the use of economic evaluations by 
decision-makers in practice has highlighted several barriers to the adoption of economic 
methods which include difficulties in accessing pertinent information, a lack of 
interpretation skills, the supply of information in a timely fashion, and the relevance of 
the information as it pertains to a given local decision-making context (Neumann, 2005, 
Hauck et al., 2003, Kernick, 2000, Von der Schulenburg, 2001). Additionally, the 
necessary complexity involved in conducting good quality economic evaluations for 
health technology assessment (e. g. the sophistication of modelling techniques) (Buxton, 
2006, Buxton et al., 1997) can compound these issues if healthcare organisations are 
expected to use the results in their specific decision-making processes. 
2.3.2 QALY league tables 
Background 
QALY league tables combine the results of multiple CEA/CUA analyses into a league 
table in order that potentially competing claims on resources can be compared in terms 
of their cost per QALY ratio. The basic notion is that new resources are allocated to 
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those services with low cost per QALY ratios i. e. those ranked highest in the table 
(Mooney, 1992). 
Critique 
As QALY league tables are simply a way of presenting the results of economic 
evaluations, they have the same associated disadvantages as the evaluations on which 
the table is based (as considered above). Specifically, there are problems associated with 
the appropriateness of QALYs, though it is beyond the remit of this thesis to discuss 
these'. More significantly, several issues have been highlighted with respect to the use 
and interpretation of league tables for priority setting decision-making. These 
arguments, summarised below, are well articulated by Gerard and Mooney (Gerard and 
Mooney, 1993, Gerard et al., 1999) and Neumann (Neumann et al., 2000). 
First,, the definitions of costs used in the league table are likely to differ between studies. 
Evaluations that consider those bome by society as well as the healthcare organisation 
may not be appropriate when using the results to prioritise healthcare from a narrower 
perspective. Second, restricting the measure of benefits to that of QALYs (health 
outcomes) does not allow decision-makers to take into account the broader objectives 
that may be important in decision-making (other than maximizing QALYs). Therefore, 
the results only account for the opportunity cost of QALYs foregone. Third, for the 
concept of marginal analysis to be fully realised using league tables, the results 
'A detailed critique of the QALY approach can be found in Donaldson, C., Atkinson, A., Bond, I and 
Wright, K. (1998) 'Should QALYs be programme specific?, Journal of Health Economics, 7, pp. 239-57, 
Williams, A. (1985) 'Econornics of coronary artery bypass grafting. ' British Medical Journal, 291, pp. 
326-29, Loomes, G. and McKenzie, L. (1989)'The use of QALYs in health care decision making. 'Social 
S,, I-cjjc,! & Ifedicine, 28, pp. 299-308. Gerard, K. and Mooney, G. (1993) 'QALY league tables: handle 
Nvith care', Health Economics, 2. pp. 59-64. 
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presented in the league table should have been derived by comparing the marginal costs 
and benefits of the proposed service change to the next best alternative use of resources. 
Different base comparators may produce a different configuration of results and the 
appropriate comparator will most likely differ between studies. However this is often 
not accounted for in the individual analyses. Fourth, for the league table to be of use for 
meaningful decision-making, the setting into which the results were being transferred 
would need to be contextually similar. 
Moreover, even accepting the problems outlined above, league tables are of limited use 
to decision-makers. The results presented in the league table are the incremental cost per 
QALY gained which, assuming perfect divisibility of healthcare activities (i. e. that 
healthcare activity can be purchased in incremental units), represent an average 'rate of 
return' (in terms of health benefits) on the investment (cost). However, since healthcare 
activities are rarely purchased in divisible units, or, if they are, the incremental costs of 
purchasing additional units and the incremental benefits realised are not constant, the 0 
cost per QALY ratio does not equate to the actual price that can be paid to purchase 
individual QALYs from the activities listed in the league table. Indeed, given resource 
scarcity, pursuing the activity at the top of the table may, in an extreme case, consume 
the entire budget, which could perhaps be better spent by purchasing things lower down 
the table to maximise the total number of QALYs from the total investment, and thus 
represent better use of money and result in greater efficiency (Birch and Gafni, 2006b). 
These concerns have led commentators to conclude that QALY league tables do not 
account for the dynamic processes of decision-making and different constraints will be 
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evident in different healthcare settings (Gerard et al., 1999, Neumann et al., 2000). In 
order for these tables to aid the priority setting process context specific data particular to 
the circumstances of individual decision-makers would be needed to populate the table. 
As a result there are few examples of the use of QALY league tables (Donaldson and 
Gerard, 2005). A notable exception to this is the attempt made by the US state of 
Oregon to use a league table to develop a prioritisation list in order to inform coverage 
decisions for the Medicaid programme (Ham, 1998). This example is renowned due to 
the failure of the approach, which was abandoned because the rankings it produced were 
considered to be clinically counterintuitive and allegedly violated the US Disability Act 
(Blumstein, 1997). The approach was also widely criticised because of flaws in the data 
collection and the methodological inadequacies of cost-effectiveness (much of which 
are covered in the critique above) (Hadorn and Holmes, 1997, Blumstein, 1997, Hauck 
et al., 2003, Baron and Ubel, 2001). In the end, a more subjective approach was adopted 
which drew on the results of public consultation, research evidence and the decision- 
makers own judgements to produce a list of services in priority order (Ham, 1997a). 
2.3.3 Programme budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA) 
Background 
Originating in the United States Department of Defence, programme budgeting (PB) 
was introduced by Robert McNamara in an attempt to reform military financial 
management at the federal level for which, prior to McNamara's appointment post 
1961, there was no integration of military planning with resources requirements or 
budget (Novik, 1965). With explicit consideration of scarcity and opportunity costs, PB 
was advocated as a framework through which the pursuit of policy objectives could be 
considered in terms of their associated economic costs (resource use), and to provide the 
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basis for further analysis on the use of those resources in terms of effectiveness and 
efficiency (Novik, 1965). The latter for which, marginal analysis (MA) - conducted 
using methods of benefit cost analysis, public expenditure criteria and analysis, and 
government project analysis - was highlighted as a way of comparing programme cost 
data with the outputs of those programmes (as defined by the policy objectives) 
(Hinrichs and Taylor, 1969). 
As applied to healthcare, the conceptual bases of PB and MA have remained largely 
unchanged. The first applications of PBMA in healthcare arose in the UK in the 1970s 
when used by the Department of Health and Social Security in England to set priorities 
for spending in the NHS (Pole, 1974, Gray and Steele, 1979). Following this, an 
illustration of programme budgeting within a Scottish area health board was amongst 
the first applications to support local (regional) level decision-making (Mooney, 1977). 
Since then,, PBMA has reportedly been used at least 70 times in approximately 60 health 
organisations internationally, and continues to be used in about half of those (Mitton 
and Donaldson,, 2001). The majority of this work was conducted in the UK, Australia, 
and Canada where it has been successfully used to allocate resources across entire 
healthcare institutions (i. e. at the macro level) (Mitton and Donaldson, 2001, Mitton et 
al., 2003c, Mitton et al., 2003b), as well as within a healthcare activity/disease area (i. e. 
at the micro level) (Astley and Wake-Dyster, 2001, Mitton et al., 2003a, Haas et al., 
200 1, Bohmer et al., 200 1). 
Although different authors have proposed various formats, the framework can basicallY 
be described by asking five questions pertaining to the use of resources: 
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I. What are the total resources available within a given service area or health 
organisation? 
2. How are these resources currently spent? 
3. What services are candidates for receiving more or new resources (and what are the 
costs and potential benefits of putting resources into such growth areas)? 
4. Can any existing services be provided as effectively, but with fewer resources. so 
releasing resources to fund items on the growth list? 
5. If some growth areas still cannot be funded, are there any services which should 
receive fewer resources,, or even be stopped, because greater benefit per f spent (or a 
greater fit with other defined criteria for fs spent) would be reached by funding the 
growth option as opposed to the existing service? 
(Mitton and Donaldson, 2004) 
Furthermore,, Mitton and Donaldson (2004) have gone on to illustrate how these five 
questions can be pragmatically applied to healthcare decision-making through a series 
of seven stages. These stages are summarised below. 
e Stage I- determine the aim and scope 
The first stage is to determine the aim and scope of the priority setting activity. This will 
depend on the organisation, its objectives and existing budget areas. For example, the 
aim and scope of a PBMA process may be to determine optimum investment of 
resources across all programmes within a health authority, or, alternatively, to determine 
how best to spend resources within a specific hospital service, or, further still, to 
identify priorities for new technologies. 
e Stage 2- compile a programme budget 
The next stage is to develop a programme budget. The purpose of the programme 
budget is to provide as detailed as possible a description of the deployment of current 
resources. This is a map of current activity and expenditure in those programme areas of 
interest and requires identifying the resources which are allocated to the individual 
programmes and quantifying the costs of providing the different services and the v 
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associated activity. Some primary data collection may be required where there are data 
gaps. The programme budget offers a starting point from which reallocation and service 
re-design options can be considered. 
* Stage 3- fon-n an advisory panel 
Typically, a PBMA process relies upon an advisory panel which is charged with 
identifying, for a given budget planning cycle, areas of service growth, and, in order to 
fund the proposed growth, areas for resource release (Cohen, 1994). The composition 
will be dependent on the question under consideration and the scope of the exercise. 
The panel may be composed of a mix of clinical personnel and managers, and could 
include lay membership. In addition, data and financial personnel are key people to 
have on hand, to provide support for the decision-making process. 
9 Stage 4- determine locally relevant decision-making criteria 
Before identifying possible options for change or redesign, the basis upon which these 
service changes will be judged needs to be defined. In PBMA exercises it is common to 
identify a set of decision-making criteria on which such judgements will be based. 
These criteria may reflect the values of the given organisation, the healthcare system, or 
society at large. The criteria can be identified in various ways including a review of 
current organisational criteria and other literature. The criteria should be specified a 
priori and weighted, if possible, to reflect their relative importance. 
9 Stage 5- identify and assess options for investments, disinvestment, and redesign 
This involves identifying a prioritised list of service growth options, options for 
improving operational efficiency, and options for service reduction. This process should 
be supported using a standardised business case to put forward priority areas for 
potential service growth, resource release (wliere a senýice which is effective, but in 
gin, to re only a small way, may be scaled back, at the mar i lease resources for a more 
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effective service development), or redesign in the form of operational efficiency gains 
(achieving the same outcomes at less cost). Each of the business cases should be 
explicitly rated against the pre-defined criteria, using available supporting evidence. The 
criteria ratings can then be combined with the criteria weights to give a weighted benefit 
score, using the following simple formula illustrated in Equation (1). 
WBS == ICS] "i *CWI (1) 
Where WBS is the weighted benefit score, CS is the criteria score for criterion I 
through to i, and CW is the criteria weightfor criterion I through to i. 
* Stage 6- make recommendations for investment, disinvestment, and redesign 
Each of the business cases should be evaluated in terms of both their marginal benefits 
(the weighted benefit score calculated above) and marginal costs. Using this 
information, the business cases can be ranked in order of most to least efficient 
(marginal benefit/marginal cost). In theory, following the notion of maximising benefits 
from scarce resources, this would dictate that resources should be moved from the least 
cost beneficial options to the most cost beneficial options. If a service disinvestment 
option produces less value than a service investment option at the margin, resources 
should be shifted accordingly. The process of comparing service investment and service 
disinvestment options should continue until it is decided that no more gain would be 
had by switching resources between options. 
Stage 7- perform validity checks and make final decisions to inform budget 
planning process 
Prior to reallocating resources, the proposed changes to services need to be validated. 
Consulting stakeholder groups (including clinical groups) will help to establish the 
clinical and organisational feasibility of implementing the selected options. Furthermore 
public acceptability for options can be ascertained through a public consultation 
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exercise. Any changes should be documented and the final recommendations with 
implementation plan and timescales produced by the advisory panel. 
As described above, the framework involves assessing the costs and benefits of 
proposed changes in the delivery of healthcare and, on the basis of this infon-nation, 
discussing and potentially implementing such changes with the intent of improving 
benefit overall. In evaluating options for change, evidence on effectiveness and cost 
effectiveness (including economic evaluations) from the literature can be used (Cohen, 
1994). These results can also be used in conjunction with other data, such as needs 
assessments, review of local and national policy, other consumer/public views, and 
other health professional views, to determine health services priorities (Ruta et al., 
1996). If the healthcare budget is limited, opportunity cost is accounted for by 
recognising that any proposed changes requiring more resources can only be funded by 
taking resources from elsewhere. Referring back to the efficiency principles, resources 
can be obtained from elsewhere by being more technically efficient (e. g. treating the 
same conditions differently and achieving the same health outcome at less cost) or more 
allocatively efficient (e. g. treating entirely different conditions to achieve a greater 
health outcome at the same cost). Such changes are considered 'at the margin' by 
comparing the marginal benefits and marginal costs of alternative ways of allocating 
resources to healthcare activities. In the end, decision-makers are charged with deciding 
whether resource shifts will actually take place and can specifically address any trade- 
off with equity that may result with the potential increases in efficiency (Mitton et al.. 
2002b). As such, the PBMA approach provides a framework that can be used to 
operationalise the economic principles of opportunity cost and the margin whilst, at the 
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same time, considering other health system objectives (Mooney, 1992. Peacock et al.. 
2006, Gibson et al., 2006a). 
Critique 
Irrespective of the fact that PBMA incorporates the basic economic principles, its 
application is not without challenges and a number of issues identified in the literature 
have yet to be resolved in full (Mitton et al., 2002b, Mitton and Donaldson, 2003c). In 
line with other research findings, Mitton et al. (Mitton and Donaldson, 2003c) reported 
that there were few problems with the conceptual basis of PBMA itself and that most 
problems commonly attributed to PBMA could be broadly described as associated with 
its operational isation and implementation in the healthcare context. 
In terms of operational problems, those widely cited include concerns about data and 
information, and the time requirements of PBMA. With respect to data, the main issues 
have been in obtaining accurate and relevant expenditure information (Miller et al., 
1997, Astley and Wake-Dyster, 2001, Steele and Gray, 1980, Craig et al., 1995), and in 
obtaining both outcomes (benefit) data and information that are locally relevant 
(Ratcliffe et al., 1996, Madden et al., 1995). However, others have argued that PBMA is 
not an exercise on improving data accuracy but about providing a better basis, using the 
existing information, for making decisions (Scott et al., 1998). Furthermore it has been 
shown that much can be achieved when only crude data is available (Cohen, 1994, Ruta 
et al., 1996), and methods such as multi-attribute utility theory and decision analytic 
techniques can be used (Peacock et al., 2007. Peacock, 1998). Moreover. there is still a 
need to exercise value judgements with the decision-making process rather than 
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developing over reliance on waiting for perfect evidence (Mooney. 2002). With respect 
to time, there is concern that the time required to conduct a PBMA exercise is too long 
(Twaddle and Walker,, 1995). This has implications for the amount of staff time and 
resources allocated to undertaking PBMA and concerns about whether this is the best 
use of such resources (Jan, 2001). However, Mooney and Wiseman (1999) argue that 
while a given PBMA exercise can be labour intensive, healthcare managers should have 
no more important activities than setting priorities and allocating resources. Indeed, 
decision-maker opinion has advocated that PBMA-like activity should take precedence 
over other managerial activities (Mitton and Donaldson, 2002). 
In terms of implementation, concerns over PBMA relate to issues about engagement 
and organisational culture. With respect to engagement, some authors have noted 
difficulties in engaging both management and clinicians in PBMA (Ruta et al., 2005). 
Consequently, some recommend providing incentives for participation and aligning 
PBMA activity alongside or within current managerial responsibilities (Mitton et al., 
2003c). On the other hand, there is also evidence that PBMA actually provides a forum 
for engagement (Mitton and Donaldson, 2003c) and results in greater team cohesion and 
an enhanced sense of ownership over the decision-making process (Astley and Wake- 
Dyster, 2001, Ruta et al., 2005, Bohmer et al., 2001). Additionally, there are issues 
around ease of community/public engagement in PBMA (Ruta et al., 1996). However, 
research on public involvement in priority setting suggests that the public may be best 
involved in developing the criteria or principles on which decision-making is based 
(Litva et al., 2002, Wiseman et al., 2003) - something which can be incorporated 
directly into a PBMA exercise. Finally, organisational culture appears to be key in 
determining the success or failure of PBMA. Instances where PBMA has failed have 
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reported reasons such as a lack of organisational stability, change in personnel and the 
loss of active "champions", and the absence of a culture receptIve to change (Mitton and 
Donaldson, 200 1, Mitton et al., 2002b). With reference to the latter, a further recurring 
challenge noted in the implementation of PBMA is that of overcoming the dominant 
approach to resource allocation which concentrates narrowly on the allocation of new 
(as opposed to existing) resources, in order to identify potential areas for the release and 
re-allocation of resources (McIver et al., 2000, Brambleby, 1995, Mitton et al., 2003b). 
Though perhaps obvious, it is important to note that these issues are not necessarily 
confined to PBMA per se, nor its application to healthcare (Hinrichs and Taylor, 1969, 
Novik, 1965). PBMA therefore can be readily conducted in a 'technical sense' to 
account for the economic principles in the management of healthcare resources (Mitton 
and Donaldson, 2003c). Nonetheless, it is also recognised that PBMA needs to be better 
developed to meet the needs of decision-makers and the context of decision-making 
(Craig et al., 1995). 
2.3.4 Needs assessment 
Background 
Health needs assessment is primarily concerned with defining, quantifying and 
estimating the size of health problems, health inequalities, and thus gaps in service 
provision as a way of identifying and measuring the health and healthcare 'need' 
evident in a population, and prioritising the allocation of healthcare resources 
accordingly (Stevens and Gillam, 1998, Stevens and Raftery, 1994). Definitions of need 
are however contested across disciplines and widely debated in the literature. 
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Bradshaw's taxonomy of need defines need in four categories: normative (as defined by 
a third party or expert), felt (as defined by individual experience), expressed (as defined 
through revealed demand), and comparative (as defined against a reference group) 
(Bradshaw, 1972). Approaches used in classic epidemiological needs assessment tend to 
focus on normative and comparative definitions of need. Normative approaches are 
essentially a descriptive analysis of the extent of a particular health problem in a 
particular population and observed difference in the provision of services and health 
status. The outcomes of such studies attempt to set a minimum standard of care (or set 
of services) to meet the unmet need identified in the population. Resources are then 
allocated to provide those services that will meet the unrnet need. Comparative 
, approaches compare the health status as measured by the impact of all diseases .F 
(incidence and prevalence), disease specific mortality and morbidity, or life expectancy, 
to identify the burden of disease or illness in a population (Murray and Lopez, 1996, 
World Bank,, 1993). The common output of this approach is a ranking of conditions and 
related treatment options from most to least burdensome (Murray and Lopez, 1996). 
Resources are then prioritised to meet the most burdensome disease areas. 
Critique 
In the first of these approaches (normative needs assessment) need is portrayed as 
something that can be objectively defined and measured. However, on the contrary. 
need as a concept is value laden and definitions of need vary across individuals and over 
time. Different definitions of need therefore necessarily lead to different decisions about 
which needs are accorded priority over others (Culyer, 1995). Even assuming that need 
can be defined, and consequently unmet need can be identified, setting a minimum 
standard of care to meet that need may not necessarily be the best use of that resources. 
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Despite claims that common approaches to needs assessment take into account the cost 
effectiveness of interventions and are conducted within the accepted context of finite 
resources (Stevens and Gillam, 1998), the narrow focus of needs assessment on specific 
populations and disease groups means that it is not possible to know whether more need 
could have been met within the current resources by directing those resources to meet 
other needs (Birch and Chambers, 1993). Choosing to allocate resources on the basis of 
fulfilling some unmet need with no consideration of alternative uses of those resources 
ignores the concept of opportunity cost, and changing the pattern of resource use on the 
basis of meeting unmet need is unlikely to result in an efficient use of resources (Petrou, 
1998). 
The limitations discussed above also apply to the second of these approaches 
(comparative needs assessment). First, 'burden' is again value laden and the concept of 
burden differs across contexts. (Hanson, 1999, Mooney and Wiseman, 2000). 
Proponents of burden of disease approaches argue that the method offers a uniform 
measurement that can be applied to all regions (Murray and Lopez, 1996). However, 
this assumes that changes in health status are valued the same within all societies and 
cultures. Additionally, the approach assumes that health services and healthcare are 
primarily concerned with the reduction of disease. The comparative use of burden of 
disease estimates supposes that disease reduction is the only goal of health services 
globally, yet a society's desire to pursue other goals, or that goals may vary between 
countries, is not recognised in the literature (Mooney and Wiseman, 2000). Moreover. 
by allocating resources to health interventions purely on the basis of reducing disease 
burden as focussed on individual outcomes, will not address the underlying causes of ill 
health with which a society may be more concerned (Hanson, 1999). 
53 
Second, whilst those involved in such studies have argued that the methods are intended 
to provide some systematic steps to help assist decisions about resource allocation. they 
do not provide any guidance about how to do this (Segal and Chen, 2001). Identifying : _I 
need in terms of burden of disease does not provide a clear decision rule about where 
resources should be directed. Whilst this approach implies that resources should be 
directed to the most prevalent diseases, it does not indicate how much should go where 
(e. g. whether resources should be directed to the most burdensome disease or divided 
pro-rata based on the relative distribution of the burden of disease) (Wiseman and 
Mooney, 1998). Furthermore, this approach does not always account for the costs and 
benefits associated with the actual interventions available in the disease areas. 
Prioritising resources to a more burdensome disease area will not result in an efficient 
use of resources if the interventions in this disease area are less effective in terms of 
benefits or costs than those in other disease areas (Mooney and Wiseman, 2000). 
Moreover, where cost-effectiveness information on interventions is used,, establishing a 
league table of 'best buys' on the basis of impacts on burden of disease is subject to the 
same critique of cost-effectiveness analysis and QALY league tables presented 
elsewhere in this Chapter. Finally, this approach most obviously tends to ignore small 
scale problems, although intervening to treat several small problems, in terms of disease 
burden, may provide greater benefits for the resources spent (Donaldson and Farrar, 
1993). 
ority setting. On the This is not to say that needs assessment is not important in pri II 
contrary, it is useful in identiýving unmet need and gaps in service provision (Segal and 
Chen. ) 
2001). However. a recurring challenge for health needs assessment is to be 
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efficient and cost effective (Stevens and Gillam, 1998). The underlying assumption 
within needs assessment implies that if a need exists and can be identified as such, it 
follows that it should be met. As such, the output from needs assessment usually results 
in recommendations that require more resources with no consideration of where such 
resources will come from or what benefits may be forgone. Needs assessment therefore 
ignores the notion of scarcity and that all needs (however defined) cannot be met and 
does not account for opportunity costs. Thus, prioritising resources on the basis of needs 
assessments alone will not result in an effective and efficient allocation of resources 
(Mitton and Donaldson, 2004). 
Indeed, attempts to use comparative needs assessment methods to establish healthcare 
priorities for allocating resources have rarely succeeded. One of the most widely 
recognised examples is the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) study commissioned by 
the World Bank in the early 1990s. This was intended to improve government spending 
on health by establishing global healthcare priorities as part of a series of health policy 
measures to combat problems of cost escalation, the misallocation of public funds, and 
their inefficient and inequitable use in the healthcare sector (World Bank, 1993). The 
GBD study provided a quantitative assessment of disease, injury and health risks 
worldwide (Murray and Lopez, 1996), the results of which were taken up by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) and combined with cost-effectiveness data on intervention 
choices to assist the allocation of resources toward areas of 'priority concern' (World 
Health Organization, 1996). However the approach received substantial criticism in line 
with that discussed above, and commentators argued the case that the WHO and the 
World Bank got it wrong, resulting in confusing resource allocation choices and leading 
to an inefficient and inequitable use of scarce resources (Mooney and Wiseman. 2000. 
Hanson, 1999, Paalman et al., 1998). 
2.3.5 Core services 
Background 
In principle the core services approach involves defining a bundle or 'basket' of core 
services or basic package of care to be publicly funded. All other services or. packages 
of care are thereby excluded from public funding. Where this has been attempted, most 
notably in New Zealand and the Netherlands, decisions over what services should be 
included or excluded from the core or basic benefit package were based on defining a 
set of criteria against which services were prioritised (Hadorn and Holmes, 1997, 
Cumming, 1994, Hoedernaekers and Dekkers, 2003a, Hoedernaekers and Dekkers, 
2003b). However, in practice these countries had difficulty prioritising healthcare 
services in this way (Mitton and Donaldson, 2003b). In each case, the committees 
established to oversee the process stopped short of defining the core or basic package 
and the concept was eventually rejected as too simplistic. Indeed, the Dutch committee 
stated that: 
Decisions on the form of the basic benefits package have rarely sought to 
exclude entire groups of services, but have tended to restrict these services at 
thefringes by limiting the extent to which the service is covered (Ham, 1997a) 
In practice few exclusions were realised and neither new Zealand nor the Netherlands 
managed to exclude interventions not deemed to be cost-effective (New, 1997). Instead, 
in each case, the criteria were used to restrict access to services, responsibility for which 
was devolved from the national level and disseminated through policy and clinical 
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guidance (Hadom and Holmes, 1997). However, it is far from clear how these prInciples 
and guidelines are applied in practice and whether they result in improved resource 
allocation decisions. 
Critique 
There are several things to note about this approach to prioritisation. First, prioritising 
services on the basis of whether they meet a set of stated criteria requires information on 
how services fulfil such criteria. However, this type of data and evidence is often 
lacking and the method offers little guidance about how to use what infort-nation there is 
in making judgments against the criteria (Holm, 1998). Moreover, the approach 
implicitly requires consistency in the definition and interpretation of criteria. However, 
the criteria are not 'value' free and it has been argued that consensus on such values is 
implausible (Hoedemaekers and Oortwijn, 2003, Hoedernaekers et al., 1996). Different 
interpretations of the criteria can therefore lead to different benefit package decisions 
(Hoedemaekers and Dekkers, 2003a), which would seem to undermine the notion that 
there is a single way of defining one package. As a result, uncertainty about whether 
and how services meet the criteria/principles means that, in reality, most current 
services are included and the number of exclusions is relatively small (New, 1997). 
Second, assuming that core services or a basic package can be defined, it is not clear 
how resources should then be allocated within the core or basic package. In the absence 
of any assessment of the costs and benefits of the services provided within the core or 
basic package, the allocation of the public funds in this way will not necessarily lead to 
greater efficiency and xvill most likely be based on historical patterns (Cumming. 1994). 
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Third, the inclusion and exclusion of entire services is too blunt an instrument. There 
will always be some individuals who would have benefited from excluded services. It 
follows that there may be services not included within the core or basic package that 
offer more benefit for the resources spent for some individuals than the benefit realised 
by other individuals from some core or basic services (Maynard and Bloor, 1998). 
Moreover, inclusions and exclusions of entire services threaten solidarity and are open 
to external challenge as they may lead to people seeking care outside of the system. 
Finally, if one of the aims of a core or basic package services is to limit public spending 
on healthcare, then any core or basic package of services should be defined with respect 
to the current budget constraint. However, this approach fails to do so and this will 
likely lead to increases in healthcare expenditure (Cumming, 1994). Moreover, it has 
been shown that health expenditure will continue to rise with changing population 
demographics (leading to more people requiring access to the core or basic services) 
and the emergence of new technologies (which qualify for access into the core or basic 
package), unless the core or basic package is constantly reviewed and revised to remove 
services or restrict access to services (Chinitz and Israeli, 1997, Chinitz et al., 1998). In 
sum, this approach will not necessarily promote an efficient allocation of resources and 
it is difficult to see how it helps to manage scarce resources. 
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2.3.6 National policy guidelines 
Background 
In contrast to trying to define a basic benefit package of care by making decisions over 
what should be included or excluded from public funding, guidelines are primarily used 
to limit access to services by providing guidance on who should receive what and how. 
Guidelines are largely focussed on medical practices about what treatments are effective 
and to whom. They help to define the minimum standards by which care should be 
provided, outlining the most appropriate ways to provide care to those in most need. 
Though guidelines are first and foremost a tool to improve the quality of care, at a 
health policy level, guidelines are also seen as a way of standardising healthcare and 
thereby ensuring greater consistency in medical decisions and more efficient resource 
use (Woolf et al., 1999). 
Sweden offers an established example of the use of policy guidelines for this purpose. 
Against a background of resource constraints and health system reforms aimed at cost 
containment (Calltorp, 1999), the Swedish Health Care Priorities Committee was 
established in 1992 to outline the roles of the healthcare system, to highlight the 
necessity of prioritisation for a sustainable healthcare system, and to investigate the 
prioritisation experiences of other countries with an explicit aim to promote 
prioritisation guidelines (Swedish Health Care Priorities Committee, 1997). The result 
of this was a set of ethical principles that were enshrined in Swedish Law in 1997 and 
provided an "ethical platfonn" to be used to guide all types of healthcare decisions 
(Calltorp, 1999, Carlsson, 2004) and to underpin the development of prioritisation 
guidelines (McKee and Figueras, 1996, Swedish Health Care Priorities Committee, 
1997, Holmstrom, 1996). In order of importance. these principles were: 
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the principle of human dignity: all people are equal in dignity. regardless of personal 
characteristics and functions in society 
2. the principle of need and solidaritý': resources should be committed to the person or 
activity in most need of them 
I the principle of cost-efficiency: \\ lien choosing between different fields of activitv 
or measures, a reasonable relation between cost and effect. measured in improved 
health and improved quality of life should be aimed for 
The resulting guidelines involved collating evidence on need with the clinical and cost 
effectiveness of interventions,, to arrive at a clinical consensus about the appropriateness 
of specific treatments (Ridderstolpe et al., 2003). 
Critique 
First, guidelines can improve the quality and consistency of care provided to patients 
(Woolf et al., 1999). Additionally, by focussing on the better delivery of services to 
those in most need, guidelines can promote distributive justice. Furthermore, it has been 
argued that through standardising care, guidelines can improve efficiency and, by 
calling attention to wasteful or incffectual practices, they can potentially free up 
resources that can be used for other healthcare services (Shapiro et al., 1993). 
However, there are also a number of problems associated with ouldelines, their 
development and their implementation. First, in their development, pidclines tend to 
evolve from some evaluation of the cvidence base, deliberation amongst experts, and 
clinical consensus about what is appropriate (Field and Lohr, 1992). I-lo\\-cver, there is 
often a lack of time, resources and skills devoted to the dcvelopment Of ýUlidelines and Z7 
fundamentally their recommendations may be wrong (Woolf et al.. 1999). 
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Moreover, the values inherent in the production of guidelines are rarely explicitly stated. 
Instead such judgements over what is appropriate should be weighed against one 
another. However, even where these are made explicit, different interpretations are 
plausible and they will not necessarily be applied consistently in the same way. Indeed, 
it has been shown in practice that where healthcare professionals disagree with 
consensus guidelines, they are more likely to rely on their own experience or 
recommendations of colleagues that result in different patterns of healthcare provisions 
and perhaps expenditure (Ridderstolpe et al., 2003). 
With respect to managing scarcity, because of their focus on improving medical 
practice, guidelines are not always concerned with cost and may promote the 
maximisation of health benefits regardless of any resource implications and cost 
constraints (Eddy, 1999, McGuire et al., 2000). They may therefore advocate the use of 
practices that are unaffordable. In turn, following them may result in escalating 
expenditure on services which may displace resources that are needed for other services 
which potentially may provide greater benefits to patients. Thus they ignore opportunity 
costs and may compromise efficiency. 
The extent to which the Swedish approach to prioritisation has impacted on the 
allocation of resources and cost containment is unclear given the plethora of other, 
simultaneous, reforms that have taken place in the country (Ridderstolpe et al., 2003). 
Indeed, there was (and still is to some extent) uncertainty about how the principles are 
to be adopted in practice (Carlsson, 2004), and this has resulted in widespread varlations 
in local implementation of the guidelines (Calltorp, 1999). Furthermore. anal,,, sis of w 
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prioritisation decisions in Sweden has consistently shok,,, -n that decisions are almost 
exclusively based on the principle of need with little additional consideration of cost 
efficiency (Bernfort, 2003, Carlsson, 2004). Indeed, it follows that the subordinacy of 
the cost-efficiency principle means that resources may not be allocated efficientlý', and, 
as such there is no explicit recognition that resources are scarce and need to be managed 
accordingly. 
2.3.7 Balanced scorecard 
Background 
The balanced scorecard (BSC) is a performance management/measurement system that 
was developed within the private sector following concerns that financial measures 
alone were insufficient for managing an organisation. Performance management 
provides one means of inducing consistency in decision-making and action through 
which management strategy can be realised (Neely et al., 1994). The BSC methodology 
is a performance management system that specifically focuses on the strategic direction 
of the organisation (Radnor and Lovell, 2003). The approach, as conceived by Kaplan 
and Norton (1992b), attempts to clarify the organisation's strategic vision and translate 
this into tangible measures based on what has improved financial performance in the 
past (financial measures) and what (non-financial measures) will drive future financial 
performance. These measures are typically presented in an integrated framework within 
which their perfon-nance is assessed (usually from four perspectives) against achieving 
the organisation's vision. The framework, shown in Figure 2.1, illustrates the four 
perspectives within which the measures are incorporated (defined as: financial. internal 
process, customer. and innovation and learning) and the links between them , N-hich need 
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to 'balanced' alongside one another in achieving the organisation's vision (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996). 
Figure 2.1 The balanced scorecard framework 
Financial perspective 
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P financially how Actions Measures shareholders s uellold 11 
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Customer perspective Internal business 
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The integrated approach of the BSC framework is presented as an extension of 
conventional performance management systems in that it not only functions as a 
measurement system but also a control tool to 1) create an organisation-wide vision and 
coherence between organisational strategy, performance, and resource allocation; 2) 
exert control within the system based on outcomes and process, as well as financial 
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resources; 3) communicate and translate the vision throughout the organisation (Kaplan 
and Norton, 2001 , 
Kaplan and Norton, 1992a). 
With respect to healthcare, BSC has gained prominence in recent years primarily as a 
performance management tool (Zelman et al., 2003). Interpretations of the scorecard 
between contexts have however resulted in some modifications and varied applications 
(Ferrari et al., 2006, Zelman et al., 2003). Perspectives that have been added to the BSC 
include a focus on the patient and healthcare (quality, access, health outcomes) (Zelman 
et al., 2003). The BSC approach was introduced into the NHS in England in 2001 as 
part of system of performance management measures though evidence has shown that it 
has not been widely adopted (Radnor and Lovell, 2003). 
Critique 
Literature on the limitations of the BSC tends to focus on two broad areas. Debates have 
questioned the underlying assumptions of the BSC, and the application of the BSC in 
practice to the public sector and healthcare organisations more specifically. 
With respect to the first of these points, Norreklit (2000) argues that if the assumptions 
of the BSC are invalid, the framework may support performance indicators that are 
faulty and which result in dysfunctional organisational behaviour and sub-optimal 
performance. The assumptions referred to by Norreklit are the casual relationships 
portrayed between the perspectives of the BSC, and the emphasis of the BSC as an 
integrated approach and a valid strategic management control tool (Norreklit, 2000). 
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One of the main strengths propounded by advocates of the BSC is that the framework 
incorporates financial measures, as indicators of past performance and, additionally. 
non-financial measures that can be used to predict future financial performance (Kaplan 
and Norton, 1996). These are explicitly linked in a cause and effect relationship (as 
shown by the arrows in Figure 2.1). However, this cause and effect relationship is not as 
straightforward as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Several commentators have argued that the 
relationship is not causal but rather logical, that the perspectives are actually 
independent of one another, and that the financial implications of actions that are 
measured may be counter-intuitive in practice (Norreklit, 2000, Laitinen, 2004). In 
terms of control, the BSC has been shown to be a hierarchical, top down control model, 
rather than interactive and rooted throughout the organisation (Norreklit, 2000). 
In practice, the failure rate of implementing the BSC is high (Neely and Bourne, 2000). 
Several reasons have been put forward to explain this, focussing specifically on the 
application to the BSC to healthcare organisations. These include: excessive data 
demands, the amount of resources required for implementation, and a failure to account 
for organisational context. First, the BSC requires a substantial amount of clinical, 
operational and financial data (Pink et al., 2001, Oliveira, 2001). In healthcare 
organisations, there is often a vast amount of data which is not necessarily integrated or 
routinely analysed for its impact on performance. Therefore obtaining relevant, accurate 
and timely data is difficult (Pink et al., 2001, Zelman et al., 2003). Moreover, the BSC 
is dependent on consistent and robust data reporting particularly for performance 
comparisons and benchmarking across organisations. However. data quality is of 
particular concern in health organisations (Pink et al., 2001). Second, there are ti ime and 
resource (financial and human capital) implications in introducing the BSC. While the 
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BSC may provide meaningful audit trails that can be rationalised by managers, some 
argue that it introduces another layer of bureaucracy into the organisation (Pink et al.. 
2001, Radnor and Lovell, 2003). Finally, the framework has been criticised for failing 
to acknowledge additional perspectives pertinent to healthcare organisations such as 
health related outcomes (in addition to financial performance) and the impact of the 
political context (Gao and Gurd, 2006). Despite claims that healthcare organisations can 
and do adapt the BSC (Zelman et al., 2003), in their review of the use of the BSC in 
healthcare settings Gao and Gurd (2006) argued that the balance in the scorecard was 
tilted toward financial rather than health outcomes. 
It has been argued that, in using the BSC, the flow of financial and quality information 
to the public will result in more efficient healthcare markets and in higher quality health 
services (Forgione, 1997). Yet this is far from clear. There is little evidence on the 
effectiveness of the BSC in performance management (Hartley et al., Forthcoming 
2008) and no evidence could be found to support the statement by Forgione (1997) that 
using the BSC would result in more efficient healthcare markets. Indeed, the counter- 
argument would suggest the contrary. The BSC approach does not formally 
acknowledge the resource scarce environment within which public sector organisations, 
and the health service in particular, operate (Donaldson et al., Forthcoming 2008). The 
actions and measures employed within the BSC framework are established 
independently of what may actually be achievable within a constrained resource. The 
realities of resource scarcity mean that choosing to allocate resources to achieve one 
action will limit the amount of resources that can be allocated to other actions which 
may have to be scaled back and, thus, may under-perform. However, the framework 
does not offer any insights into NN-hich actions should be given priority or where scarce 
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resources should be directed. There is no guidance on how to actually balance the 
different perspectives that constitute the framework, what the relative importance of 
each is, and therefore what trade-offs can be made between them. In reality, this leads to 
differences in the way that resources are allocated in healthcare organisations, despite 
the existence of the framework (Pink et al., 2001). Without an explicit comparison of 
the costs of achieving actions and impact (benefits) of them, the resulting allocation of 
resources may be inefficient. 
2.4 The application of theory in practice 
In practice, several approaches to managing scarcity were identified in the literature. As 
discussed above these could be broadly split into health economic and health service 
approaches. The emphasis of health service approaches primarily focused on identifying 
and addressing healthcare need in some capacity - either in terms of identifying unmet 
need through needs assessment, constructing a basic package of care by defining 
cnecessary care' through core services, or restricting access to healthcare to those in 
most need through the use of guidelines. However, it was argued that, in the absence of 
comparative information on benefits and the alternative use of resources, such 
approaches do not account for the economic principles of opportunity cost or the r 
margin, an unsurprising finding given that these approaches were not developed within 
an economic paradigm. Nevertheless, evidence on the application of these approaches 
has also shown that they have often failed to address scarcity and could result in 
increasing healthcare expenditure. 
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Moreover, and perhaps more surprising, is that the economic approaches such as 
economic evaluation (specifically cost effectiveness analysis) and QALY league tables 
do not tend to explicitly incorporate the economic principles and thus aid the 
management of resource scarcity. Furthermore, additional challenges in implementation 
mean that economic evaluations and QALY league tables are often not routinely 
adopted in practice beyond the national level. This has led some to question the 
usefulness of health economic methods for priority setting at the level of the individual 
healthcare organisation (Coast, 2004, Prosser et al., 2000, Langley, 2000) and conclude 
that whilst economic evaluation is necessary for answering specific questions in the 
assessment of the relative value of one intervention over another,, it is not sufficient, 
even when framed within QALY league tables, for making decisions over the allocation 
of scarce resources (McDonald, 2002, Coast, 2004, Martinet al., 2003). 
This is not to say that approaches such as needs assessment and economic evaluation do 
not have a place in decision-making. On the contrary, they have specific functions in 
determining gaps in the provision of services and evaluating health technologies. 
However, alone they are not sufficient and are consequently not able to manage 
scarcity. 
On the other hand, PBMA is an economic approach that adheres to the economic 
principles. PBMA guides decision-makers in making choices amongst competing 
claims on scarce resources and in practically critiquing existing healthcare activities vis- 
a-vis new and alternative healthcare activities thereb-N, explicitly considering opportunity 
costs and the margin. However, despite little debate about its conceptual basis it has not 
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been widely adopted in healthcare decision-making. This is, in part, explained b)ý the 
focus of previous PBMA research which has involved conducting one-off academic 
exercises instigated by academics and narrowly concerned with 'maximising benefit and 
minimising opportunity cost' (Mitton and Donaldson, 2001). More recently. research on 
PBMA has shifted to focus on examining the application of PBMA in practice. First, a 
broader set of decision-making criteria has been adopted to reflect the realities of real- 
world decision-making (Peacock, 1998, Wilson et al., 2006). Second, there is 
recognition of the need to ask decision-makers what they think and to do so with formal 
surveys and qualitative methods (Mitton and Donaldson, 2002, Patten et al., 2005). 
Third, extending an institutional economics perspective (Jan, 2001), the orgamsatIon is 
seen as an integral component to the technical application of the PBMA approach 
(Mitton and Donaldson, 2003a). Fourth, to study the application of PBMA and its 
iterative development, it is necessary to adopt an alternative research paradigm to 
conduct the research in a participatory way from within the organisation (Patten et al., 
2006). Proponents of PBMA are therefore keen to highlight its evolution from the 
simplistic application of economic principles for one-off decision-making, to merely 
acting as a vehicle for incorporating these principles alongside the pragmatic necessities 
of everyday decision-making and to support this decision-making on an on-going basis 
(Mitton et al., 2002a, Donaldson et al., Forthcoming 2008). 
As such, PBMA offers an approach to managing scarcity that incorporates economlc 
principles and, in contrast to the majority of the other approaches, provides a 'process' 
as opposed to a 'tool' for managing scarcity, and hence provides a suitable vehicle for 
applying economic principles in practice. Moreover, in studying the application of 
economic principles in practice it is not only important to focus on the abilitv of PBMA 
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to adhere to the economic principles, but also to understand the decision-making context 
within which PBMA is used, how it is adapted, and how it should be refined, something 
that can only really be undertaken using qualitative research working within the given 
context. 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter outlined the economic theory as applied to the management and allocation 
of scarce resources as a basis for critiquing approaches used in practice to managing 
scarcity identified from the literature. Specifically, the concept of resource scarcity was 
discussed in relation to the economic principles of opportunity cost and the margin, and 
the implications of these principles for the allocation of healthcare resources. 
Several approaches to managing scarcity in practice were identified in the literature. 
Broadly these were split into health economic and health service approaches. Each of 
these was critiqued with respect to how they adhered to the economic principles, and 
thus their potential for managing scarce resources. 
Economics was therefore shown to provide a theoretic set of principles for managing 
the allocation of scarce resources but their application was not widespread. Reasons for 
this were explained, in part, by the failure of common decision-making approaches 
(including the economic approaches) to explicitly capture these economics principles, 
and, perhaps more so, the failure of economic approaches to be pragmatically applicable 
in 'real' decision-making contexts. One approach, PBMA, Nvas highlighted as adhering 
to the economic principles. Furthermore. PBMA offered a process for managing 
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scarcity and thus offered a potential vehicle through which economic principles could 
be utilised in the management of scarce healthcare resources. However, in studying the 
, application of economic principles in practice it was also noted that it was necessary to Z- 
adopt an alternative research paradigm and utilise qualitative research to be able to 
understand the decision-making context within which PBMA is used, how it is adapted, 
and how it should be refined. 
The following chapter sets out the methodology and methods employed in this research 
to study the use and application of economic principles in practice, through the vehicle 
of PBMA, in the context of local level decision-making in the NFIS in England. 
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Chapter 3 Theory, methodology and methods 
3.1 Chapter overview 
The previous chapter (Chapter 2) presented an overview of economic theory as applied 
to the management and allocation of scarce resources and used this as the basis for 
critiquing the approaches used in practice to manage scarcity identified from the 
literature. In particular, one approach, PBMA, was highlighted as adhering to the 
economic principles. Furthermore, PBMA offered a process for managing scarcity and 
thus offered a potential vehicle through which economic principles could be utilised in 
the management of scarce healthcare resources. However, despite numerous 
applications, PBMA has not been routinely adopted in healthcare decision-making. One 
reason put forward for this was the way in which PBMA exercises were undertaken. 
Often such projects were research exercises instigated by academics conducting a one- 
off PBMA exercise that involved the straightforward application of economic 
principles. More recently, however, it has been recognised that any approach has to fit 
alongside the pragmatic necessities of everyday decision-making in the 'real-world' and 
support decision-making on an on-going basis. As such, it is argued here that it is 
important to be able to understand the decision-making context within which PBMA is 
used, how it is adapted, and how it should be refined, something that can only really be 
undertaken using qualitative research working within the given context. 
This chapter presents the methodology and methods adopted in this research to do just 
this. In order to answer the fundamental research questions posed in Chapter 1. Section 
1.5, and reiterated in this chapter, a qualitative approach was chosen on the basis that it: 
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is broadly concerned with how the social world is interpreted, understood. and 
experienced; involves methods of data collection that are flexible and sensitive to the 
social context; and utilises methods of data analysis, explanation and argument building 
that require developing an understanding of the complexity, detail and context of the 
data (Mason, 2002). The research described in this chapter utilises a participatory action 
research (PAR) approach that provides a suitable framework for conducting and 
presenting the research as it enables the iterative development and implementation, and 
refinement of PBMA through the research process. The PAR consisted of three phases 
of research to study PBMA prior to, during, and after its introduction into a 
commissioning organisation. At each phase, qualitative methods of data collection and 
analysis were used to undertake the research, each of which is described, justified (in 
the context of this research) and discussed. 
3.2 Research objectives 
As outlined in the introduction, Section 1.5, the objectives of this research are: 
To identify approaches to managing scarcity in the health services research, 
management, economics, and ethics literature. 
To examine PCT decision-makers' views on managing scarcity and commissioning 
- specifically how commissioning is understood in principle, and how this translates 
in practice. 
To develop, implement, and observe the application of PBMA as a framework for 
managing scarcity to fit with the organisational structure of PCTs and account for 
the barriers and facilitators of such implementation. 
To evaluate how the PBMA framework is interpreted and reconstructed by users 
within the PCT and whether the use of the framework results in improved process 
and management of scarce resources. 
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The first of these research objectives was addressed in Chapter 2. This chapter focuses 
on the latter three objectives, presenting justification for the research paradigm adopted 
and the methodology and methods used for conducting the research. 
3.3 Research design 
Given that the above objectives are concerned with studying PBMA prior to, during, 
and post its introduction into a commissioning organisation, PAR was adopted as a 
framework around which the research could be conducted. PAR offered a way of 
situating the research as well as a useful approach to its description and presentation. 
3.3.1 Participatory action research (PAR) 
Broadly, action research can be defined as follows: 
Action research is a period of inquiry, which describes, interprets and explains 
social situations while executing a change intervention aimed at improvement 
and involvement. It is problem focussed, context specific, andfuture orientated 
Action research is a group activity with an explicit critical value basis and is 
founded upon a partnership between action researchers and participants, all of 
whom are involved in the change process. The participatory process is educative 
and empowering, involving a dynamic approach in which problem 
identification, planning, action, and evaluation are interlinked Knowledge may 
be advanced through reflection and research, and qualitative and quantitative 
research methods may be employed to collect data. Different types of knowledge 
may be produced by action research, including practical and prepositional. 
Theory may be generated and refined, and its general application explored 
through the cycles of the action research process. (Waterman et al., 2001, 
D 21' 1 . 1- 0 
In recent years, PAR has increasingly become established as a framework for 
researching intervention, development and change within groups. communities, or 
organisations. SPecifically, it has been extensively used in education and nursing 
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research (Waterman et al.. 2001). In these fields, PAR has been used as a form of social 
research that focuses on the study of actions and practices in order to change and 
improve them. In doing so, the purpose of PAR is to research those actions, 
change/modify/broaden them, and re-research them. As such, PAR seeks to merge 
knowledge generation with action and change (Greenwood and Levin, 1998). 
concentrating on 'knowledge for action' rather than simply 'knowledge for 
understanding' (Comwall and Jewkes, 1995). A distinctive feature of PAR is the 
participatory nature of the research. PAR tends to be conducted by and for those who 
are the end-users of the research. Consequently, PAR is inherently context specific - 
addressing actions identified by those involved in the research and applying results to 
directly address those actions. As Checkland (1997) notes: "this [action research] 
involves researchers giving up the pure 'observer' role and entering the problem 
situation to research with participants rather than simply on them. The aim is to find the 
changing structures of meaning which lead individuals and organizations to act in the 
ways they do in turbulent enviromnents" (Checkland, 1997, pg. 117). 
PAR is often intended to be a continuous research tool comprised of "self reflective 
cycles of planning a change, acting and observing the process and consequence of the 
change, and reflecting on these processes and consequences" (Kernmis and McTaggart, 
2003 p381). This cyclical process is illustrated in Figure 3.1 below. In each cycle, 
participants identify important problems and issues, initiate research, change actions, 
examine the implications of those changes, and generate the agenda for the next cycle. 
Furthermore, continuous reflection on the knowledge generated from researching and 
changing actions. is fed into future cycles. As such, PAR is reflexive. flexible and 
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iterative (Cornwall and Jewkes, 1995), which means that study outcomes can be 
difficult to predict from the outset. 
Figure 3.1 The action research spiral. 
(Reproduced from Kemmis and McTaggart (2003, pg. 382) 
3.3.2 Using PAR to research the use of health economics in decision- 
making 
In the context of healthcare, PAR has tended to be used to improve practice through 
studying and changing skills, education, service delivery, or management processes 
(Waterman et al., 2001). In relation to health economics, there is only one example of 
PAR conducted by Patten et al. (2006). In their research, Patten et al. (2006), used PAR 
to study and improve the decision-making process by introducing PBMA within a 
Canadian Health Region. The PAR conducted by Patten et al. was led by a qualitative 
researcher, health economists, and senior managers and clinicians within the Region. 
Qualitative methods were used to: gain an understanding of the organisation and its 
current priority setting practices; recognise the complexity of PBMA from the decision- 
maker"s perspective; and allow researchers to work closely with decision-makers to 
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000, 
identify the research agenda, generate necessary knowledge to change priority setting 
processes, and implement those changes (Patten et al., 2006). 
The research reported in this thesis utilises PAR in a similar way to the study above. In 
this case, the research was conducted by a researcher trained in health economics and 
qualitative research, collaborating closely with decision-makers involved in the 
research. PAR was used as a framework to enable the iterative development, 
implementation, and refinement of economics in decision-making, though the vehicle of 
PBMA. Specifically, PAR was adopted over one cycle to study PBMA before, during 
and after its introduction into the commissioning organisation, in the three phases 
illustrated in Figure 3.1 - Phase 1: planning the change, Phase 11: acting and observing 
the change, and Phase III: reflecting on the change. Each of these phases corresponds 
directly to the research objectives 2-4 outlined in 3.2. Qualitative methods of data 
collection and analysis were used in each of these phases as described briefly below 
and, in more detail, in Sections 3.5 and 3.6 
In Phase 1, the current organisational context, processes, and practices into which 
PBMA (as the focus of change) was being introduced was examined using in-depth one- 
to-one interviews with decision-makers to identify how commissioning was undertaken 
in theory and practice, and to gather their reflections on current commissioning 
processes. An analysis of themes was used to provide thick description (Geertz, 1973) 
of the current commissioning context and the constraints inherent in the current 
commissioning process. 
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In Phase 11, PBMA was introduced into a commissioning organisation and developed 
iteratively and interactively with decision-makers, stakeholders, and researchers. 
Ethnographic approaches were used to observe the implementation of PBMA in terms 
of the application and adaptation of PBMA to the organisational. context, organisational 
dynamics, participation and motivation, and potential challenges to implementation. An 
analysis of themes from the observational data was used to examine common concepts 
encountered during the implementation of PBMA. 
In Phase III, focus groups with the decision-makers and stakeholders involved in the 
research were used to gather reflections on the PBMA process. An analysis of themes of 
the focus group transcripts was used to identify challenges in the implementation of the 
PBMA process. 
Obviously these different methods generate different data. Further details on the 
justification for the methods of data generation and analysis used in this research are 
presented later in the Chapter (Sections, 3.5 and 3.6). Before discussing the methods in 
depth, it is important to consider the underlying methodological perspective taken in 
this research within which these methods are employed to generate data, and how that 
data is analysed and interpreted. 
3.4 Methodology 
Literature on methodological research perspectives is extensive and it is not the 
intention to reproduce it here, but. rather, to present a reasoned summary of the 
methodological approach taken in this thesis and why it is appropriate in this research. 
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According to social science, the social world can be viewed in multiple ways, through a 
variety of different lenses. The viewpoint one adopts is dependent upon one's beliefs 
nil about broad theories about the social world such as the nature of society, the nature of 
knowledge, and the nature of explanation and meaning (or ontology, epistemology, and 
hermeneutics, respectively). Without rehearsing them in full, these arguments are 
largely centred on notions of 'reality' and 'truth' (referred to only as reality herein) 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2003, Mason, 2002, Harnmersley and Atkinson, 1995, Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994, Hughes, 1990). 
In simplistic terms, reality can be represented on a continuum, the two extremes of 
which are commonly labelled as realism or positivist, and relativism or interpretivist. 
Using these definitions, positivist research is primarily associated with the natural 
science model of research. In this model of research, reality is positioned as 'out there', 
independent of the people concerned and people's perceptions of it. As such, reality is 
fixed, unchanging, and accessible. It is assumed that objective knowledge is possible, 
that reality can disclose causal relationships, and is deductive - produced through 
hypothesis testing. On the other hand, interpretivist research is associated with the 
humanistic model of social research (Bryman, 2004). In this model, reality is positioned 
as being constructed, interpreted, and reconstructed by people in the social world who 
communicate. As such reality is not fixed, but is constantly shifting and changing, as it 
is shaped by, and shapes, the context and the interpretations people make within it. It is 
assumed that knowledge is subjective and is therefore inductive - generated from 
observations of reality. At the very extreme of this model it is argued that there are 
multiple versions of reality to which an ultimate or singular 'meaning' cannot be 
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ascribed. At a lesser extreme, however, it is argued that a version of reality (one of 
many) can be accessed by analysing 'meaning' in talk, text, and observations, as 
symbols that represent a reality. 
These extremes are also commonly associated with quantitative (positivist) and 
qualitative (interpretivist) research paradigms. However, few researchers and little 
research are situated at the very extremes (Silverman, 2001) and, in practice much 
research is often defined more broadly. Indeed, in relation to qualitative research, 
Silverman (2001) suggests that the methods used by qualitative research exemplify a 
"common belief that they can provide a 'deeper' understanding of social phenomena 
than would be obtained from purely quantitative research" (Silverman, 2001, pg. 32). 
Similarly, Mason (2002) proposes that qualitative research is concerned with how the 
social world is interpreted, understood, and experienced; involves methods of data 
collection that are flexible and sensitive to the social context; and utilises methods of 
data analysis, explanation and argument building that require developing an 
understanding of the complexity, detail and context of the data. These definitions 
underlie the broadly interpretavist stance adopted in this research to explore and observe 
the use of health economics in the natural setting of decision-making. 
The arguments about methodological perspectives and the theories of the social world 
presented above are well established in the social sciences but are relatively new to 
health economics. Indeed, Small and Mannion (2005) state that as a discipline, health 
economics has remained "insulated from important theoretical and philosophical 
debates" (Small and Mannion, 2005 p221) that have dominated the other social sciences 
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and that, in turn, health economics has failed to embrace alternative methodological 
paradigms in its research. Elsewhere, they argue that "health economics as presently 
constituted is failing in both its descriptive powers and prescriptive possibilities" and 
that alternative theoretical approaches (with an emphasis on postmodemism) offer the 
"possibility of expanding the scope of health economics and grounding it more 
appropriately in the everyday experience of those engaging with health systems" 
(Mannion and Small, 1999 p255). They conclude by suggesting that health economists 
might want to consider, amongst other things, "becoming more eclectic and flexible in 
their choice of methodology by developing an increased awareness of the value of 
behavioural and qualitative methods; and developing a more open dialogue with 
heterodox economics and other health related social sciences" (Mannion and Small, 
1999 p270). 
Since Mannion and Small's early paper, there have been a number of attempts to use 
qualitative research in health economics. However, as Coast et al. (2004) argue, such 
attempts were limited as much of the research had rarely "gone beyond content analysis 
[] to feedback into quantitative models, with little qualitative analysis" (Coast et al., 
2004 pl7l) and few studies had used the methodology and methods in empirical 
research to answer specific research questions. In conclusion, Coast et al. surmised that 
there appeared to be a general acceptance of the use of qualitative data within health 
economics but not qualitative methods or methodologies. However, more recently, there 
have been a number of notable exceptions including the use of qualitative research to 
refine quantitative methods in health economics (Coast and Horrocks, 2007, Borghi et 
al., 2007) and explore and understand the behaviour of responders towards health 
economics methods (Baker and Robinson, 2004, Smith. 2007). Additionally, qualitative 
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research has been used to understand the organisational context within ývhich health 
economic methods are advocated and understand the challenges and barriers to the 
adoption of health economics within these healthcare organisations. Such research 
includes: the use of interviews and observation to study the use of economic evaluations 
in NICE (Williams and Bryan, 2007); as already mentioned above, the use of PAR to 
study the implementation and acceptance of PBMA in decision-making (Patten et al., 
2006); and the use of participant observation and documentary analysis to analyse the 
use of health economic methods in the decision-making processes in a health authority 
(McDonald, 2002). 
In this thesis, a qualitative research or interpretivist perspective was adopted on the 
basis that it provided the most suitable methodology and methods for studying the 
research objectives. This research builds on that undertaken by McDonald in the UK 
(described in Chapter 1) which focussed solely on economic evaluation, and utilises and 
develops the research design and methods employed by Patten et al. in studying the use 
of PBMA in Canada, to study the use of health economics and health economic 
principles in the management of scarce resources more broadly, using PBMA as a 
vehicle. Hence the claim that the research is unique, not only in its application to the 
UK context, but also internationally. 
3.5 Methods of data collection 
Methods of data collection used within the three phases of the PAR included interviews, 
observation. and focus groups. Each of these methods is described below in terms of the 
detail of the method and its application to the research. 
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3.5.1 Interviews 
Interviews involve the elicitation of verbal responses to verbal questions from a 
respondent or set of respondents. Qualitative interviews tend to consist of a series of 
open ended questions, as opposed to closed ended, which allow respondents to report on 
their own experiences and express what they 'think' or 'feel'. This yields rich, deep data 
that come in the form of extracts of natural language - so called in-depth interviews 
(Darlington and Scott, 2002, Britten, 2000, Britten et al., 2000). Interviews are therefore 
useful in exploring a range of perspectives around a particular event or phenomenon. 
As such, interviews were used in this research in the first phase of the PAR to examine 
the current commissioning context. In-depth interviews using open ended questions 
were conducted in 2004 within PCTs in one SHA (as well as within the SHA) in the 
North of England. The interviews were used to explore: participants' perceptions of 
commissioning; how commissioning was understood (i. e. how commissioning ought to 
be undertaken); how this translated into practice (i. e. how commissioning was 
undertaken); and their reflections on this (the strengths and weaknesses of 
commissioning). 
The selection of participants balanced both theoretical and practical considerations. In 
theory, Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggest that data collection and analysis should be 
conducted simultaneously to the point where no new findings are revealed in the 
analysis (data saturation). Practically, however, it is often difficult to obtain intei-Nýiew 
participants and Darlington and Scott note that "in reality, the ability to pick and choose 
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respondents on theoretical grounds is a luxury we have rarely encountered" (Darlington 
and Scott, 2002 p54). As such, participants were selected using a mixture of practical 
sampling strategies including snowball sampling (identifying participants from other 
participants), quota sampling (selecting participants on the basis of their experience or 
characteristics), and judgemental sampling (selecting the most appropriate participants 
for the topic at hand) to identify participants on the basis of their job title which was 
matched across each of primary care organisations. 
Thirty one people were approached to take part in the research to provide a range of 
different views, at different levels of the organisation. Where they declined, their 
explanation was noted and they were asked to suggest another potential participant. In 
total, data was collected from 22 participants (14 males and eight females). The roles of 
participants included executive level management (e. g. members of the senior executive 
team and the PCT Board,, such as chief executive) (n=6), non-executive management 
(e. g. lay-members of the PCT Board such as PCT Board chair) (n=5), and director level 
management (e. g. a high level manager who may or may not be on the PCT Board such 
as director of public health) (n= 11). For those participants at director level, their role 
could be further divided into three areas of speciality; public health/medical (n=5), 
commissioning (n=4), and finance (n=2). Information on interview participants is given 
in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Interview participants 
ID ROLE 
Executive 
FUNCTION GENDER 
Female 
5 Executive Male 
6 Director Public Health Female 
7 Director Commissioning Male 
8 Non-executive Female 
9 Executive Female 
10 Director Public Health Male 
II Director Commissioning Male 
12 Non-executive Male 
16 Non-executive Female 
17 Executive Male 
18 Director Public Health Male 
19 Director Finance Male 
20 Director Commissioning Female 
22 Executive Male 
24 Director Finance Male 
25 Non-executive Male 
26 Executive Male 
27 Non-executive Male 
29 Director Public Health Male 
30 Director Commissioning Female 
31 Director Public Health Female 
In order to build trust prior to the interview, and conform with ethics, the interview 
participants were sent an information sheet (Appendix A) detailing the research, the 
interview process, and circumstances under which the interview could be terminated. 
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Additionally, participants were asked to fill in a pre-interview questionnaire (Appendix 
B). Before commencing the interview, participants were asked to re-read the 
information sheet and sign a consent form (Appendix Q giving permission for the 
interview to be recorded and transcribed. To establish rapport with participants, the 
interviews were conducted by a single interviewer (the researcher and author of this 
thesis) who was both knowledgeable and interested in the interview topic. The pre- 
interview questionnaire was used as an ice breaker and also served as a prompt (Britten, 
2000). 
Participants were offered a choice of interview either face-to-face at their chosen 
location, or via telephone. All chose a face-to-face interview which was conducted at 
the interviewees' places of work. An interview schedule was used to guide the interview 
and served to prompt the researcher to probe the participant. The schedule consisted of 
semi-structured questions which were revised throughout the course of conducting the 
interviews to incorporate new concepts as they emerged from the interviews. The 
ordering of questions varied and they were never delivered verbatim. As such, the 
schedule was used to guide the interview in an informal but purposeful way (Mason, 
2002). Burgess (1984) refers to such encounters as "conversations with a purpose". The 
interview schedule in its most recent form is reproduced in Appendix D. The interviews 
took approximately 11/2 hours to complete (ranging from 44 minutes to I hour and 46 
minutes) and were audio-recorded (to avoid the recognised problems associated with 
note taking (Britten, 2000)) and transcribed. 
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3.5.2 Observation 
Although interviews give access to information about participants' actions and 
behaviours, it does not follow that what participants say they do (in an interview setting) 
reflects what they do (in the 'real' setting) (Silverman, 2001). Observation methods go 
some way to addressing this. Observational methods in the social sciences involve the 
systematic detailed observation of people's behaviour and talk (Pope and Mays, 2000). 
Such observation is considered to be 'naturalistic' given that it is concerned with the 
study of social life in real, naturally occurring settings (often referred to as the field). 
In this research observational methods were used, not to verify or cross reference data 
obtained through the interview setting, but in the second phase of the PAR to describe 
and observe the introduction and implementation of PBMA. Specifically, observation 
was used as it enabled the recording of organisational and individual behaviour, 
routines, and interactional practices, first-hand. The observation was conducted within 
one healthcare organisation (herein referred to as the Commissioning Consortium d )ý 
selected on the basis that it fulfilled the criteria put forward by Burgess (1984) for 
identifying field sites for observation, the criteria being as follows: 
simplicity (selecting the site that offers the opportunity to move from the simple to 
more complex situations and sub-sites) 
accessibility (selecting a site that permits access and entry) 
0 unobtrusiveness (a site that permits the researcher to be low profile) 
permissibleness (a site in which the researcher is permissible and the researcher has 
free entry) 
participation (a site in which the researcher is able to participate in the ongoing 
activities). (Burgess, 1984 p6l) 
d The detials on this entity have been deliberately limited to avoid explicit identification of the 
organisation. Further information on the organisational context is gi In Chapter 5. t:, ltý given, as necessarY, 
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Specifically, the site was selected through a series of meetings held with local PCT 
managers to explore and identify potential research collaborations between health 
economics and the local health economy, the need for research and support in decision- 
making and commissioning, and the strategic direction for the local health economy. As 
well as fulfilling the criteria outlined by Burgess above, the size of the Commissioning 
Consortium (which brought together 3 of the 6 PCTs in the region) enabled the research 
to be conducted across three PCTs and meant that the organisation had the capacity, 
power, and influence to support the research. 
Given that access to the research field was closed , i. e. controlled by a gatekeeper 
(Walsh, 1998), and the observation was conducted overtly, access to the field had to be 
negotiated and the necessary ethical and organisational permissions obtained. The 
research was subject to assessment by the Local Research Ethics Committee (reference 
SLREC 1127) and the NHS Research and Development lead for the region. Permission 
for the observation and access to the field was also separately negotiated with the CE of 
the Commissioning Consortium through a series of formal and informal meetings which 
involved the researcher and the research supervisors. Additionally, a plan of research 
was submitted to the CE for approval and amended accordingly (Appendix E). Access 
was constantly re-negotiated throughout the duration of the research in line with 
changes affecting the organisational structure and personnel. An honorary contract was 
issued, allowing physical access to the organisation and once in the organ'sation, an 
identity card, desk, phone, computer, and a login username and password were supplied. 
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Once in the field, observation involved participating in the dally life of those being 
observed and watching, observing, and talking to them. The level of participation 
adopted in this research was predominantly that of the pairticipant-as-observer. 
described by (Gold, 1958) as researching the field whilst participating fully in it. As 
such, from the period September 2004 to April 2005, the author of this thesis (AB) 
(hereafter referred to as the researcher), worked for 3 days a week within the 
Commissioning Consortium under the direction of the Director of Public Health who 
was responsible for implementing PBMA. During this period the researcher worked 
closely with the Director and commissioners to introduce PBMA into the organisation 
and observe its introduction. This "'insider' role" (Pope and Mays, 2000, pg. 34) was 
further enhanced through day-to-day interactions with those working in the 
organisation. Though somewhat facilitated by senior management approval and 'buy-in' 
to the research, this had to be negotiated separately. Attempts to build trust and rapport 
with participants were created in several ways including: 1) taking on work outside the 
research remit; 2) dressing in a similar fashion; 3) following similar working patterns - 
i. e. working late; 4) socialising with participants in work - i. e. over coffee breaks; and 
5) socialising with participants after work - i. e. helping establish and partaking in the 
organisation's football team. 
The 'insider' role was balanced against the 'outsider' role to avoid "going native" (Pope 
and Mays, 2000, pg. 34). For the two days a week that the researcher was not working 
within the Commissioning Consortium, the researcher continued in their role as a health 
economist employed at Newcastle University. As such, the researcher had access to 
both NHS and University IT systems (allowing use of University files. email etc. ) 
within the organisation , N-hich enabled -outside' contact. Furthermore. by limiting the 
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number of days worked in the organisation, the researcher was able to maintain their 
coutsider' role, spending time out of the organisation to reflect critically on experiences 
and status (Brewer, 2000). 
Data collection was restricted to observations of the implementation and application of 
PBMA in the Commissioning Consortium in order to limit the amount of data gathered 
to what could readily be analysed (Silverman, 2001). Particular focus was given to 
trying to identify how PBMA was adopted within the organisation, the barriers and 
facilitators to adoption and how PBMA was interpreted and reconstructed by 
participants. Observations were structured around specific events and meetings that took 
place during the course of the PBMA exercise. In most cases these were observed 
directly. However, in some cases the researcher was denied access to some meetings 
such as one-to-one progress meetings between the Director of Public Health and the CE, 
or meetings on sensitive issues (as deemed by the CE). In these cases, selected 
informants present were interviewed informally following the meetings to gather their 
observations of the proceedings. The period of observation covered the full duration of 
the PBMA exercise which was considered to be sufficiently broad and long enough to 
observe and experience a wide range of routines, activities, people, and behaviours 
(Brewer, 2000). 
Observations were recorded in a research diary on a daily basis whilst in the setting 
under observation. The diary was used to document observations and interactions in the 
day-to-day setting, in meetings (both formal and informal), and one-on-one personal 
communication between the researcher and other participants. 'Substantive field notes 
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(Brewer, 2000), indicated the time, date, location, and identities of people involved 
alongside what was seen and heard (Pope and Mays, 2000). Where plausible, notes 
were entered directly into the diary or transferred as soon as possible and dated 
appropriately. This helped to ensure that the notes were comprehensive and allow for 
points of clarification to be addressed at the next visit to the field (Lofland and Lofland. 
1995). The diary was read periodically and amended to make notes more legible as 
appropriate. Additionally, 'analytic field notes' (Brewer, 2000) were used to record 
initial thoughts relating to the interpretation of the observational notes and were 
highlighted as such to distinguish them from the substantive field notes. The diary (as 
an object rather than the content of it) was visible within the organisation and 
colleagues within the organisation were aware of its significance. Finally, the researcher 
had regular debriefing meetings with the research supervisors to record feelings and 
emotions and reflect upon developing relationships in the field, problems, emotional 
costs and other things affecting the research (Brewer, 2000). These sessions were 
recorded verbatim and were used to form part of the data to provide the basis of 
reflexivity used to contextualise the research. 
The end of the research was denoted by the production of an internal report and a 
regional workshop. Withdrawal from the field involved both physical and emotional 
disengagement and was done in stages (Brewer, 2000, Mason, 2002). Physical 
disengagement took place over several months. Following the initial piece of research 
documented here, the researcher continued to work within the Commissioning 
Consortium for one day a week, providing health economics input into a number of 
small scale (micro) PBMA exercises. Emotional disengagement was eased by the fact 
that many of those involved in the research left the organisation as a result of various 
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national policy and structural changes that followed, though contact has been 
maintained with many of these people (including the CE and Director of Public Health). 
Additionally, due to the fact that this research formed the thesis presented here, there is 
an ongoing emotional and practical association with the organisation. 
3.5.3 Focus groups 
Focus groups are a method of interviewing that involves more than one interviewee - 
essentially a group interview. However, unlike a group interview, focus groups 
explicitly use group interaction to generate research data (Kitzinger, 2000). 
Furthermore, the focus group is often distinguished from other group interviews by its 
emphasis on a specific theme or topic that is explored in depth (Bryman, 2004). In other 
words, a focus group is a focussed group interview. Group interaction within focus 
groups encourages participants to raise issues with which they are directly concerned 
and that are important to them, and permits them to raise their own questions and 
question the views of others or revise or modify their own views (Kitzinger, 2000). 
Group interaction also allows the interviewer to explore a broad range of views and 
examine the ways in which participants collectively make sense of the issues discussed 
and jointly construct the meaning of such issues (Basch, 1987, Bryman, 2004). As such, 
focus groups may facilitate the expression of ideas and experiences that may otherwise 
have been left underdeveloped in a conventional interview (Bryman, 2004). It is for 
these reasons that Kitzinger (2000) argues that focus groups are useful for studying 
work place cultures. Indeed, the empowerment of participants within a focus group 
setting makes them particularly useful in action research where ýhe research participants 
are an active part of the research and analysis (Baker and Hinton, 1999). 
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Given the above, focus groups were used in the third phase of the PAR to gather 
reflections on the implementation of PBMA and suggestions for refinement of the 
process. Given the specific nature of the focus group, the restricted numbers of people 
directly involved in this research, and that there is no consensus on the required number 
of focus groups (Bryman, 2004), only two focus groups were held. These consisted of 
the directors and managers directly involved in the observation exercise of the 
implementation of PBMA. It is argued that such natural/pre-exi sting groups result in 
more naturalistic discussions that approximate naturally occurring data (such as that 
collected by participant observation) ((Kitzinger, 1994, Kitzinger, 2000). However, 
some commentators suggest that natural groups can often operate with taken-for granted 
assumptions that will not be brought to the fore (Morgan, 1998) and pre-existing styles 
of interaction or status that may have a negative impact on the group interaction 
(Bryman, 2004). As such, the different groups involved in the research (the managers or 
Heads of Service, and the Directors) were separated to limit group dynamics (such as 
hierarchy and power) affecting the data (Kitzinger, 2000). The numbers involved in 
each of the focus groups were kept small as the participants were very involved with the 
topic and were likely to have a lot to say (Morgan, 1998). In total six managers (out of a 
possible nine) and five Directors (in addition to the CE and three PEC Chairs) attended 
the focus groups. 
The focus group for the Directors was held opportunistically following another meeting 
conducted as part of the research, whereas the focus group for the Heads of Service v,, zs 
convened specifically. Prior to running the focus groups, participants were given 
information on the purpose of the research and specific issues that would be discussed 
(Darlington and Scott, 2002). In both cases, this was communicated via email and 
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reiterated verbally at the beginning of the focus group. Additionally, participants were 
given the opportunity to opt out if they felt unwilling or unable to take part. Each of the 
focus groups lasted for around one hour and was run by the researcher who acted as the 
moderator to facilitate and guide the interview (Kitzinger, 2000). Given that the aim of 
the focus group is to elicit the perspectives of those being studied (i. e. the participants) 
it follows that the role of the moderator should not be intrusive nor should the process 
be too structured. As such, participants were encouraged to sit in a circle to establish the 
right atmosphere (Kitzinger, 2000) and the researcher used a topic guide which grouped 
topics into areas of discussion to be raised during the course of the focus group and 
facilitated the discussion (Appendix F). This allowed the researcher to address similar 
research questions across all focus groups, whilst at the same time allowing participants 
to raise their own issues. 
In terms of moderation, Bryman (2004) points out that there is no singularly correct way 
in which focus groups should be moderated or what style of questioning should be used 
and focus groups are affected by various factors such as the nature of the research topic 
and the levels of interest and knowledge among participants in the research. The role 
adopted by the researcher was two-fold - to encourage and allow flowing discussion to 
allow specific issues to come to the fore, and intervening to bring such issues into the 
discussion when other participants did not do so. In this way, some control over the 
interview was relinquished to the participants to allow the discussion to be as broad as 
possible, whilst the researcher intervened only when the discussion veered off on a 
tangent, to urge discussion, or take on the role of 'devil's-advocate' to provoke debate 
(Bryman, 2004). 
94 
Each of the focus groups was electronically recorded with participants' consent in order 
to keep track of what people were saying as well as who was saying it and how they 
were saying it. Following the recorded discussion, participants were invited to discuss 
anything privately and also given the opportunity to contact the researcher in person or 
via email. 
3.5.4 Limits on methods of data collection 
The methods described above have their associated advantages and disadvantages. In 
this research, each of the methods was chosen on the basis that they were most 
appropriate for researching the particular issues in question. Nevertheless there are some 
limitations associated with these methods that should be highlighted. 
First, with respect to interviewing (and, by implication, focus groups) these methods 
rely on verbal responses, i. e. what is said, to infer information about respondents' 
behaviour, meanings, attitudes and feelings (Bryman, 2004). These are not directly 
observed in the interview setting but are the data revealed through questioning (Brewer, 
2000). As such, interviews assume that respondents' descriptions are a reliable 
reflection of their behaviour, meanings etc, and that the questions asked in the interview 
reveal descriptions of the subject intended. Brewer (2000) notes that the second of these 
assumptions can be limited by careful questionnaire design and piloting. The first, 
however, is compounded through interaction with the interviewer. For example, the 
socio-demographics of the interviewer and respondent can influence the interaction 
between them and thus the responses given. The effect of the interviewer on 
interviewees' responses can be moderated by making interviews less structured (more 
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conversational), and having a single interviewer conduct all interviews (thereby making 
the effect constant). However, the interviewer effect can never be entirely eliminated. 
Interviews are often therefore referred to as 'situated understandings' (Brewer, 2000) 
that are specific to the interactional encounter. As such, the data generated through 
interviews are bound to the interviewer and bound to the context within which they 
were conducted, and need to be interpreted in this respect. 
Second, with respect to observation, this is most obviously limited by constraints on the 
role adopted by the observer and the physical location of the observation. In other 
words, only a small part of the subject being researched can be observed and recorded. 
It is therefore important to indicate why some events were observed and others not, so 
as to avoid focussing only on the exceptional or abnormal (Brewer, 2000). Moreover, 
what is observed and recorded is only ever the partial, personal view of the observer. As 
with interviews, this should be accounted for when analysing and interpreting the data 
gathered from such observations. 
3.6 Methods of data analysis and interpretation 
In qualitative research data tend to: come in the form of extracts of natural language that 
are personal to the researcher (who collected them), be voluminous in scale and yet 
generalisable to a limited extent (Pope et al., 2000). Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that analysis of such data should not be or, indeed, cannot be, systematic and rigorous 
(Huberman and Miles, 1988, Brewer, 2000). The method of data analysis adopted 
depends upon what status is attached to the data and how the data will be interpreted 
which is dependent upon the analytical position of the researcher (Silverman, 2001). As 
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Brewer (2000) notes, interpretation is therefore specific to the researcher and is 
dependent upon the researcher's insight into the data. Furthermore, interpretation is not 
independent of analysis and the two are done side-by-side. 
In this research,, the transcribed data from the interviews and focus groups, and the field 
notes and research diary from the observation, formed the formal data for analysis. Data 
collected through interviews, observation, and focus groups were analysed and 
interpreted by themes which were used to provide a detailed descriptive analysis of 
what was happening in the data -a rich description of what people said or did. The 
methods of data transcription and data analysis and interpretation are presented in more 
detail below. 
3.6.1 Transcribing data 
In order to analyse audio recorded data, such as that collected through interviews and 
focus groups for example, it is usual to transcribe it from its original oral form into text. 
In this research, interview data were transcribed verbatim, the most common kind of 
transcription (Rapley, 2007). The researcher transcribed one interview to become 
familiar with the data and decide upon the extent of notation required for subsequent 
analysis. All other interviews were outsourced and transcribed by two qualified 
transcribers with whom the researcher communicated. In each case, the transcription 
was conducted following a number of useful conventions outlined by Rapley (2007). 
First, transcripts were named appropriately so they could be easily identified and 
retrieved. The transcript title included information on the date of the original recording 
and interviewee ID number. Second, those involved in the recording were identified b,,, - 
their title. Third, line numbers Nvere used to enable quick reference to a line of text. 
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Fourth, notation was used to represent what was happening in the text such as pauses. 
overlaps in speech, and interruptions etc (Appendix G). 
Despite being often referred to as a verbatim transcript, it is important to note that 
transcripts are not a comprehensive record of what went on during the recording. As 
Rapley (2007) points out, transcripts are simply translations. In other words, they are 
partial and selective textual representations of the interaction studied. Furthermore, it 
does not follow that a verbatim transcript will accurately capture or express what has 
been recorded. Indeed as Poland (2001) states, the process of transcription itself is 
"inherently problematic" (Poland, 2001 p630) with regard to the quality of 
transcriptions. In particular, Poland (2001) highlights several challenges to transcription 
quality including transcriber problems with sentence structure (knowing where 
conversational sentences begin and end), the use of quotation marks (identifying where 
individuals are mimicking or paraphrasing others), omissions (leaving out words), and 
mistaking words or phrases for others. In order to limit the potential for these problems, 
good quality recording equipment was used and was tested prior to each interview, 
trained and experienced transcribers were contracted to undertake the majority of the 
transcription, and the work of the transcriber was reviewed for quality by reading the 
transcription alongside the audio recording. On this last point, this not only offered a 
useful exercise for checking the quality of the transcription but also provided a way of 
getting to know the data. Mistakes in the transcripts were corrected. However, some 
transcription details were omitted in the presentation of the analysis in the interests of 
readability. 
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The focus group data were transcribed by the researcher. Given that the process of 
transcription is very time consuming, Bryman (2004) advises that in the case of focus 
groups it may not be necessary to transcribe the entire recording, suggesting that 
sections of the interview may be more relevant than others. Only relevant sections of the 
focus groups were therefore transcribed. As above, transcription was conducted 
verbatim, adopting the applicable conventions already discussed. 
3.6.2 Analysis of themes 
There are many approaches to qualitative thematic analysis - two common examples are 
grounded theory and analytical induction (Bryman, 2004). However, some authors 
contend that though much lip-service is paid to these techniques, they are rarely adhered 
to in their entirety (Bryman, 2004, Bryman and Burgess, 1994, Brewer, 2000). As such, 
these authors advocate that analysis should instead be described in terms of a series of 
'basic operations' that are based on the shared principles of analytic induction and 
grounded theory. Such basic operations include coding, the use of memos, and constant 
comparison. 
Data coding, sometimes referred to as indexing, is a way of organising the data into 
manageable units, identifying specific categories or themes in the data (Pope et al., 
2000). The process of coding involves establishing patterns in the data to order and 
explain the data, and examining regularities and variations in the data between the 
categories and themes used to code them. This is described by Fetterman (1998) as a 
process of searching for patterns of thought and action repeated in various situations and 
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with various players, comparing, contrasting, and sorting categories and minutiae until a 
discemable pattem of thought or behaviour becomes identifiable. 
In this research, the transcribed data from the interviews and focus groups and the diary 
data from the observation were read and re-read several times by the researcher. In each 
case,, the data were openly coded by the researcher to categorise significant remarks or 
observations in the data (Bryman, 2004). This involved reviewing and asking questions 
of the text, such as: what the item of data represents, what is happening, what people are 
doing, what people are saying they are doing, and what kind of event is going on? 
(Lofland and Lofland, 1995). A constant comparative approach, comparing data 
categories to ensure all data relevant to each category were identified and examined, 
was used to identify and label common categories emerging from the interview accounts 
(Pope et al., 2000). At this stage, joint data sessions were also held with one of the 
supervisors (MJM) to examine the analysis and supportive evidence and confirm (or 
revise) codes. Following this, the data were further explored and the codes were refined 
by collating or merging codes, where categories were similar or, developing sub-codes, 
where categories required more detail (Gibbs, 2002). This was done by referring back to 
the text and linking codes to contexts, to consequences, to patterns of interaction, and to 
causes (Bryman, 2004). In particular close attention was paid to the identification of 
potentially deviant or negative cases (Becker, 1998). These were used to explain the 
exceptions - those things that did not seem to fit the analysis - which helped to support 
or modify categories. Finally, these codes were further interrogated to identify common 
threads that tie all other categories together into a story (Gibbs, 2002). 
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The coding was facilitated using memos and computer assisted qualitative data analysis. 
Memos, notes written by the researcher for the researcher, served as reminders about 
what was meant by specific terms and phrases used, helped to cement ideas and keep 
track of those ideas, and provided the building blocks for reflection (Bryman, 2004). 
Computerised software, specifically NVivo (NVivo, 2002) was used to aid the coding 
of the interview and focus group data, allowing passages of data to be coded, collated, 
and retrieved speedily and efficiently, whilst also logging and tracing ideas and memos. 
As Fetterman (1998) points out, computers do not replace the researcher and still 
require the eyes and ears of the researcher to determine and interpret categories within 
coding. Due to the nature of the observational field notes, these were coded manually to 
avoid entering all the field notes electronically. 
The themes that emerged from the coding of the data were used to build an account or 
description of what participants said. This was done by examining the codes and re- 
reading the data to identify good examples or extracts of the descriptions of the 
behaviour and the talk that the codes represent (Brewer, 2000). In the case of the 
interview data, the categories developed through the coding were used to build a 'thick 
description' (Geertz, 1973) of what was happening in the data (i. e. the current 
commissioning context). Thick description uses detailed accounts of the social setting to 
inform the understanding of, and create general statements about, the phenomenon 
being researched. Fetterman calls this the 'emic perspective' (the study of phenomena 
from the insider's perspective), and states that this is "instrumental to understanding and 
accurately describing situations and behaviours" (Fetterman, 1998, pg. 20). The 
descriptive results were presented in several forums including to a group of original 
participants in order to verify the findings, and to supervisors, the project steering 
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group, and peer academics to enhance reflexivity (see below). The results from this 
analysis are presented in Chapter 4. In the case of the observational and focus group 
data, less thick description was used and instead attention was paid to specific events or 
key people to identify good examples of the practices observed and discussed. The 
results from these analyses are presented in Chapter 6. 
3.7 Quality and rigour in qualitative research 
As discussed in the methodology (Section 3.4. ), the findings generated from the analysis 
of qualitative research represent one of a range of possible interpretations of reality. As 
such the outputs from qualitative research cannot be judged with respect to whether they 
are an accurate representation of an absolute reality. Indeed, it is often this aspect of 
qualitative research that generates the most criticism. Common critiques of qualitative 
research argue that qualitative research is no more than anecdotal, personal opinion and 
heavily subject to researcher bias; because the research is so personal, another 
researcher may therefore come to different conclusions (Mays and Pope, 1995). As 
such, these criticisms question the reliability, validity and generalisability of the 
research and outPuts. 
Despite the criticisms attributed to qualitative research, it does not mean that qualitative 
research cannot be rigorous or that qualitative researchers should not strive for rigour in 
both the process and the product. However, there is much debate about how to assess 
rigour in qualitative research (Mays and Pope, 2000, Silverman, 2001). Some authors 
advocate the use of identical criteria to those used in positivist quantitative research, 
namely reliability, validity, and generalisability (Mason, 2002, Lecompte and Goetz, 
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1982). Others argue that qualitative research is different and cannot be judged using the 
same criteria used in quantitative research, substituting them instead with interpretivist 
alternatives (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). However, Harnmersley (1992) offers a 
pragmatic approach to assessing the quality of qualitative research that sits somewhat 
between the two positions identified above. Harnmersley (1992) draws on the 
quantitative criteria of validity and reliability as well as interpretivist criteria to specify 
a set of general criteria. These criteria cover two broad areas: truth (or validity) and 
relevance. For Harnmersley, truth or validity is concerned with assessing the plausibility 
and credibility of the claims made in the research and involves taking into account the 
amounts and kinds of evidence used to support such claims (Hammersley, 1992). In 
terms of relevance, Hammersley argues that the research should be judged with respect 
to the importance of the topic within its field or the contribution that it makes to the 
literature in that field, a criterion he refers to as 'value relevant' (Hammersley, 1992). 
In this research, validity was addressed in several ways through respondent validation, 
the explicit exposition of the methods of data collection and analysis, attention to 
negative cases, and reflexivity. Each of these is discussed in more detail below. 
3.7.1 Respondent validation 
As it suggests, respondent validation involves discussing the interpretations produced 
by the researcher with research participants in order to compare the accounts and 
examine the level of correspondence between the two, and thus improve the credibility 
of the research (Mays and Pope, 1995). In this research, participants were asked to 
judge the adequacy of the interpretations on two separate occasions. First, interim 
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results from the interview data were presented to a group of original participants and to 
a research steering group that was made up of a mix of NFIS professionals and 
academics whose role was to provide advice and alternative perspectives on the 
research. Second, the interpretations from the observational and focus group data were 
presented in an internal report on which a selection of original participants were asked 
to comment, and at a regional workshop where attendees were encouraged to offer 
alternative interpretations. Participants' views were used to confirm or revise the 
analytical themes. 
3.7.2 Exposition of the methods of data collection and analysis 
Different research methods can impact on the research in a number ways. Different 
research methods vary in terms of the influence that they may have on participants and 
thus participant behaviour, the type of data that can be collected, and the extent of the 
interpretations that can be made. As such, it is important that methods and data are kept 
in context, since interpretations are tied to the methods used (Brewer, 2000). Brewer 
asserts therefore that a clear account of the methods should do a number of things: 
establish the integrity of the research and author by outlining the grounds upon which 
claims within the data are being justified and outlining the strengths and weaknesses of 
the research design; establish the authority of the data by outlining the coding system 
used to interpret the data, and by providing sufficient data extracts in the text to allow 
readers to evaluate the inferences drawn from them, and the interpretations made of 
them-, and show the complexity of the data, avoiding the suggestion that there is a 
simple fit between the social world being studied and the representation of it (Bre"-er, 
2000). In addition, the methods should be sufficiently explained to permit replication 
(Stiles, 1999). In this research, the methods of both data collection and analysis, 
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including the limitations of those, are presented in detail. Furthermore, in the results 
chapters that follow, data in the form of extracts from interviews, field notes, and focus 
groups are presented to evidence the claims made. 
3.7.3 Attention to negative cases 
'Negative' or 'deviant' cases which may appear to be weak or contradict the arguments 
presented, are analysed and discussed. Brewer (1984) argues that attention to negative 
cases shows how deeply the material has been thought about and can often serve to 
exemplify and support positive cases. In this research, negative cases were sought and 
used to refine the emerging themes and arguments. Furthermore, negative cases were 
used to illustrate the multiple and contradictory descriptions from participants and 
highlight the context of such descriptions. Analysis of negative cases is specifically 
undertaken in Chapter 4. 
3.7.4 Reflexivity 
In qualitative research, the data are created in and through interaction between the 
researcher and participants (whether in an interview, observational work, or focus group 
setting). Reflexivity involves reflection by the researcher on the effect and implications 
of their methods, their values and biases in the analysis and production of the research, 
as well as acknowledgement of the researcher's cultural, political, and social context 
(Bryman, 2004). As such, reflexivity may assist in improving the credibility and thereby 
the quality of the research (Seale, 1999). Reflexivity requires a critical attitude towards 
data and recognition of the influence on the research of such factors as the location of 
the setting. the sensitivity of the topic, power relations in the field and the nature of the 
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social interaction between the researchers and the researched, all of which influence 
how data are generated, interpreted and conveyed in writing up the results (BreýN-er. 
2000). 
Reflexivity is perhaps especially important in this research where questions may be 
raised as to the influence of the background and role of the researcher who is both 
involved in implementing PBMA and studying its implementation. As such, these issues 
were reflected on in the analysis and interpretation of the data using joint data sessions 
with supervisors to examine the arguments put forward. Emphasis on reflexivity is 
drawn out in Chapters 5 and 6, as well as the discussion in Chapter 7. 
3.7.5 Relevance 
Finally, turning to Hammersley's (1992) criterion on relevance, research is deemed to 
be relevant when it adds to the knowledge base or increases confidence in the existing 
knowledge base, an important dimension of which is the extent to which the findings 
can be generalised (Mays and Pope, 2000). Qualitative research is concerned with depth 
as opposed to breadth (Brewer, 2000), and although generalisations should not be 
exaggerated from one or two fields of study, it does not mean that generalisations 
cannot be made. In qualitative research, such generalisations involve theoretical 
inferences from data to develop concepts, connections and empirical applications of the 
data to a wider population (i. e. making inferences about the data that can be applied 
beyond the data on which it is based) (Dey, 1993). Theoretical inferences drawn from 
this research were presented in seminars to health service colleagues from different 
localities in order to gauge the plausibility of such geiieralisations. Feedback from these 
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presentations was incorporated in further iterations of the analysis and in the 
presentation of the results (Chapters 4-6). Furthermore, the methods and results are 
presented in depth in order to enable the reader to judge whether the findings apply in 
similar settings. 
3.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented a detailed account of the methodology and methods adopted in 
this research to study the application of PBMA. Participatory Action Research (PAR) 
was used as a framework to conduct the research in three phases, studying PBMA prior 
to, during, and after its introduction into a commissioning organisation. In-depth one-to- 
one interviews with decision-makers were used to examine the current organisational 
context, processes, and practices into which PBMA was being introduced. Ethnographic 
approaches were used to observe the implementation of PBMA in terms of the 
application and adaptation of PBMA to the organisational context, organisational 
dynamics, participation and motivation, and potential challenges to implementation. 
Focus groups were used to gather reflections and suggestions for refinement of the 
process from the decision-makers and stakeholders involved in the research. This 
chapter outlined each of these methods and their associated limitations. The data 
generated through these methods was subject to an analysis of themes to identify and 
examine common concepts that emerged. The final sections of this chapter discussed 
the issue of achieving quality in qualitative research and the attempts to introduce rigour 
into this research, including the use of respondent validation, clarity and detail in the 
explanation of methods, and the importance of reflexivity. 
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The following chapters detail the results from these methods. Chapter 4 presents the 
results from the interviews undertaken in the first phase of the PAR, providing a thick 
description of the current commissioning context and the constraints inherent in the 
commissioning process from the analysis of themes. Chapter 5 presents the results from 
the first part of the second phase of the PAR, describing the implementation of the 
action (PBMA) as it was applied within a commissioning organisation. Chapter 6 
reports the results from the second part of the second phase of PAR, drawing on the 
analysis of themes of the observation of the implementation of PBMA to build an 
account of how PBMA was applied, how it was received, and how it was adapted. In 
addition, this chapter also presents the results from the focus groups undertaken in the 
third phase of the PAR, again, using an analysis of themes to reflect on the challenges 
of implementing PBMA and suggestions for refinement of the process. 
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Chapter 4 The context prior to the implementation of PBMA: 
results of the analysis of interviews in PAR Phase I 
4.1 Chapter overview 
The previous chapter outlined the methodology and methods employed within this 
thesis to explore commissioning and to study the application of PBMA as a potential 
vehicle for introducing economic principles into the commissioning process. 
Specifically, Participatory Action Research (PAR) was presented as a framework for 
conducting the research. This was divided into three phases, studying PBMA prior to, 
during, and after its introduction into a commissioning organisation. This chapter 
presents the results from the first phase of the PAR exercise - planning a change. In this 
phase, the current organisational context, processes, and practices into which PBMA (as 
the focus of change) was being introduced was examined. Interviews were conducted 
with 22 PCT and SHA decision-makers in northern England to identify how 
commissioning was understood in principle by decision-makers (i. e. how 
commissioning ought to be undertaken), how this translated into practice (i. e. how 
commissioning was undertaken), and finally, decision-makers' reflections on this. An 
analysis of themes was used to empirically analyse the interview data and identify broad 
themes and sub-themes. These themes were used to build a thick description of the 
current commissioning context and the constraints inherent in the current 
commissioning process. The results from the analysis of themes were also used to 
construct a schematic model of commissioning, illustrating how the themes relate to, 
and impact on, each other. 
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4.2 Thematic analysis results 
Codes were developed from the interview data to label common concepts as they 
emerged. In total thirty five codes were identified from which six broad themes were 
generated. These were: commissioning concepts, principles, structures, methods. 
outcomes, and constraints. Figure 4.1 illustrates these codes and the themes and sub 
themes generated from them. The six themes were used to construct a thick description 
of PCT commissioning as perceived by the decision-makers interviewed. The thick 
description is presented under the following headings using anonymised verbatim 
quotes by way of illustration: 1) strategy - the concepts and principles that guide 
commissioning; 2) process - the structures utilised in commissioning and methods that 
drive commissioning in practice; and 3) performance - the outcomes of and constraints 
in the commissioning process. 
4.3 Commissioning strategy: concepts and principles 
In discussing their understanding of commissioning, participants revealed no single 
definition of commissioning. This was highlighted by the interchangeable use of 
terminology (commissioning, priority setting and resource allocation) both within and 
across interview accounts. Despite this, a set of common concepts and principles 
emerged that can be used to illustrate how participants understood commissioning. 
4.3.1 Commissioning concepts 
The existence and need for commissioning was described using three concepts that were 
identified from the interview accounts. These were that: resources are constrained and 
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Figure 4.1 Thematic analysis results 
. loop, 
scarce; resources are competing; and choices over resource use have to be made. Each 
of these is discussed below. 
Resources are constrained and scarce 
Reference to resources tended to focus narrowly on financial resources, rather than 
human resources or time for example. First, financial resources tended to be described 
in relation to the budget received by the PCT from the Department of Health and was 
typically presented as being finite and, as such, constrained. The following extract 
explicitly demonstrates this last point: 
the health budget is very clearly defined and comes as a cash limited sum 
with some elements ofgrowth added on an annual basis. " 
(ID9, Female, PCT Exec). 
Furthermore, as illustrated in the extract below, participants went on to describe 
financial resources as inadequate ("there just there isn't enough money") to meet the 
demands, needs and wants (generically, claims) placed upon the PCT ("to do everything 
that we would like to do"). Financial resources are therefore portrayed as being 
insufficient and thus scarce ("we can't square the circle"). 
"... ultimately it comes back to the fact that there just isn't enough money 
around to do ever thing that we would like to do. ... we're almost in a situation Y 
where we can't square the circle and there isn't a balance between local need 
and the resource that's available. " 
(ID25, Male, PCTNon-Exec) 
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Resources are competing 
Second, as shown in the following extracts, participants often described scarce 
resources as having to be 'battled for' or 'fought over' ("you're [ ... 
] left with [ ... 
] small 
amounts of money to fight over therefore depicting claims on scarce resources 
(here "demands") as 'competing' for scarce resources. 
"... by the time you've dealt with some of the main blocks of planning for the 
next year you're very often left with relatively small amounts of money to fight 
over ... 
(ID29, Male, SHA Director) 
you'll never satisfy all the demands because there'll be competing 
demands. " 
(ID16, Female, PCTNon-Exec) 
Choices have to be made over resource use 
Third, participants described how decisions over resource use had to be made ("we 
decide how we're going to spend the PCTs money") and that this involved making 
choices about who ("who we're going to give it to") and what ("and what for") to 
allocate resources to. Implicitly, this also involves decisions about what or who not to 
allocate resources to and, additionally, how, and when to allocate resources. 
"... we decide how we're going to spend the PCTs money in the next financial 
year, who we're going to give it to and whatfor. " 
(ID7, male, PCTDirector) 
4.3.2 Commissioning principles 
Decisions about what, who, how, and when to allocate resources appeared to be driven 
by three common principles that were identified throughout the interview accounts. 
These principles are summarised below. 
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Claims on resources should be compared andjudged against one another 
First, participants suggested that decisions over claims on resources should be compared 
against each other in some way and that this required an element of judgement in terms 
of assessing the relative "value" or merit of claims. 
"Priority setting is essentially I think about trying to... assess the relative value 
of competing demandsfor resourcesfor investment... " 
(IDI 7, Male, PCT Exec) 
Claims should meet a common set of objectives which need to be 
balanced 
Second, participants suggested that decisions over claims on resources had to meet or 
fulfil a range of objectives and "influences". These were described as clinical objectives 
(e. g. increasing clinical benefits and reducing clinical risks), economic objectives (e. g. 
achieving financial balance), political objectives (e. g. satisfying directives from central 
government, meeting government standards, addressing local demands), and social 
objectives (e. g. improving equity). In the extract below, decision-making is likened to a 
4(spinning" act ("it does feel like you're spinning a lot of plates in the air at the same 
time") in which these objectives and influences have to be closely (and somewhat 
skilfully) monitored in order to ensure that they are kept "spinning" 
"... it does ftel like you're spinning a lot of plates in the air at the same time. 
You've got influences coming from all over the place, iihether they are 
economic, whether the - v're social, whether, you 
know, they are to do with 
political influence... " 
(ID], Female, PCT Exec) 
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The act of decision-making portrayed above is also explicitly depicted in the following 
extract which describes decision-making as "balancing various bits of the jigsaw": 
it's about balancing various bits of thejigsaw. " 
(ID6, Female, PCT Director) 
The implication of this is that these objectives and influences ("various bits of the 
jigsaw") have to be balanced against one another (or, in economic terms, be traded-off 
against one another) when considered within the 'bigger picture' of decision-making. 
Claims should achieve value for money 
Third, participants suggested that decisions over claims on resources should be made in 
such a way as to maintain financial balance and achieve value for money - expressed 
below as "making the biggest amount of impact for the money": 
"At the end of the day we have 1350m of taxpayers money which I am charged, 
as accountable officer, for using wisely i. e. not only using properly ... 
but also, 
for the decisions that we actually make, say 'are we making the biggest amount 
of impactfor the money we get? "' 
(ID5, Male, PCT Exec) 
Indeed some participants positioned this in terms "duty", suggesting that the PCT was 
responsible for ensuring financial balance and value for money on behalf of tax payers 
(as funders of healthcare) and the population served by the PCT (as the users of 
healthcare services): 
"... we do take it very seriously that we are spending public money so we want 
to spend it to make the best possible use of it. We have a duty to do that to 
people. " 
(ID8, Female, PCTNon-Exec) 
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These results show that decision-makers share a common conceptual understanding of 
decision-making. That being: resources are scarce, claims on resources are competing, 
and choices and trade-offs have to be made. Decision-makers even went on to identify a 
common set of commissioning principles that they suggested ought to guide decisions 
about such choices and trade-offs. Collectively, these concepts and principles can 
therefore be defined as comprising the 'commissioning strategy' -a set of normative 
statements about what should guide decision-making. The commissioning strategy 
constitutes the first stage of the schematic model of commissioning discussed in Section 
4.6. 
4.4 Commissioning process: structures and methods 
A large proportion of time in the interviews was spent describing commissioning in 
practice. Specifically two themes emerged from the interview accounts in relation to 
commissioning in practice: commissioning structures and commissioning methods, each 
of which is discussed below. 
4.4.1 Commissioning structures 
A number of structures were identified in the interview accounts. However, this analysis 
focuses solely on PCT structures and their roles in the commissioning process. These 
structures were described by participants as being both formal and semi-formal. 
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Formal structures were portrayed as being those that were accountable and responsible 
for decision-making. Those identified within the interviews included the PCT Board 
and the Professional Executive Committee (PEC): 
the decision-making process within the Trust ... involves primarily working 
with my sort offellow directors through the Executive Team, the Professional 
Executive Committee, and the Board " 
(ID7, Male, PCT Director) 
The PCT Board was described as consisting of both executive and non-executive 
members, whereas the PEC was shown to be primarily made up of primary care 
clinicians and other primary care health professionals as well as members of the PCT 
Executive Board. 
Semi-formal structures were presented as multi-agency stakeholder groups, including 
representatives from provider agencies (both managers and clinicians), primary care 
practitioners, the local authority (where relevant), voluntary groups, and service users: 
it we've got, you know, joint meetings between different primary care 
organisations, we've got decision-making bodies between ourselves and our 
acute providers through what's called the modernisation board, care streams, a 
range of different mechanisms. " 
(IDIO, Male, PCT Director) 
The exact constituency and remit of semi-formal structures tended to vary between 
PCTs, and were also described as varying over time, but they were generally labelled as 
health improvement groups (abbreviated to either HIGs or HIMPs), care streams, 
modernisation groups. or planning groups, that focused on specific disease areas. client 
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groups or policies. On the whole, these groups were managed through the PCT and held 
to account through the formal structures of the PEC and Board. 
Structures were often referred to in terms of their roles within commissioning. The roles 
identified throughout the interview accounts could be divided into fulfilling three main 
functions in the commissioning process: supporting, debating, and endorsing decisions. 
Supporting role of structures 
First, an important role identified throughout the interview accounts was that of 
providing a supportive function in commissioning. In particular, participants 
emphasised the 'bottom-up' support provided by the semi-formal structures, portrayed 
as doing the "legwork" and working out the fine detail for commissioning decisions: 
"So we have a planning system underpinning the Board and the Professional 
Executive Group for all of the major clinical priority areas and other areas 
involved in the NHS Plan. ... and those planning groups 
do all the legwork ... " 
(IDI, Female, PCTExec) 
Debating role of structures 
Second, structures provided a forum for considering and debating commissioning 
decisions prior to making recommendations. For example the PEC was depicted as a 
structure predominantly used to discuss and validate (or 'sound out') decisions with 
primary care clinicians, by providing the opportunity for clinicians to express their 
opinions and put forward their perspective. This is depicted in the following extract as a 
place where "professional voices can be heard" 
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"The role of the PEC quite clearly is to be a place where clinicians and health 
professionals voices can be heard and can take part in decision-making " 
(ID8, Female, PCTNon-Exec) 
Few participants made reference to structures that facilitated consultation with the 
general public in the same way. 
Endorsing role of structures 
Third, structures provided an endorsing function. This role was solely attributed to one 
structure - the PCT Board - which was often referred to as the 'final hoop' through 
which decisions had to pass before being 'signed-off. This role was recognised by 
participants (both Board members and non-Board members) as removed from the "day- 
to-day", "nitty-gritty" commissioning work, conducted by the other structures: 
these things are very much part of the bread and butter of the executive 
team and effectively the staff And that's not really the role of either me or other 
non executives to get involved in the day-to-day nitty gritty. " 
(ID25, Male, PCTNon-Exec) 
This role, therefore, was often described as the "veneer" that was applied to 
commissioning decisions made elsewhere within the organisation: 
"... we'll report to the Board about whether we think what's been agreed, what 
the financial impact is of that on financial balance, and all that. But the board 
isn't going to truly get into the details I think I think that's a veneer I think. " 
(IDI I, Male, PCT Director) 
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4.4.2 Commissioning methods 
The interview accounts revealed that there was no prescribed method for 
commissioning and consequently no single method could be identified as being used. 
Rather, commissioning appeared to be driven by several methods, elements of which 
were used within each of the PCTs. In this respect, five typologies emerged from 
participants' descriptions of commissioning. These present commissioning as being 
'evidence-based', 'political', 'backroom', 'clinical'I and 'historical'. 
Evidence-based commissioning 
'Evidence-based' is used herein as a generic term to denote the use of data and/or 
evidence-based information in commissioning. In terms of data, participants referred to 
the use of routine data such as epidemiological data (e. g. disease incidence, prevalence, 
morbidity, and mortality measures), secondary care data (e. g. hospital activity, length of 
stay, and mortality measures), and primary care data (e. g. consultation, referral, and 
prescribing rates). Evidence and information included: analysis of primary data (e. g. 
needs assessment, clinical, and cost effectiveness analyses); national policy 
documentation and guidance from the DH or NICE; and local reports from the SHA, 
PCT, public health, and local authority. Additionally, there was also reference to tacit or 
experiential evidence such as professional expert or user/carer opinions. There was no 
reference to conducting original research or the use of academic research output. The 
extract below surnmarises the above: 
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"Obviously there's more detailed analysis within each of the care streams 
because you rely on them to do that detailed work, both on historical spend and 
trends; previous investments; needs assessments; NICE guidelines; national 
targets; what users and carers bring to the fore as their priorities; what the 
professionals and trusts themselves are bringing together, so it's a real mix. But 
we try and make it as evidence-based as we can... " 
(ID9, Female, PCT Exec) 
Descriptions in the interview accounts revealed that evidence, as applied to 
commissioning, was utilised in two ways. First, evidence was used to predict or identify 
4problem' areas by highlighting, as in the extract below, "needs" and "gaps" in the 
provision of service and the resources required to meet those needs: 
in trying to identify needs and service gaps etc. they will be using a lot, you 
know, the core statutory collected information whether that is hospital activity 
data, morbidity and mortality data, or anything that the public health 
department normally provides... " 
(IDI, Female, PCT Exec) 
Second, evidence was used to justify or 'lend weight' to decisions in commissioning 
healthcare services. This is illustrated in the following extract which depicts the use of 
evidence in the form of a "check list" to inform decisions. 
i'... the PEC developed a series of statements around decision-making that 
would inform its decisions. ... it's a 
list which has things on like: is this value for 
money?, is it good clinical practice? does it fit with national priorities? has it 
been tested out with users and carers? and such, so they have almost a check 
list. " 
(ID20, Female, PCT Director) 
However, participants suggested that evidence-based commissioning was not 
necessarily practised to the extent that they would have liked or that they deemed to be 
appropriate. It was evident within the interview accounts that evidence-based 
commissioning was not common-place but. rather, something to strive for. 
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Political commissioning 
Many participants portrayed national and local politics as dominating commissioning. 
Reference to national politics was discussed in two ways. 
Firstly, direct reference was made to the impact of Government and Government 
policies on PCTs. Changes in national Government (and therefore policies) and 
reorganisations of structures and roles were perceived as perpetual and integral to 'life' 
in the PCT. Indeed, one participant noted that, "... the only constant thing in all that we 
do is change. " (ID6, Female, PCT Director). Constant change resulted in instability for 
organisations and individuals who depicted themselves as spending most of their time 
learning about forthcoming changes, reacting to them, or recovering from them. Some 
referred to the impact that this has on the organisation (in terms of performance) and 
employees (in terms of job security). 
Secondly, indirect references to politics were discussed in terms of the impact of 
centralised guidance, planning, and monitoring (collectively referred to as national 
drivers hereafter). Those cited in interview accounts included national policy and 
planning guidance issued by the DH (e. g. the National Service Frameworks, the NHS 
plan, Public Service Agreement and access and waiting time targets), as well as 
guidance and targets issued through the special health authorities (e. g. inspection and 
key performance indicators monitored by the Commission for Health Improvement - the 
predecessor to the Healthcare Commission), and mandatory guidance on the provision 
of new technologies (medicines, therapies, and procedures) in the NHS issued by NICE. 
The fixation on these dri'vers is portrayed in the following extract: 
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"The key thing that drives us has to be what comes through ftom national and 
SHA policy and that's what tends to go into the LDP [local delivery plan], so 
that might be the public service agreement targets or other AWS planned 
targets, or NSF targets. It is the central imperatives, the central objectives which 
we tend to look at. " 
(ID31, Female, PCT Director) 
The national drivers were discussed both positively and negatively in the interview 
accounts. Participants emphasised the laudable clinical and moral aims upon which the 
national drivers were perceived to be founded and referred to national drivers as 
providing a clear direction for commissioning based on the collective achievement of a 
common set of goals. However, participants also considered national drivers to be 
contradictory, sometimes irrelevant, narrow in focus, highly prescriptive and inflexible. 
Moreover, the national drivers were typically described by participants as "the must- 
dos" and it was suggested throughout the interviews that the PCTs tended to focus on 
reacting to and directing/allocating resources towards the national drivers first and 
foremost. Colloquial phrases such as the "hang em, flog em' issues"; the "hanging 
offences"; and "P45-ers"', were used by interview participants to suggest the 
seriousness of the implications of not doing so: 
'4... there are obviously must-doS in relation to the NHS plan and meeting 
waiting time targets ... 
by and large the local priorities have been the national 
priorities of access and waiting times, NSFs. The sort of hang em', flog em' 
issues. " 
(ID6, Female, PCT Director) 
With respect to local politics, while only passing reference was made to local 
government, participants focussed on the influence of the SHA which was considered to 
be highly political given its close alignment with the centre (the DH). The SHA's role in 
' In the UK a P4S is a Tax form received from an employer on leaving their employment. It is therefore 
often associated with being made unemployed. 
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commissioning was described as both 'guiding' and 'interfering'. In terms of providing 
guidance, the SHA was perceived by participants as 'holding the reins' for 
commissioning in line with its remit for setting and monitoring the strategic direction 
for commissioning across the health authority area. However, that this often resulted in 
the SHA setting additional targets and performance indicators for PCTs, was regarded 
as interfering. Additionally some participants discussed specific instances where PCTs 
were 'told' where to allocate resources by the SHA. The extract below depicts the roles 
of the SHA from one participant's perspective: 
[talking about what goes into the local decision-making and planning process] 
what the SHA hints, suggests, arm twists, that we actually should be 
thinking about. " 
(ID5, Male, PCT Exec) 
These two roles are also reflected in the interview accounts from SHA participants. 
These depict the SHA as, on the one hand, one of many voices in the system that is 
pointing out a direction for commissioning, and yet on the other, also imply that the 
SHA presides over the final decision to which PCTs are expected to defer: 
"In that sense we [the SHA] appear to bejust another voice in the system, we're 
not controlling it but we are just pointing out that the relative priorities that they 
have appear to be inadequate compared to their mission if you like, and their 
statutory responsibilities. " 
(ID29, Male, SHA Director) 
"If we fundamentally disagree with the way that they [the PCTs] want to 
allocate the resources then we would have to pull them in and say that we 
disagree and argue the case with them why. And we'd expect them to agree with 
us that they've got to balance their freedom against the priorities that are set 
both commonly by all the PCTs and Trusts in this area and ourselves, and their 
local initiatives. " 
(ID27, Male, SHA Non-Exec) 
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Backroom commissioning 
Backroom commissioning was described by participants as an extension of local 
political commissioning. However, in contrast to political commissioning which can be 
considered explicit (given that it is based on fulfilling policies, guidelines, or targets 
with which participants were all familiar), backroom conunissioning is implicit because 
participants were not clear how decisions are made. Backroom commissioning was 
portrayed as being conducted in a closed envirom-nent "a smoke filled room", where 
'big' deals about local priorities and the allocation of 'big chunks' of resource are 
brokered among the chief executives of the most 'important' organisations - the PCT, 
the acute hospital trust, and the SHA. This is reflected in the following extracts: 
clearl there can be a smoke filled room, I guess with the NHS it wouldn't y 
be, but instead a smoke ftee room in which a bunch offairly influential people 
say 'so we'll do it like this then'. " 
(IDI I, Male, PCT Director) 
"... my guess at the moment would be that a lot of the big decisions, the major 
investment decisions, for the next year would be agreed between the Chief Execs 
and the Strategic Health Authority ... 
but us, at the different level, won't really 
know how they came to that decision. " 
(IDIO, Male, PCT Director 
Clinical commissioning 
Clinical commissioning refers to the influence of clinicians (primary and secondary) 
and the clinical setting. This was explained in three ways. 
First, clinicians were recurrently portrayed by participants as vocal in campaigning for 
or against healthcare service (organisational) and technological changes. This is 
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depicted below as clinicians "who are willing to dig their heels in and kick and fight for 
their particular service area": 
if you look at investments ... it has 
been where there have been committed 
clinicians andpeople who are willing to dig their heels in and kick andfightfor 
their particular service area and it hasn't always been 'well this is actually best 
value for money, this makes best use of what tax payers are paying in, this 
achieves better quality of life outcomes overall'. " 
(ID31, Female, PCT Director) 
Participants suggested that a powerful clinical consensus about the best way to manage 
healthcare dominated decision-making and was rarely challenged by the PCT. This view 
was further evident in participants' portrayals of the Royal Colleges f, who were 
depicted as lobbying bodies that impacted on commissioning by contesting decisions 
and shaping legislation. 
Second, clinicians were portrayed as influencing commissioning through their 
behaviour within a clinical setting. Reference was made to GPs in particular whose 
referral patterns, demand management strategies, and prescribing behaviour were 
considered by participants to drive resource allocation decisions: 
" We have to take account of known trends in resource use in areas like 
prescribing, for example, which again we might not have explicitly chosen to 
spend our money on, but is a reflection of individual, you know, it's been a 
clinical decision determined by GPs... " 
(IDI 7, Male, PCT Exec) 
f There are a number of medical Roý'al Colleges England and Wales. Each is responsible for a different 
medical specialty, including Nursing. They generallý' act as advocates for their members by championimz 
tl I within their profession, and engaging with the values of their members, improving standards and training I 
the Rovernment and providing leadership on health and healthcare issues. 
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Third, participants suggested that despite risk management strategies, unplanned events 
in the clinical setting impacted significantly upon commissioning decisions. These 
events were mainly described as administrative changes (e. g. changes in emergency 
admissions procedures), legislative changes (e. g. changes in working times, or wage 
increases), or unforeseen clinical events (e. g. disease outbreaks such as influenza, or 
hospital acquired infections). 
Historical commissioning 
Historical commissioning was described in the interview accounts as allocating 
resources in line with allocations made in previous years with slight adjustments for 
inflation and the addition of new service development funding. The examples used by 
participants portrayed historical commissioning as simply 'recycling' or 'rolling over' 
resources from one year to the next: 
the majority of resources that the PCT get are spent on, you know, the same 
basis that we spent [them] last year. so the vast majority is just sort of 
recycled " 
(ID7, Male, PCT Director) 
This was justified by participants who indicated that the PCT did not start with a 'clean 
sheet of paper' and that patterns of service use were determined by arrangements 
inherited by the PCT from predecessor organisations: 
"In fact a lot of what we do is based on historical reasons. We do a lot of stuff 
that the health authority did before us. " 
(ID8, Female, PCTNon-Exec) 
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Though participants recognised that this method of commissioning was not ideal. they 
also highlighted that the historical pattern of service provision was rarely questioned 
and was not the focus of commissioning decisions which were * fixated' on the 
additional (often referred to as "marginal") new resources: 
"there's a tendency to simply look at the marginal new money rather than the 
totality of the resource ... recognising that at the moment we're 
dealing with a 
fixation of the marginal new monies. " 
(ID24, Male, PCT Director) 
Participants therefore speculated that some current patterns of service use were perhaps 
redundant, but making changes to these current patterns was a major challenge for 
commissioning. This is described below with reference to the lack of prioritisation of 
"established activity". 
"I mean the biggest problem about resource allocation is that you can't 
necessarily achieve rapid shifts in the balance of resources between what you 
might like to do ideally in terms of resource allocation and reflecting priorities. 
Because essentially you've got an enormous burden ifyou like, or under-burden, 
of established activity which isn't necessarily overtly prioritised " 
(ID25, Male, PCTNon-Exec) 
These results illustrate the structures and methods that guide decision-making in 
practice (as opposed to in principle, as reflected in the results presented in 4.3). The 
results show that there are a number of structures within the PCT with roles for 
identifying, debating and validating, and endorsing commissioning decisions. However, 
the methods used by the PCT to make decisions, including political, historical, and 
clinical commissioning seem to be influenced by a number of structures external to the 
PCT such as NICE, the DR SHA. and the Acute Trusts. Furthermore, it is not clear 
how the commissioning concepts and principles outlined above in the commissioning 
strategy are realised through the PCT structures or the commissioning methods. The 
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themes of structures and methods used in commissioning can be described as 
constituting the 'commissioning process' as illustrated from a positive perspective. The 
commissioning process constitutes the second stage of the schematic model of 
commissioning as discussed in section 4.6. 
4.5 Commissioning performance: outcomes and constraints 
Reflecting on the commissioning process, participants focussed on what they perceived 
to be the weaknesses of the current system. Two themes emerged from the interview 
accounts that presented these weaknesses as first, negative outcomes of the 
commissioning process, and second constraints in the commissioning process. 
4.5.1 Commissioning outcomes 
Participants consistently and repeatedly referred to the commissioning process as ad- 
hoc,, reactive, and, by implication, lacking 'rationality', strategy, planning and 
management. Specifically, the second of the extracts below depicts this using the 
metaphor of bridge building to contrast a rational planning process involving identifying 
the type of bridge needed, the cost of the bridge, and project managing the build of the 
bridge, with the reality of PCT commissioning which is, by implication, reactive, 
lacking any fonnal structure and planning. 
"I don't think we are always ... taking decisions based on evidence, objective 
information that we examine in depth. I don't think we look at best value in 
terms of the use of resources. And I don't think we look at any concept of health 
gain in terms of the decisions that we take. " 
(IDI, Female, PCT Exec). 
"... the idea that we have a rational planning process is a bit like, you know, 
we're going to build a bridge so we will get some resources, we will choose a 
, 
fordable, we'll do some project management to build it, and it's design that's qf 
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nonsense. It's more like they look out there and think, 'oh they're building a 
bridge over there, better get out there and work out how we're going to afford 
it'. And actually nobody in this age does the planning permission bit or the 
setting up thefeasibility, nobody ever does that. " 
(ID29, Male, SHA Director) 
Furthermore, participants emphasised the lack of transparency in the process, noting 
that, although they desired transparency in commissioning ("we strive for 
transparency") and there were systems in place that should have ensured transparency in 
commissioning ("In theory it is of course [transparent], you know it comes up through, 
goes through the Board, the Board makes the decision"), the basis upon which the 
commissioning decisions were made and where they were made was often not clear. 
"I mean we aim to be a transparent organisation [ ... jI think we strive for 
transparency but I don't think we achieve 100% transparency at the moment. " 
(ID. 12, Male, PCTNon-Exec) 
"Ifyou ask members of the public, most NHS staff, a lot of GPs, they wouldn't 
know what the decision-making process is. So it's definitely not transparent. In 
theory it is of course, you know it comes up through, goes through the Board, 
the Board makes the decision. But when it actually comes to making the 
decisions, where the decisions are made, that's not transparent. Nor are the 
criteria on which those decisions are based " 
(IDIO, Male, PCT Director) 
Additionally, participants discussed, with mixed views, the 'fairness' of the process. As 
with all these outcomes, there was consensus that an unfair process would be an 
accidental (rather than deliberate) consequence, but that it was hard to judge whether 
faimess was achieved: 
we do aim to be fair, but it's not always that easy given that some things are 
historically weighted one way or another. It's quite hard to move ftom a 
historical perspective to a current perspective. " 
(ID8, Female, PCTNon-Exec) 
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4.5.2 Commissioning constraints 
Constraints on PCTs (the organisation and individuals within the organisation) in the 
commissioning process were defined as limiting the ability of the PCT and decision- 
makers to undertake commissioning and were used to explain or justify the 
commissioning outcomes. In the interview accounts commissioning constraints were 
commonly described in three ways: a lack of control and choice in commissioning, a 
lack of capacity in commissioning, and a lack of cooperation in the commissioning 
process. 
Lack of control and choice in commissioning 
In the first of these constraints decision-makers suggested that local commissioning was 
controlled by organisations and structures outside the PCT. In particular, participants 
tended to focus on the influence of central government and the impact of national 
drivers which were perceived to dominate commissioning and drive commissioning 
from the top: 
"... there's a lot of control ftom above from the Government, so we have a lot of 
national targets to meet and that's not an option, we have to meet them. " 
(ID8, Female, PCTNon-Exec) 
Indeed, in the extract below decision-makers are described as being agents of the 
government and the PCT is portrayed as an implementer of Government targets without 
question or active involvement - it is simply an extension of the Government: 
" 1eah, and also the position ftom above and, you know, I've lost count the 
number of times GPs tell me, in the mostftiendly manner, you know, don't take 
it personalýv, we're just saying, we see the PCT as agents of the Government, 
1, ou know, you have Government targets you're tasked to achieve. 
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(ID], Female, PCT Exec) 
Furthermore, participants suggested that the focus of local level commissloning was on 
the implementation of centrally driven and monitored objectives, and that the 
performance management of national drivers (described in Section 4.4.2) meant that 
resources were often directed toward meeting the national drivers at the expense of local 
priorities, illustrating tension between national and local decision-making: 
"... in reality there is a lot of constraint about what we can ... what we have the fteedom to do because it's either prescribed because of a range of national, 
eitherftameworks or objectives in some key performance indicators. " 
(ID. 16, Female, PCTNon-Exe) 
"... national targets [push] you to invest in areas that you wouldn't necessarily 
see as a local priority at the expense of those local priorities. " 
(ID7, Male, PCTDirector) 
In these descriptions, participants position themselves (both explicitly and implicitly) as 
having little choice or control in local commissioning decisions which are constructed 
as being driven centrally through the national targets. Indeed, as one participant puts it 
ccyou aren't a total free agent", equating the process to one of being in a "strait-jacket of 
national prescription": 
" Well the important thing is that a lot of activity actually comes badged and you 
get specific funding for doing specific things. So in a sense you aren't a total 
ftee agent. There are discretionary things, for example the whole area of 
fertility treatment untilfairly recently has been one which has historically been 
left for local determination. And we're now getting a policy line established 
through the government which is seeking to standardise. Its actually 
interestingly standardising at a lower level of service than we currently operate, 
so that's an interesting one. There aren't sort of clear and strai&forward 
answers to these things, because although youfeel as ifyou are and to a degree 
you are in a strait jacket of national prescription ftom which follows national 
rcsource there is no, flexibility on the margin to actually be able tofollow some 
of the local issues. - 
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(ID25, Male PCTNon-Exec) 
In this extract, the extent of control exerted by the national drivers is Illustrated using 
the example of central policy being imposed in the area of fertility treatment to denote 
the level of 'prescriptivism' faced by local decision-makers. The construction of local 
commissioning as restrained and controlled by the imposed national drivers is also 
replicated in the extract below: 
"The big question is, is there too little or too much national guidance? I think 
everybody would say there is too much. There is very little room for manoeuvre. 
The agenda is so fast that one of the reasons we don't commission properly is 
that we don't have the time to do it properly because we're always reacting to 
another national initiative or another target. " 
(ID5, Male, PCT Exec) 
Again, in this description, decision-maker 5, a PCT Exec, portrays the national drivers 
as being prolific ("... there is too much"), constraining ("There is very little room for 
manoeuvre"), and driving local decisions ("we're always reacting to another initiative or 
another target"). 
As well as the Govemment, other health sector organisations, particularly the Acute 
Trusts (hospitals) were also depicted as asserting control over the commissioning 
process. The following extracts describe how control is held by the Acute Trusts (or is 
perceived to be held): 
And let's be honest about it, Acute Trusts have always felt they'l, e had the 
power in the s, vstem, they've wielded the clout and that nobody can challenge 
them. Well commissioning on a [larger scale] puts us on an equalfooting it-ith 
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them. And hopefully when we ask them things now they will tell us, because 
they've [the Acute Trusts] pulled the wool over our eyes something chronic. 
And it's really difficult getting decisions out of them. And things like... and 
services still get provided and patients still access things, but we haven't had 
service level agreements for all the services that we've been commissioning. 
And it's just impossible to find out the information on that. So I hope that the 
new approach to commissioning means that maybe we'll be able to get good 
information, get them [Acute Trusts] to take us seriously, which I don't think 
they have up to now. " 
(ID8, Female, PCTNon-Exec) 
In the above extract, the Acute Trusts are positioned as more powerful and more 
aggressive. Additionally, the extent to which the Acute Trusts hold control is further 
illustrated here by describing how services have been provided without the knowledge 
of the PCT, and the absence of contracts for the provision of those services. 
"Hospitals hold all the aces at the moment. And therefore the problem with the 
hospital holding all the aces is their motivation is not a resident based one, it's 
an organisational based one and the hospital'sjob is to make their organisation 
successful by providing very good, high quality cost efficient services. They're 
not too worried what goes on anywhere else. That's where the PCTs need to 
come in and take charge of those negotiations. " 
(ID26, Male, SHA Exec) 
In the second of the extracts (above), commissioning is depicted as a game of cards that 
the Acute Trusts, as winners, are in charge of (i. e. controlling). Furthermore, it is 
implied that the PCT needs to contest the control of the Acute Trusts and take charge of 
commissioning itself 
Lack of cooperation in commissioning 
In the second of these constraints, participants described a lack of cooperation in 
commissioning between themselves and the other individuals and organisations that 
make up the health service. Indeed the healthcare system Nvas often presented as 
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fragmented - split by organisational boundaries that created barriers (obstacles or 
hurdles) inhibiting cooperation in commissioning. This is explicit in the extract below 
which refers to the health service as made up of separate, competitive, structures: 
"Right. Well I suppose I mentioned barriers in that I ... this very much reflects 
me personally, but because I came to health completely green, I was ver much Y 
struck by how it is not ... it isn't a national service, it isn't an integrated service, 
and, you know, the word silos are often used, you've got all these ... separate 
structures and competitive. You know, you'd see that there is a sort of between 
... you 
know, even within the city there was this sort of competitive approach 
I 
... 
I" 
(ID16, Female, PCTNon-Exec) 
Furthermore, participants reasoned that the health service was not only fragmented by 
the bricks and mortar that constituted the separate organisational structures, but that 
these structures created and were defined and maintained by organisational and 
professional boundaries that supported different cultures, objectives, and behaviours 
that ultimately inhibited a collective approach to commissioning. This view is reflected 
in the following extracts: 
"big boundaries are between ourselves and the secondary and tertiary sector 
which are largely historical in terms of the secondary care not fully 
understanding the new role of the primary care commissioning process and 
being somewhat distrusýful of it in terms of losing out or all the rest of it. 
(ID12, Male, PCTNon-Exec) 
people have, you know, been there a long time, they work to a ... in a 
particular way and it's ... it takes a 
long, long time to change behaviours 
throughout the organisations. [ ... 
] So there is still very distinct sort of medical 
barriers, you know, medical behaviour boundaries. I don't want to sort of 
attribute them to any one profession but they are medical organisational 
boundaries that we have always done things like this, you know... " 
(ID16, Female, PCTNon-Exec) 
Not only were organisational and cultural boundaries highlighted by participants as 
inhibiting a collaborative approach to commissioning, but they were also described as 
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causing hostility 
collaboration: 
and conflict between organisations, thus further inhibiting 
"I think currently the way we think about services and the way secondary care 
providers think about services is different and is configured differently and we 
haven't cracked a way at arriving at a joint view through participation on both 
sides. So they come to a conclusion, we come to a conclusion and then some 
outcome is brokered in sometimes quite brutal decisions about money or 
power. 
(IDI I, Male, PCT Director) 
"It's actually, up until now we've been saying, and the battle is does it go into 
tertiary, secondary primary and indeed social. There's also a history I think of 
distrust in terms of local authority and Health in the fact that local authorities 
think Health are loaded with money, and Health thinking the local authorities 
all they want to do is grab health's money and run. And again this is ... that is 
cultural barriers. " 
(ID5, Male, PCT Exec) 
Notably, in the extract above, decision-maker 5, a PCT Executive, suggests that 
decision-making (and resource allocation specifically) is a "battle" and that 
organisational boundaries give rise to cultural barriers which in turn divide 
organisations and create a climate of distrust. This latter point is further illustrated in the 
extract below: 
"The organisations have traditionally tended to operate as islands and sort of 
pull up the drawbridges and not want to share risk across, so the game has been 
to load the risk into the other organisations, financial or management or 
whatever it is, and that's the PCT... the commissioners as well, you know. " 
(ID31, Female, PCTDirector) 
In this extract, the use of islands and drawbridges to represent health service 
organisations emphasises the lack of communications and cooperation between these 
1- 
1) 
organisations. Here, conflict (the commissioning 'battle') is portrayed as inevitable -a 
symptom of divided organisations lacking in communication and trust. 
Lack of capacity in commissioning 
The last of these constraints was actually often cited by participants as the most 
significant in commissioning: 
"Capacity is the biggest constraint ... there's 
loads of data around but what we 
don't have is the capacity, be that human beings or be it information systems to 
analyse that and turn it into usable information ". 
(ID20, Female, PCT Director). 
Specifically, capacity was portrayed in three ways - as human capacity (i. e. in terms of 
the number of people involved in commissioning), capability (i. e. in terms of ability to 
undertake commissioning), and time (i. e. in terms of the amount of time dedicated to 
commissioning). In their descriptions, each definition of capacity is constructed as 
deficient - lacking people, skills, and time for commissioning. 
The following extracts illustrate the different definitions used to describe capacity. The 
first of these highlights capacity in terms of human capacity and capability. Participants 
commonly reported that the number of individuals possessing analytic and critical 
appraisal skills was limited: 
"I think that there's very little ... there's not enough people with information 
handling and analytical skills within the NHS -I think they are in short supply. 
And we do need to find ways of accessing that sort of expertise. But in a way 
that can be, notjust vested in a handful of experts, but translated into knowledge 
which helps structure people's thinking, yeah? ". 
(IDI 7, Male, PCT Exec) 
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Furthermore, participants commonly referred to a lack of support tools or methods, and 
a lack of information that they perceived necessary for enhancing capability for 
commissioning: 
(( our problem is that we haven't got a systematic approach and we haven't got 
the information and all the other things that we would need in order to do that " 
(ID31, Female, PCT Director) 
"in some instances it's quite surprising I think that, you know, the lack of data 
you might imagine is just routine even down to, you know, 'how many people is 
a certain service treating? ' You know, sometimes that basic in rmation is not Ifo 
there. 
(ID7, Male, PCTDirector) 
Time was depicted in two ways - first, in terms of the amount of time that could be 
dedicated to commissioning and, second, in terms of the experience of decision-makers 
and the organisation more broadly (i. e. length of time in service). The extract below 
indicates the first of these, portraying commissioning as requiring a lot of time to do 
4 properly'. Thus, given that time is limited (there are only a set number of hours in a 
day), the amount of time that can be spent on commissioning is restricted: 
"The big things which I think impede the commissioning process, and I think 
this is what it's about, prioritisation is a part of the commissioning process, . 
1; 
information and 2; capacity, management capacity, the time to be able to say, 
let's look at the evidence, let's look at the needs of our local population, let's 
look at, you know, best models ofpractice ftom other areas, let's look at saying, 
you know, if we're prioritising that also it is about saying ... not necessarily 
about saying well it's either this one or that one, but about saying well we could 
gofor eitherlor, or we could say a cut down modelfor both of them, or we could 
say let's look at different models altogether and that actually requires an awful 
lot qf time, it's not just about picking and choosing between two different 
things. " 
(ID31, Fcmale, PCT Director) 
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The second depiction of time as experience was described by participants in terms of the 
fact that human capacity and capability for commissioning can only be acquired over 
time and that an immature organisation (one that has not been in existence long), 
necessarily lacks capacity for commissioning. In the extract below, decision-maker 19, a 
PCT director, describes the 'newness' of the PCT and the problems of this associated 
with commissioning. Specifically, the lack of capacity in commissioning is directly 
attributed to the length of time that the organisation has been in existence. This is 
further demonstrated by the suggestion that time (and a stable period of time) is the 
panacea that the PCT needs to be able to develop capacity for commissioning. 
"... so you go back to the fact of, as a new organisation, PCTs do have capacity 
problems in taking on all the workload, because we have if you think about it, 
had quite a lot to cope with, certainly this year we've had the new GMS contract 
and that meant not only discussing it and trying to get our heads around it, but 
at this year end we've had to sort out thirty three contracts, you know, we had to 
do the year end, we're doing the budgeting, and certainlyftom my perspective I 
haven't got any more staff, you know so they all wear several hats, and despite 
the best planning you could do, we are finding that it is difficult to deliver on 
some of the timescales, but I think that's part of the reason there is an interest in 
working the PCTs, you are not tied to a narrow area, and it is changing, and 
hopefully now that we've become more mature as an organisation, we've got the 
capacity and if we have got a stable period we can actually develop more, and 
we can demonstrate to people the benefit of having a [Nowhere] PCT which 
does try to look at things in a new light, isn'tforever leading with, you know, the 
money where it was originally invested, but is prepared to try and change things 
for the betterfor the population. " 
(ID19, Male, PCT Director) 
These results describe the outcomes resulting from the commissioning process 
(described in the previous section), and the constraints in the commissioning process. In 
terms of outcomes, decision-makers portrayed the commissioning process as 
unsystematic and lacking transparency. Furthermore, they highlighted several 
constraints or barriers in the commissioning process that justified these outcomes. In 
particular, the commissioning process was depicted by decision-makers as dominated 
by politics, controlled by central government through the implementation of national 
performance assessment targets and national guidelines. Additionally, decision-makers 
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described the impact of organisational boundaries in creating and maintaining different 
(and often conflicting) cultures, which prevented organisations cooperating with one 
another; and generated hostility between organisations. Finally, decision-makers 
identified a number of deficiencies that limited their ability to undertake commissioning 
including a lack of capacity (i. e. numbers of people), capability (i. e. skills, data and 
information), and time. Commissioning performance is defined in relation to the 
commissioning strategy. Together, the outcomes, as weaknesses resulting from the 
commissioning process, and the constraints, as barriers inherent in the commissioning 
process, describe the 'commissioning performance'. The commissioning performance 
constitutes the third stage of the schematic model of commissioning as discussed below 
in section 4.6. 
4.6 Schematic model of PCT commissioning 
The empirical evidence generated from the thematic analysis of the interview accounts 
was used to construct a schematic model of PCT commissioning. The model 
encompasses the key themes discussed in this chapter and seeks to provide an overview 
of how these themes relate to, and impact on, each other in the current context of 
commissioning. The model is presented in Figure 4.2, and illustrates the results in three 
stages from setting the commissioning strategy, executing the commissioning process, 
and reflecting on the performance of the commissioning process. 
The commissioning strategy is illustrated on the left of this figure and illustrates the 
commissioning concepts and commissioning principles as a set of normative statements 
about what should guide decision-making within the PCT. It is interesting to note, given 
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the remit of this thesis, these commissioning concepts and principles are not dissimilar 
to those concepts and principles promoted within health economics. 
However, the commissioning process, pictured in the centre of this figure, is less 
straightforward than the simple application of the commissioning strategy would 
perhaps suggest. The commissioning process illustrates, from a positive perspective, 
how commissioning is undertaken, the PCT structures utilised in commissioning, the 
impact of structures external to the PCT, and the resulting methods that drive 
commissioning. Indeed, structures external to the PCT (central government and health 
authorities, special health authorities, decentralised government and health authorities, 
healthcare providers, and patients and the public) are shown as influencing the PCT 
structures and thus the commissioning methods which consist of a mix of evidence- 
based, political, clinical, historical, and backroom commissioning. As such, although 
the commissioning strategy outlines a set of concepts and principles for guiding 
decision-making it is not clear that these are translated into practice through the process 
of commissioning. There is a disconnection between the PCT commissioning structures 
and the commissioning methods (as demonstrated by the broken line connecting the 
structures and methods in Figure 4.2). These methods are dominated more by the 
structures external to the PCT. Therefore even if the commissioning concepts and 
principles are present in the PCT structures they do not drive commissioning. 
Commissioning performance, on the right of Figure 4.2, highlights the deviation of the 
commissioning process from the commissioning strategy. Relative to the 
commissioning strategy, commissioning performance is illustrated as being poor. This 
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is defined by the commissioning outcomes which demonstrate weaknesses of the 
process, and the commissioning constraints which demonstrate the barriers inherent in 
the PCT that limit their ability to undertake commissioning in line with the strategy and 
justify the commissioning outcomes. 
4.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the results from the first phase of the PAR - planning a change - 
which examined the current organisational context within which the research was being 
conducted. The results of the analysis of the interview data were used to build a thick 
description of the current commissioning context and the constraints inherent in the 
commissioning process. In addition, the empirical evidence generated through the 
analysis was used to construct a schematic model of PCT commissioning. 
These results show that there seems to be a level of common understanding and 
acknowledgement amongst decision-makers that resources are scarce, claims on 
resources are competing, and that choices and trade-offs have to be made. Decision- 
makers even identified a common set of commissioning principles that they have 
suggested ought to guide decisions about such choices and trade-offs. It is encouraging 
to observe that there seems to be a level of common- understanding amongst decision- 
makers of what commissioning is about. Furthermore, these principles are not dissimilar 
to those promoted within health economics. 
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However, less encouraging but not so surprising, is the evidence that these principles do 
not seem to translate to practice. Although a number of structures with roles for 
identifying, debating and validating, and endorsing commissioning decisions were 
identified within the PCT, the process and the resulting decisions appeared to be driven 
by structures outwith the PCT through political, historical and clinical commissioning 
'methods'. As a result, the outcomes of the commissioning process defined the process 
as unsystematic and lacking transparency, and constraints inherent in the process were 
identified as limiting the PCTs and decision-makers' ability to undertake 
commissioning in line with the strategy and justified the commissioning outcomes. 
The next chapter presents the results from the first part of the second phase of the PAR 
- the action - and describes the application of PBMA as a potential vehicle for 
introducing economic principles into the commissioning process within a 
commissioning healthcare organisation in an attempt to improve the commissioning 
outcomes and to overcome the commissioning constraints identified here. 
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Chapter 5 The application of PBMA: res u Its of the 
implementation of PBMA in PAR phase 11 
5.1 Chapter overview 
The previous chapter presented the results from the first phase of the PAR - planning a 
change - which examined the current organisational context within which the research 
was being conducted. Specifically, Chapter 4 provided a thick description of the current 
commissioning context and the constraints inherent in the commissioning process. The 
second phase of the PAR involved acting and observing a change. This chapter presents 
the results from the first part of this phase - the action - and describes the application of 
PBMA as implemented within a commissioning organisation as a potential framework 
to overcome the constraints identified in Chapter 4. The Chapter is structured as 
follows. The following section (5.2) outlines the organisational context for the research, 
including the role of the researcher in the organisation with respect to both the 
development and implementation of PBMA, and the observation of it. The third section 
(5.3) reports the application of PBMA to the organisational context in relation to the '7 
steps' outlined in Chapter 2,2.2.3. This section describes how the 7 steps were 
developed iteratively and interactively with decision-makers and stakeholders, and 
applied within this organisational context. The observational results from the 
application of PBMA are discussed in the following Chapter (Chapter 6). 
5.2 The organisational context 
The focus for the research was the North of England. The research took place during the 
ty (SHA) financial year 2004-2005. At this time,. the regional Strategic Health Authori 
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had recently issued a new 'vision' for health and healthcare in the region 
(Northumberland Tyne and Wear Strategic Health Authority, 2004). As part of this, 
planning and commissioning were identified as integral to achieving this vision. Indeed 
the SHA stated that Local Delivery Plans (herein LDPs): 
need to be developed based on a transparent and comprehensive assessment of 
existing activities, capabilities and shorýfalls within and across organisations. 
Rather than concentrating on incremental changes and investment around the 
margins the focus should be on the whole of services. Where gaps exist and 
reform is necessary to delivery it needs to be identified at the early planning 
stage and should be able to demonstrate the efficiency gains both in terms of 
qualitative and quantitative outcomes. 
(Northumberland Tyne and Wear Strategic Health Authority, 2004). 
In line with this new vision, changes in the commissioning arrangements in the region 
resulted in the creation of a new organisation referred to here as the 'Commissioning 
Consortium'. The Commissioning Consortium constituted three primary care 
organisations (here, PCTs). The three PCTs that made up the Consortium covered a 
geographical population of approximately 800,000 and had a combined operating 
budget of approximately GBf-I billion. The management team of one of these PCTs 
took on the additional role of the single management team for the Consortium. The 
Consortium was responsible for commissioning acute services only on behalf of the 
Consortium. Primary and social services continued to be commissioned by each of the 
PCTs independently of the Consortium. In the case of the PCT that shared its 
management with the Consortium, the Consortium had additional responsibility for 
commissioning primary and community care from the PCT provider arm. 
The Commissioning Consortium single management team consisted of the Chief 
Executive (CE), 5 Directors (typical to most PCTs), and 9 Heads of Service. The Heads 
146 
of Service were organised into streams of care -a common set or 'portfolio' of services 
for which they were responsible for managing and commissioning. The organisation of 
the management team is illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
The CE of the Commissioning Consortium was responsible for implementing the 
SHA's vision for commissioning and was keen to see how PBMA could be utilised 
within the commissioning process. At his request, a macro (organisation wide) PBMA 
exercise was undertaken to identify priorities for commissioning that would inform the 
LDP which spelled out the commissioning intentions of the Consortium for the 
forthcoming three years. 
Figure 5.1 Commissioning Consortium organisational chart 
Chief Executive (CE) 
Director of Commissioning I 
i Head of urgent care I 
I Head of planned care I 
Director of Public Health 
Head of ongoing care I 
Head of health maintenance 
Director of Finance 
Head of finance and service agreements 
Director of Performance 
I Head of performance management I 
Head of women's and children's services 
Director of Service Redesign I 
Head of mental health scrN ices 
Head of N asCLIlar services 
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5.2.1 The role of the researcher 
For the period of the research, the researcher (the author of this thesis) spent three days 
a week working for the Director of Public Health (DPH) within his directorate, to apply 
PBMA and conduct the observation. The DPH himself, held an honorary post at the 
same University as the Researcher and had prior experience of and exposure to PBMA, 
albeit from a practical, as opposed to academic, perspective. Furthermore, the DPH had 
recently been appointed in the Consortium and, as the researcher (noted below), had a 
lot invested both personally and professionally in the successful completion of the 
PBMA exercise. 
As an employee within the Directorate of Public Health, the researcher was called on to 
collect, collate and analyse data and information required for all the stages of the PBMA 
exercise. In addition, the role of the researcher also required advising the DPH when 
asked, working closely with him to develop and refine his ideas, and helping to present 
the PBMA exercise both within and outside the organisation. Unless otherwise stated, 
the researcher was present at all the meetings referred to in this Chapter. The role of the 
researcher during such meetings was primarily observational, though there were a few 
occasions where the researcher's opinion was directly sought and consequently given. 
In circumstances where the researcher's attendance at meetings was restricted (because 
access was not granted by the CE), informants (such as the DPH or other members of 
the Working Group) were interviewed following the meetings in order to elicit their 
perceptions and observations. Unlike the formal interviews conducted in Chapter 4. 
these interviews were informal in the sense that they x,,, -ere not electronically recorded or 
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transcribed. However, verbal consent was obtalned to record the interviews as part of 
the observational field notes (Chapter 6,6.2). 
As well as being an employee within the organisation under observation, the researcher 
was employed as a health economist at the University and was undertaking this research 
in part towards a PhD, of which this thesis is the result. As a health economist, though 
not an established proponent of PBMA, the researcher was keen to highlight the 
potential of PBMA for commissioning and for the organisation to explore this potential 
by adapting it to their context. In light of this, the role adopted by the researcher 
throughout the research was predominantly that of an advocate of PBMA, though this 
was tempered to avoid being labelled or portrayed as a PBMA evangelist -a role often 
attributed somewhat negatively to the DPH by others within the organisation. 
Furthermore, the fact that much of the research was being used for a PhD increased the 
pressure to maintain the exercise and obtain a substantial set of data. The dual role of 
being an organisational employee yet conducting PhD research, however, seemed to go 
unnoticed by colleagues in the organisation who reacted as though they saw either one 
role or the other, not both. To some colleagues, therefore, the researcher was just 
another member of staff who worked for the DPH's team, while, to others, the 
researcher was external to the organisation, 'just a student', and someone with whom 
they could confide about problems with other colleagues for example. 
5.2.2 Gaining access and stakeholder buy-in 
An outline of the proposed PBMA exercise was developed by the researcher in 
collaboration with the DPH and agreed by the three PCT CEs that made up the 
Consortium. Following this, a detailed project plan and timetable Nvere submItted and 
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signed-off by the Consortium CE (Appendix E). The project plan and timetable were 
presented to the Consortium Executive Board (CEB) where it was actioned by the 
Directors in absence of the CE (who was on annual leave). Additionally, the project 
plan was presented to the Heads of Service and the Directors at the Heads of Service 
away day. This meeting was convened by the CE (who chaired the proceedings) to 
address new staff and formally introduce the Commissioning Consortium. At this 
meeting the DPH and the researcher provided training to empower stakeholders with 
knowledge about PBMA and enable them to build a sense of ownership over the 
process. Training included presentations on the fundamentals of economics, economics 
approaches to commissioning, an introduction to PBMA, and the proposed project plan 
for the Consortium PBMA exercise. A copy of this presentation is given in Appendix H. 
Meetings were also held between the DPH and the Chairs of the three Professional 
Executive Committees (PECs) in each of the PCTs to engage them in the early stages of 
the process. A summary of the main groups involved in the PBMA exercise is presented 
below in Table 5.1 and also illustrated in Figure 5.3 in 5.3.3, whilst a summary of the 
meetings referred to above is provided in Table 5.2 below. 
Table 5.1 Cast list of individuals involved in the PBMA exercise 
Commissioning Consortium Chief Executive ......................... Advisory Panel 
Commissioning Consortium Directors (5) .............................. Advisory Panel 
Heads of Service (9) ....................................................... Heads of Service 
PCT PEC Chairs (3) ......................................................... Advisory Panel 
.................................................................................... 
Stakeholder Group 
PCT PEC Members (60) ................................................... Stakeholder Group 
Director of Public Health ................................................... Advisory Panel 
........................................ I ........................................... 
Working Group 
Researcher .................................................................... 
Working Group 
Information Officer ........................................................... Working Group 
Public Health Trainee ........................................................ Working Group 
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Table 5.2 Meetings conducted and observed as part of the PBMA 
process 
Meeting Purpose Date Observation 
status 
First Advisory CEB forms Advisory Panel. 
Not present 
Panel PBIVIA project plan signed- 22/09/04 Key informant 
off DPH 
Agreement and sign-off of Not present Second Advisory benefit criteria and decide 30/09/04 Panel who should weight them and Key informant 
how DPH 
Heads of Service Project plan presented alon 9 8/10/04 Present 
away day with introduction to PBIVIA 
Third Advisory Review of programme 18/10/04 Present Panel budgeting data 
Inform of progress on the 
Lunchtime seminar PBIVIA, share information 
to support Heads and experiences with peers, 30/11/04 Present 
of Service raise any 
problems/questions 
Fourth Advisory Initial review of business 02/12/04 Present Panel cases 
8/12/04 
(Consortium 
Fifth Advisory Weeding out of business wide) Present Panel cases 13/12/04 
(single PCT) 
16/12/04 
(Consortium 
Sixth Advisory Rating of business cases wide) Present Panel 
31/12/04 
(single PCT) 
Not present 
Time out session 
with Heads of Update on PBIVIA progress 13/01/05 Key Informant 
Service Information Officer 
Seventh Advisory Ranking of business cases 20/01/05 Present Panel 
Review of PBIVIA, Regional 
conference on presentation 
of the results of 30/03/05 Present 
the exercise and discussion PBIVIA exercise about a way forward 
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Figure 5.2 
STAGE 1 
Flow-diagram of the PBMA process 
STAGE 2 
Identified PBMA aim to 
define local commissioning 
intentions for the LIDP 
Programme budget 
compiled from cost and 
activity data for all 3 PCTs 
Commissioning 
Executive Board 
Researcher 
STAGE 3 Advisory Panel, Commissioning Stakeholder Group, and --------- Executive Board Working Group compiled 
Benefit criteria 
-------------- 
Working Group 
STAGE 4 identified 
Benefit criteria Stakeholder 
weighted Group 
Production of Working Group 
Fact Pack 
STAGE 5 
Lunchtime seminar to I 
support development of --------- 
Working Group 
business cases Advisory Panel 
Business cases Heads of 
submitted Service 
> 
Weeding out of 
----- 
Advisory Panel 
business cases 
I 
Review of I 
_I 
Advisory Panel 
business cases 
Business case benefit 
ratings reviewed and 
changes made accordingly 
Key information of 
business cases tabulated 
STAGE 6 to calculate a ranking 
Theoretical rankings 
reviewed and changes and 
recommendations made 
Stakeholder 
_ýroup 
Working Group 
Advisory Panel 
Recommended business 
c cas Advisory Panel ases put forward into 3 --------- 
STAGE 7 PCT LDPs 
Process Heads of 
reviewed Service 
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5.3 The application of PBMA 
The PBMA exercise took place over 7 months, running from September 2004 to March 
2005, in parallel with the LDP process. The stages of PBMA outlined in Chapter '-'. 
2.3.3, were developed iteratively and interactively by the researcher with decision- 
makers and stakeholders in order to adapt and apply the process within the 
Commissioning Consortium. Each of the PBMA stages as they were applied are 
presented below. A flow-diagram of each of the stages of the PBMA process is 
illustrated in Figure 5.2. Additionally, an overview of the key meetings that were 
conducted within these stages in presented in Table 5.2. The results of the analysis of 
the observation of these stages is presented in Chapter 6. 
5.3.1 Stage 1: determining the aim and scope 
The aim and scope of the PBMA exercise were determined by the remit of the 
Commissioning Consortium and defined by the DPH following consultation with the 
CEB. 
The overall aim of the PBMA exercise was: 
To identify local commissioning intentions for the local delivery planning (LDP) 
process for 2005-2008. 
The specific objectives of this first exercise were: 
e To map the current resource expenditure across the Consortium; 
To generate and assess proposals for potential investment. disinvestment, or 
redesign. 
I ý") 
To develop and agree a set of organisation-wide weighted criteria for judging 
proposals; 
To prioritise proposals to meet national, Consortium, and local PCT targets in 
2005/2006 
The PBMA exercise was conducted at the macro level of the Commissioning 
Consortium, i. e. across all streams of care and service areas. Since the Consortium was 
the focus of the exercise it followed that the scope of the exercise was confined to the 
commissioning functions of the Consortium, i. e. commissioning in relation to secondary 
care excluding the Ambulance Trust, and excluding Primary Care. However the 
Consortium also had a responsibility to commission primary and community services 
from its PCT provider arm. These functions were therefore also included in the exercise. 
The scope was further defined by the organisation's remit for service change that was 
partly driven by that fact that the Consortium was carrying an estimated deficit of f, 19 
million. 
Due to the remit and timescale of the PBMA exercise the focus for service change was 
restricted to primarily concentrate on examining efficiencies in relation to service 
performance against national targets (rather than the entire Consortium spend). For 
example, service areas for potential investment were identified as those services where 
targets were not being met or not likely to be met; service areas for potential redesign 
were identified as those services where targets were being met but in an inefficient 
manner (so that re-design of these service areas could release resources for investment 
back into the same service); and service areas for potential resource release were 
identified as those services which were not associated with any national performance 
targets service that could perhaps be reduced or redesigned. The PBMA also had to take 
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account of current or likely commitments to future spending such as forthcoming 
targets, local PCT priorities, prior LDP commitments for investment for 2005/6. and 
new policy imperatives. The aim and objectives of the exercise (outlined above) were 
met through the following stages of the PBMA process. 
5.3.2 Stage 2: compiling a programme budget 
The programme budget was assembled by the researcher. This comprised cost and 
activity data across the three PCTs, broken down by provider, and benchmarked against 
the other PCTs within the locality. Cost data were derived from the existing 2003/4 
programme budget statutory returns prepared by each of the Consortium PCTs for the 
DH, as well as any appropriate local authority data and commitments. The programme 
budget cost data provided a break down of PCT expenditure (including all primary, 
secondary, tertiary and community care, and prescribing) by 23 programme categories 
classified by disease area, such as mental health, respiratory disease etc. This was the 
first year in which PCTs submitted programme budget returns and consequently the 
quality of the data was relatively poor. As a result, a considerable amount of time was 
spent collating the cost data from each of the PCTs and reconciling this with cost data 
from the local providers. This involved several individual meetings with finance 
personnel from each of the respective organisations. The activity data were obtained 
directly from providers by a public health trainee. Data on inpatient and outpatient 
activity for each programme budget category for each PCT were compiled using 
hospital statistics and performance data. The programme budget was able to provide an 
overall picture of the balance of broad resource expenditure across different 
programmes, and to highlight areas for further work. A copy of the Consortium 
programme budget is in Appendix 1. 
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5.3.3 Stage 3: forming an advisory panel 
Three groups were formed to undertake and steer the PBMA exercise -a Working 
Group, an Advisory Panel, and a Stakeholder Group. The Working Group comprised 
the DPH and those working within the Directorate of Public Health -a public health 
trainee, an information analyst, and a health economist (the researcher). The Working 
Group was responsible for project managing the PBMA exercise and undertaking the 
day-to-day work required for the exercise. However, aside from the researcher, who was 
employed through the University yet working within the Consortium to conduct this 
doctoral research, the members of the Working Group had additional responsibilities 
and commitments to those associated with the PBMA exercise. As such, the PBMA 
exercise was the researcher's only role within the Consortium and therefore the 
researcher had much invested in the conduct and success of the PBMA exercise, 
perhaps more so than any other member of the Working Group. 
The PBMA Advisory Panel was formed from the existing Commissioning Consortium 
Executive Board (CEB) and included the Consortium Chief Executive, the Consortium 
Directors (5) and the Chairs of the local Professional Executive Committees (PECs) that 
made up the Consortium (3). The need for the Consortium to also prioritise its own 
primary care commissioning intentions for its own PCT LDP necessitated the 
establishment of a sub-panel that excluded representatives from the other PCTs that 
made up the Consortium. 
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The Stakeholder Group was formed from the existing PECs. All members of the three 
PCTs PECs that made up the Consortium (approximately 60 professionals) were invited 
to act as a professional advisory group within the PBMA exercise. As such the PECs 
acted as proxies to represent clinicians and stakeholders. In addition the nine 
Consortium Heads of Service were also invited to comment on the process at various 
stages. A diagram illustrating the groups involved in the PBMA exercise is presented in 
Figure 5.3. 
5.3.4 Stage 4: determining locally relevant decision-making criteria 
The Working Group compiled a set of draft benefit criteria. The group searched the 
existing literature (including grey literature) to collate information on: criteria 
developed by other health authorities and agencies in the UK and internationally; 
criteria developed by local govermuent agencies in the UK; and local criteria used by 
the Consortium PCTs in the recent past. The results of the literature search were 
reviewed by the DPH and the researcher. Four key criteria themes emerged from the 
review. These were policy and strategy criteria, feasibility and practicality criteria, 
quality of life and length of life criteria, and quality of service criteria. A total of 18 
separate sub-criteria were identified under these four main themes. 
The themes and criteria were compiled by the DPH and researcher, along with a short 
definition of each,, and presented by the DPH to the Advisory Panel and Stakeholder 
Group as a draft. Following this consultation, some of the criteria were merged and the 
final set was reduced to 16. The final set of criteria signed off by the Advisory Panel is 
presented in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3 Criteria and definitions 
Criteria Brief Definition 
Meet local policy objectives and/or targets including existing 
local objectives LDP commitments; key targets or balanced scorecard 
targets, SHA vision and strategy 
0 national Meet national policy objectives including NHS Plan- National 
Cn objectives Standards; Public Health White Paper; Patient choice 
local support 
Compatible with strategic partners' policies; has support of 
local MPs, the public and local community groups 
Overall affordability. The overall cost is not prohibitive, if it is 
>% affordability a disinvestment then pump priming or bridging finance is not :t prohibitive 
.0 .7 Ease of implementation. Will get clinician (primary and 
secondary), provider 'buy-in', is achievable within required 
ILL implementation timescale and there is a reasonable level of risk of option 
C-4 being implemented to plan and delivering anticipated 
benefits 
life expectancy What is the likely impact on life expectancy? 
!t 
J 
physical well- 
being What is the likely impact on physical well-being? 
4 - 0 mental well- 
being What is the likely impact on mental well-being? 
0 
social well- 
being What is the likely impact on social well-being? 
vi life 
circumstances 
What is the likely impact on life circumstances? 
Ability for an individual to obtain needed healthcare within 
accessibility an acceptable 
timeframe- considerations include availability, k 
cost of service, location, ours of operation, transportation, 
etc. 
W to equity 
Accessibility to socially excluded, ethnic or other minority 
4- groups, meeting inequality targets 
0 
2: % 
human Impact on capacity, skill mix, training resources 
M 
CY 
physical Quality of buildings, furnishings, equipment, food resources 
satisfaction 
Adequate information, appropriate patient-focused, patient 
involvement 
sustainability Likelihood of long term survival of the service 
Following agreement by the Advisory Panel, the Working Group developed a weighting 
exercise to determine the relative importance of the criteria. Based on her prior 
knowledge of weighting and voting methods, the researcher presented the Working 
Group with various methods for eliciting criteria weights. The benefits of each were 
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considered by the Working Group who identified the allocation points method as 
straightforward and suitable for the exercise (Clark, 1974, Mullen and Spurgeon. 2000). 
This technique was used to elicit the number of points that respondents would be 
willing to spend across each of the criteria. The total number of points was fixed and 
chosen to allow respondents to distribute them equally across the criteria if they so 
wished. 
The allocation of points exercise was completed by the Stakeholder Group in order to 
engage with and capture the values of clinicians and other stakeholders. Responses were 
collected through a simple questionnaire format (Appendix J). PEC Chairs were asked 
to distribute the weighting questionnaire by email or hardcopy to their members (the 
Stakeholders). Returned questionnaires were identified only by the PEC name and 
entered anonymously into a database by the Working Group to calculate the relative 
weights of the criteria. Twenty completed questionnaires were returned from two of the 
PECs (about a 50% response rate). However, one PEC failed to return any 
questionnaires following a breakdown in communication between the Consortium and 
the PCT of the PEC concerned (this is discussed further in the observations results in 
Chapter 6,6.2.5). 
The results of the weighting exercise are shown in Table 5.4. The second column of this 
table shows the average number of points (out of 100) allocated by respondents to each 
of the benefit criteria and how those points were distributed between the sub-criteria. 
The number of points allocated to each of the criteria directly reflects the weight of that 
criterion (i. e. the level of importance attached to that criterion). In terms of the criteria 
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therefore, the most important criterion is that of quality of life, followed by policý, and 
strategy, quality of service, and feasibility (these rankings are illustrated in the final 
column of the table). In order to ascertain the weights (and thus level of importance) of 
each of the sub-criteria, the number points distributed to the sub-criteria are adjusted 
according to the weight of the main criteria with which they are associated (e. g. the 
weight for the sub-criterion 'local objectives' = the number of points allocated to the 
sub-criterion 'local objectives' * the number of points allocated to the main criterion 
'policy and strategy'). These weights (presented as a %) and the associated ranking are 
illustrated in columns 3 and 4 of the table. 
Table 5.4 Stakeholder criteria weightings 
Benefit criteria 
1. Policy and strategy 
Average points 
allocated out of 100 
(within each heading, 
out of 100) 
28.33 
Standardised 
weight 
Ranking 
2 
local objectives (38.89) 11.02 1 
national objectives (31.94) 9.05 3 
local support (29.17) 8.26 4 
2. Feasibility 18.75 4 
affordability (57.78) 10.83 2 
implementation (42.22) 7.92 6 
3. Quality of life 31.25 1 
life expectancy (16.36) 5.11 8 
physical well-being (25.45) 7.95 5- 
mental well-being (25.45) 7.95 5 
social well being (18.18) 5.68 7 
life circumstances (14.55) 4.55 10 
4. Quality of service 21.67 3 
accessibility (18.88) 4.09 12 
equity (22.38) 4.85 9 
hr (13.99) 3.03 13 
physical resources (12.59) 2.73 14 
satisfaction (20.28) 4.39 11 
sustainability (11.89) 2.58 15 
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5.3.5 Stage 5: identifying and assessing options for investment, 
disinvestment and redesign 
The Commissioning Consortium Directors and Heads of Service were charged with the 
responsibility of identifying options for investment, disinvestment, and redesign, and 
assessing them. In order to aid the identification of options, a 'Fact Pack' of potentially 
useful information gathered from work undertaken as part of this exercise (such as the 
programme budget data) and readily available local and national data, was compiled by 
the Working Group. This included: the Consortium programme budget data; 
Consortium performance information on all healthcare commission and LDP targets; 
local epidemiological and health needs assessments, and DPH reports; local and 
national priorities and planning guidance (e. g. NSFs); and national evidence and 
guidelines (e. g. NICE guidelines). The Fact Pack was made available electronically to 
all senior managers within the Consortium. In addition to the Fact Pack, a workshop 
was held with the Heads of Service during one of their regular organisational monthly 
meetings. At this workshoP the DPH introduced the contents of the Fact Pack and the 
process for identifying and submitting options for investment, disinvestment, and 
redesign. 
In order to identify options, Directors and Heads of Service were advised to use the 
information contained in the Fact Pack to reflect on their portfolio of services. 
Specifically they were asked to consider the following question: "Are ive spending 
more or less on certain services in my portfolio for the activity achieved than I would 
expect, based on current performance, stated priorities, compared with other trusts, or 
based on what I know about these services? " From this. Directors and Heads of Service 
had to identify services from within their portfolio (stream of care) that they felt either 
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required potential investment, disinvestment, or redesign in order to improve efficiency, 
improve performance, better meet health needs, or fit with national and local priorities 
and targets. As suggested above, Heads of Service were encouraged to use the 
information contained within the Fact Pack including the programme budget, local 
epidemiological information, and national guidance to decide where service 
improvements should be made and whether any potential areas for disinvestments could 
be used to help achieve the service improvements. In some cases, Heads of Service 
consulted with clinical providers through established networks in order to gauge their 
input in identifying potential investments and redesigns, though this was by no means 
the norm. For the most part, Heads of Service tended to rely on the performance 
assessment targets to establish where targets were not being achieved and identify 
investments to tackle this. This way of identifying investments within the PBMA 
process is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
All options (either for investments, disinvestment, or redesign) were submitted in the 
form of business cases. A standard business case template was developed by the 
researcher and DPH, and included in the Fact Pack (Appendix K). This was based on 
those used in previous PBMA exercises and refined through input from the Advisory 
Panel. The business cases were authored by the Directors and Heads of Service who 
were asked to obtain input from service providers where possible. As well as an outline 
of the current service option and proposed changes to the service, the authors had to 
provide information on the costs and benefits of the proposed changes (investment, 
disinvestment, or redesign) in the business case. Costs included the additional 
(marginal) costs incurred or saved by the proposed change and were estimated for 
2005/6 and 2006/7 and broken down into capital and revenue costs where appropriate. 
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Benefits were defined in line with the local benefit criteria identified in 5.3.4. The 
benefits were estimated in terms of the additional (marginal) benefits that would be 
gained or lost by the proposed change using the 16 criteria identified above (Table 5.3). 
The impact of the proposed change on each of the benefit criteria was rated by the 
authors on a scale from -4 (a very large negative impact or loss of benefit) to +4 (a 
very large positive impact or gain in benefit). In addition, authors had to provide the 
relevant supporting evidence for the proposed change to justify the benefit ratings (e. g. 
by reference to policy documents, targets, NICE guidance etc) and estimate the numbers 
of people who were likely to benefit from the proposed change. 
The submission of business cases was reviewed by the Advisory Panel and a lunchtime 
workshop was held with the Heads of Service to maintain momentum over submissions. 
The workshop was used to inform Heads of Service of the progress made on the PBMA 
process and their input into the process, and allow Heads of Service the opportunity to 
share information with their peers about their experience of the process and raise any 
problems that they had encountered. Completed business cases were submitted to the 
Working Group and each was attributed an ID number. Following the workshop, a total 
of 12 business cases were generated for developments, spanning 2 or 3 PCTs across the 
Consortium, and a further 48 business cases were generated for the PCT alone (the PCT 
primary care business cases). The majority of business cases were resource investment 
options, with only one disinvestment proposal. The lack of disinvestments was not 
surprising given knowledge of previous PBMA exercises which have struggled to 
identify disinvestments. Possible reasons for the lack of disinvestments in this exercise 
are further explored in Chapter 6 and discussed in Chapter 7. 
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Each of the business cases were considered by the Advisory Panel and sub-panel with 
the aim of screening ('weeding') out any business cases before subjecting them to 
detailed scrutiny. The 'weeding out' of options took place over the course of two 
Advisory Panel meetings (one for the Consortium business cases and one for the single 
PCT primary care business cases). During the course of these meetings each business 
case was reviewed in terms of the proposed change, to check the costs, and decide 
whether it should be considered in the next stage, following revision, or not be 
considered any further. A total of 30 business cases were screened out by the Panel on 
the following grounds: 
* Elements of the business cases were duplicated in other business cases; 
They could be re-considered in 2005 for 2006/7 (i. e. they were not considered to be 
'urgent' enough to be considered in this funding round); 
They could be picked up through other sources of funding (e. g. through future 
funding streams or ring-fenced funding); 
They could be mainstreamed from existing service budgets (e. g. as part of in-service 
costs); 
e They involved other agencies and therefore had to be considered separately; 
More appropriate funding alternatives could be identified elsewhere (e. g. through 
the Local Authority's education budget); 
They required very small amounts of money and therefore a decision was taken to 
fund them outside of the PBMA process. 
Some of these reasons may be viewed as simply deferring the process of decision- 
making, something which is elaborated upon in the following chapter. Data on the 
business cases that were retained in the process were entered into a spreadsheet by the 
Working Group. Heads of Service, at the request of their Directors, were instructed to 
visit the spreadsheet to submit any data that was missing. 
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Following this, the Advisory Panel and sub-group met to review the remaining business 
cases, Consortium, and single PCT primary care business cases respectively, in detail. 
The meeting was structured as a half day in-house 'away-day' - i. e. attendees were in 
theory out of the office and unavailable, but were on-site and able to deal with emalls 
and any arising matters during breaks. Being on-site also reduced the travel time. 
thereby optimising the length of the meeting time. 
The first half of the meeting was given over to the Consortium business cases whilst the 
single PCT primary care business cases were discussed in the latter half All members 
of the Advisory Panel were present and the DPH chaired the meeting. Panel members 
assessed the business case proposals in turn, discussing the nature of the proposal, the 
ratings attributed to the benefit criteria by the author, and the costs involved. In some 
cases there was disagreement between the author's criteria benefit ratings outlined in the 
business case and the views of the panel. In these cases, members of the panel put 
forward a case for altering the benefit ratings and, on the suggestion of the DPH, each 
member of the Advisory Panel voted on the revised benefit ratings, abiding by the 
majority rule. As a result many of the original benefit ratings were revised by the 
Advisory Panel following this debate. Within this process, a further five business cases 
were screened out for the same reasons outlined above. For transparency, changes made 
to the business cases (such as changes in the benefit ratings) and the reasons for the 
changes were recorded directly into the business case database by the researcher. All 
changes were verified with those present. 
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Finally, following the Advisory Panel meeting, PEC members, in their capacity as the 
Stakeholder Group, were invited to review any aspect of the business cases but to focus 
in particular on the benefit ratings. Each member of the Stakeholder Group received 
copies of the revised business cases by email from the Working Group. Responses from 
Stakeholders were documented or verbally communicated directly to the DPH. In a 
small number of cases, members of the Stakeholder Group recommended revising one 
or more of the business cases. The feedback from Stakeholder Group was collated by 
the Working Group and fed into the Advisory Panel to inform the final ranking of 
priorities. 
5.3.6 Stage 6: making recommendations for investment, disinvestment, 
and redesign 
The business cases were then ranked by the Advisory Panel in order to identify and 
make recommendations for potential investment, disinvestment, and redesign to inform 
the commissioning intentions for the LDP. 
The process of ranking took place over two separate Advisory Panel meetings, with the 
Advisory Panel considering the Consortium-wide business cases, and the sub-panel 
considering the single PCT primary care business cases. In order to aid the ranking 
process, the researcher tabulated key information contained within the business cases to 
allow business cases to be compared with one another. Information included: a 
summary of the proposed change identified in the business case, the additional 
(marginal) costs incurred or saved by the proposed change (using 2006/7 costs where 
available), and the estimated annual number of beneficiaries (e. g. patients. carers. 
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residents). This information was provided within each of the business cases and thus 
was available at previous meetings but this was the first time this information was 
collated and explicitly compared across business cases. 
To further aid the comparison of business cases, additional infon-nation including the 
marginal benefits and a benefit/cost ratio was calculated for each of the business cases. 
The additional (marginal) benefits gained or lost by the proposed change were estimated 
for each business case using Equation (1), Chapter 2,2.3.3, to determine the weighted 
benefit score (using the benefit ratings determined by the Advisory Panel benefit ratings 
in 5.3.5 and the criteria weights elicited from the Stakeholder Group in 5.3.4, Table 
5.4). Alternative weighted benefit scores were also estimated using, first, the benefit 
ratings revised by the Stakeholder Group in 5.3.5, and, second, by multiplying the 
benefits by the potential number of beneficiaries stated in the business case. 
Furthermore, for each business case, a benefit to cost ratio was calculated by dividing 
the marginal benefit (the weighted benefit score) by the marginal cost, to give the 
benefit per f spent. In total 3 different benefit/cost ratios were presented: 1, using the 
weighted benefit score calculated from the Advisory Panel benefit ratings and the 
Stakeholder Group criteria weights; 2, using the weighted benefit score calculated from 
the benefit ratings revised by the Stakeholder Group and the Stakeholder Group criteria 
weights; and 3, using the weighted benefit score from the Advisory Panel ratings 
multiplied by the number of beneficiaries and the Stakeholder Group criteria weights. 
Business cases were ranked in a number of different ways based on this information. 
Each was ranked using the weighted benefit score (the higher the benefit score. the 
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higher the ranking of the business case) and also the 3 benefit/cost ratios outlined above 
(the higher the benefit/cost ratio, the higher the ranking of the business case). The 
inclusion of Stakeholder feedback in the benefit/cost ratio did not affect the final 
rankings of the business cases. However, the inclusion of the number of beneficiaries 
did have a significant impact upon the order of the ranking of business cases, altering 
the ranking by 4 places in 4 cases, and up to 10 places in one case. 
The above information (including the marginal costs, the number of beneficiaries, the 
weighted benefit score, the cost/benefit ratios, and the rankings) was presented at the 
meetings by the researcher electronically, using a laptop and overhead projection 
facilities to enable easy comparison of the business cases. The rankings of the business 
cases were discussed by the Panel and sub-panel and any proposed amendments to 
scores or rankings were incorporated in real-time and revised in-situ so that the impact 
of these changes could be observed. Not much emphasis was placed on the benefit/cost 
rankings (however calculated) at either of these meetings. The Advisory Panel decided 
to recommend all of the Consortium business cases for funding in the LDP, whereas the 
sub-panel (assessing the PCT primary care business cases) excluded three business 
cases and agreed to recommend those remaining for funding in the LDP. The excluded 
business cases did not rank lowest in terms of benefit/cost ratio, though they 
consistently had the lowest weighted benefit scores. Using examples of business cases 
from the PBMA exercise, Table 5.5, provides a condensed version of the information 
that was presented to the Advisory Panel and the subsequent decisions taken by the 
Advisory Panel. 
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Following this meeting it was also revealed that the initial deficit estimated by the 
Consortium (of f 19 million) had since been revised downwards and that the 
investments that resulted from the PBMA exercise could be carried *in-year' by the 
Consortia PCTs. The effect of this on the PBMA process is discussed further in Chapter 
61,6.2.8, and Chapter 7. 
5.3.7 Stage 7: performing validity checks and final decision to inform 
budget planning process 
Following the previous meetings, the Working Group compiled an interim report 
detailing the process and outcomes. The report was distributed to the three PCTs that 
made up the Consortium. Each PCT considered separately whether and how to include 
the business cases in their individual PCT LDPs which were subsequently put forward 
to the SHA. Although it is difficult to make a direct link between the consortium-wide 
priorities that emerged from the PBMA process and the priorities identified in the three 
PCT LDP documents, most of the priorities identified in the PBMA process were 
defined in some form in all of the LDPs. Not surprisingly, the PCT that shared its 
management team with that of the Consortium showed a clear link between the PBMA 
priorities and the PCT priorities identified in the LDP. It is impossible to determine the 
extent to which the PBMA process influenced the final choice of LDP priorities and to 
what extent the same priorities would have emerged in the absence of a PBMA process. 
In addition, a copy of the interim report was sent to all Heads of Service in order to 
obtain their feedback on the outcomes of the process, focussing on v, -hat had happened 
to their specific business cases. Finally. once the LDP was finalised. a regional 
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conference on the PBMA exercise was organised by the DPH and Researcher, Nvith 
input from the SHA, to promote the results and discuss the plausibility of future PBMA 
activity. 
5.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter described the results of the implementation of PBMA in Phase 11 of the 
PAR. The PBMA was applied within the Commissioning Consortium which, as a new 
organisation, was responsible for commissioning secondary care on behalf of three 
PCTs that belonged to the consortia. The organisation was trying to manage a deficit at 
the time of the research and was interested in applying PBMA to identify the future 
commissioning intentions of the Consortium. The PBMA exercise was developed and 
implemented within the Consortium by the researcher along with decision-makers and 
stakeholders. 
The aim and objectives of the PBMA exercise were to define the commissioning 
intentions for LDP process, map current resource expenditure across the Consortium; 
generate service proposals for potential investment, disinvestment, or redesign; develop 
and agree organisation-wide weighted criteria for judging proposals; and prioritise 
service proposals to meet national and local targets. As a starting point, a programme 
budget was compiled by the researcher to provide an overall picture of resource 
expenditure across the different healthcare programmes of the Consortium. In addition, 
a Working Group, an Advisory Panel, and a Stakeholder Group were formed to 
undertake and steer the PBMA exercise. 
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In order to guide decision-making, a set of local benefit criteria were derived and 
weighted to determine their relative importance. The Commissioning Consortium 
Directors and Heads of Service were responsible for identifying options for investment. 
disinvestment, and redesign, using the Fact Pack to decide where service improvements 
should be made and whether any potential areas for disinvestments could be used to 
help achieve the service improvements. All options were submitted as business cases 
which outlined the current service option and proposed changes to the service, and the 
costs and benefits (in line with benefit criteria) of the proposed changes. 
60 business cases were submitted. These initial business cases were screened and 30 
rejected for several reasons including that they could be picked up through other sources 
of funding or that they involved other agencies and therefore had to be considered 
separately. The remaining business cases were assessed in detail by the Advisory Panel 
and changes to the business cases (including the revision of benefit criteria ratings) were 
made as necessary. A further 5 business cases were rejected at this stage. Following 
this, the Stakeholder Group reviewed the business cases separately and their feedback 
was used to inform the final ranking of priorities. 
The business cases were then ranked in order to inform the commissioning intentions 
for the LDP process. Business cases were ranked using information on the marginal 
costs and marginal benefits contained within each of the business cases to calculate a 
weighted benefit score and benefit/cost ratio. Not much emphasis was placed on the 
benefit/cost rankings (however calculated) and all business cases (except three) were 
recommended for funding in the LDP process. Although it is difficult to make a direct 
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link between priorities that emerged from the PBMA process and the priorities 
identified in the LDP, most of the priorities identified in the PBMA process were 
defined in some form in all of the PCT LDPs. However, it is impossible to determine 
the extent to which the PBMA process influenced the final choice of LDP priorities and 
to what extent the same priorities would have emerged in the absence of a PBMA 
process. 
The following chapter presents the results of the observation of the implementation of 
PBMA described here. 
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Chapter 6 Observations during and reflections following the 
implementation of PBMA - results from the analysis 
of the observations in PAR Phase 11 and focus 
groups in PAR Phase III 
6.1 Chapter overview 
The second phase of the PAR involved both acting and observing a change. The 
previous Chapter, Chapter 5 presented the results from the first part of this phase, 
describing the application of the action (PBMA) as it was implemented within a 
commissioning organisation (the Commissioning Consortium). This chapter reports the 
results from the second part of this phase - the observation. Ethnographic approaches 
were used to observe and record the introduction, application, and development of 
PBMA with respect to the organisational context, organisational dynamics, participation 
and motivation, and to identify potential challenges to implementation. The results draw 
on an analysis of themes of the observational field notes in order to build an account of 
how PBMA was applied, how it was received, and how it was adapted. In addition, this 
chapter presents the results from the third phase of the PAR - reflecting on a change. In 
this phase, focus groups were used to reflect on the implementation of PBMA. As 
above, the results draw on an analysis of themes from the focus group transcripts to 
identify potential barriers and facilitators in the implementation of PBMA. 
The chapter is organised as follows. The following section (6.2) presents the results 
from the analysis of the observation and the third section, (6.3) presents the results from 
the analysis of the focus groups. Collectively, the themes from both the observation of 
the application of PBMA and the focus group reflections on PBMA were used to revise 
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the schematic model of commissioning presented in Chapter 4, Figure 4.2 and inforrn 
the development of a refined model illustrating the role of PBMA in the commissioning 
process. The refined model, Figure 6.1, is presented in section 6.4. 
6.2 Observation of the implementation of PBMA 
The observation of the implementation of PBMA was primarily structured around 
specific events and meetings that took place during the course of the PBMA exercise as 
described in Chapter 5 (Table 5.2). In most cases observations were gathered directly by 
the researcher. However, where the researcher's attendance of meetings was restricted, 
the observations of informants who were present were elicited through interview by the 
researcher following these meetings. As described in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1, these 
interviews were informal. Although verbal consent was obtained to record the 
interviews as part of the observation field notes, the interviews were not electronically 
recorded or transcribed. 
The period of observation covered the full duration of the PBMA exercise (7 months) as 
described in Chapter 5 and represented in Figure (5.2). Observations were recorded as 
field notes in the research diary and documented events and interactions in day-to-day 
settings, in meetings (both formal and informal), and personal communication between 
the researcher and other participants. The field notes were subject to an analysis of 
themes as detailed in Chapter 3, Section 3.6.2, and key concepts emerging from the data 
were identified and used to build a description of what was observed. 
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The key themes that emerged from this analysis are presented here. The themes, aside 
from the first, are concerned with the context in which this PBMA exercise was applied 
rather than the technical application of PBMA per se. Extracts from the field notes are 
used to illustrate the themes. Extracts taken directly from letters, documents, 
conversations or interviews recorded in the field notes are quoted verbatim where 
stated. In some cases interviews or conversations were not recorded in the field notes at 
the time. In these circumstances, although the interview or conversation was observed 
directly, the extract is not presented as verbatim but in the context of how it was later 
recorded in the field notes. Where conversations were not directly observed this is 
stated. Otherwise, extracts represent observations as they occurred and were recorded in 
the field notes. 
6.2.1 Conceptual and methodological understanding of PBMA 
Participants' understanding of the PBMA process and the underlying conceptual basis 
differed between the hierarchies in the organisation. Despite having held an introductory 
session on PBMA at the Heads of Service away day at the beginning of the process, it 
was not until later on, where Heads were asked to develop the business cases for 
investment, disinvestment, and redesign in Stage 5, that it became evident that the 
Heads were "struggling" with the process as noted in the extract below. As such, the 
Heads required on-going training in order to develop their understanding of PBMA 
which resulted in the development of a lunch-time support session for the Heads of 
Service together with the creation of the Fact Pack. 
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[In a letter ftom the Performance Director to the Finance Director and the 
DPH] 
"I think a ftw people are struggling with this. I will pick up with [the DPH] but 
think we need to take stock of issues and probably re-issue an idiot's guide to 
PBAM and the PB bit. " 
(Taken verbatim ftom the letter recorded in Field notes, 16111104) 
On the other hand,, the Directors had a clearer understanding of the PBMA process and 
the underlying economic concepts. This was particularly evident when it came to Stages 
5 and 6 of the PBMA process where Directors, in their role as members of the Advisory 
Panel, were responsible for reviewing the business cases for prioritisation. In the 
following extracts members of the Advisory Panel demonstrate their understanding of 
the PBMA process and concepts through their interrogation of the business cases: 
[Observation of an Advisory Panel Meeting] 
Advisory Panel members are asking questions about the effectiveness of current 
services, current ways that the money is spent in a specific area andfor which 
there ma be an alternative business case. y 
(Field notes, 13112104) 
[Observation of an Advisory Panel Meeting] 
There is a lot of discussion about business cases and all speak and debate and 
question the assumptions of the business cases. 
(Field notes, 16112104) 
Nevertheless, Directors did encounter methodological problems with PBMA. In 
particular two aspects were noted. 
First, the Advisory Panel found it difficult to make comparisons of business cases 
outlining a health promotion or prevention activity (public health) with business cases W 
that detailed a service deliN, ery activity. In particular the Advisory Panel noted that with 
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public health activities it was difficult to determine when the benefits from public health 
activities were likely to be realised and who would benefit: 
There seemed to be some difficulty in making judgements betit, een two 
predominant types of business cases. Those which supported or improved 
process (i. e. support a process which will enable other things to be delivered 
down the line which can't be quantifiedyet e. g. enabling communities to make 
healthy choices, health promotion and prevention activities) and those business 
cases that improved1support service delivery. 
(Field notes, 13112104) 
Decisions to prioritise such activities for investment were therefore considered to be 
more risky than the health service delivery activities that have quantifiable benefits and 
where the results of investment are evident in a short time frame. 
In addition, this issue was amplified by the introduction of information on the number 
of potential beneficiaries in the business cases in Stage 5 of the PBMA process. In the 
main, business cases tended to present marginal benefit information in terms of the 
benefits accruing to an individual with the expectation that this would be multiplied by 
the number of potential beneficiaries to obtain the total marginal benefit for the business 
case. However, public health business cases that were directed toward the entire local 
population often identified this population as the total number of potential beneficiaries, 
whereas only a proportion of the population were likely to actually benefit, and 
therefore aggregating individual benefits to all the potential beneficiaries exaggerated 
the marginal benefit of such business cases. It was only when reviewing the business 
cases in the latter part of Stage 5 that this problem became evident and was raised by the 
Advisory Panel. At this stage the Advisory Panel began to question the robustness of the 
beneficiary information, particularly with respect to some of the public health usiness I 
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cases where the numbers of beneficiaries were calculated on the basis of the potential 
numbers who may benefit as opposed to the actual numbers who would benefit. 
The second aspect concerned the fact that the Advisory Panel struggled with the rating 
scale used to judge business cases against the benefit criteria to determine the marginal 
benefits. The rating scale consisted of an open scale ranging from -4 to +4. where +4 
represented the greatest marginal positive impact on benefit and -4 the greatest marginal 
negative impact. The central (0) point was the only defined point on the scale, 
representing no marginal impact. The rating scale was initially completed by the Heads 
of Service, as the business case authors, as part of the business case submission and was 
later reviewed by the Advisory Panel in Stage 5 and amended if necessary. As a result 
of the lack of pre-defined values on the rating scale, the Advisory Panel tended to judge 
the business cases relative to one another and score them accordingly (as described in 
the extract below), rather than considering the merits of each relative to the benefit 
criteria: 
Some started to rate business cases tactically suggesting "we need to score this 
one lower because it's worse than the one we havejust scored " 
(Field notes, 16112104) 
6.2.2 Buy-in to the PBMA process 
In management and decision-making, buy-in (as a noun or verb) tends to be used to 
signify the commitment of interested or affected parties (or stakeholders) to a decision, 
to buy-into the decision. In this case, the term buy-in is used to describe the 
commitment of those involved in the PBMA process to the PBMA process. 
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As above, commitment to the process appeared to differ between the hierarchies of the 
organisation and over time. At the beginning of the process, particularly in the first 
Advisory Panel meetings the Directors seemed unwilling to commit to the PBMA 
exercise, expressing this in their anxiety over the time frame of the exercise and in their 
questioning of the commitment of the CE: 
[In conversation with the DPHfollowing his attendance at the CEB meeting to 
introduce the PBAIM project plan] 
"The impression I got was that there was one of disbelief by some members that 
we were expected to do all this in the time ftame and they questioned whether 
the CE had reall agreed to and understood what it all involved The answer I Y 
gave was YES and others agreed saying 'you know [the CE] of course he would 
expect that "'. 
(Verbatim quote recorded in Field Notes, 22109108) 
In contrast, the PEC Chairs, in their capacity as members of the Advisory Panel and the 
Heads of Service seemed more willing to commit to the process, though this was often 
described as being somewhat of a surprise both to those working on the PBMA exercise 
and themselves: 
Today the DPH is upbeat and optimistic. He has had several successful meetings 
with the PEC chairs who have all bought into the process. I think he is surprised 
at how forward thinking and encouraging they are about the process. This 
enthusiasm (on the part of PCT and PEC colleagues) has also taken me by 
surprise as well. I have been preparedfor many stumbling blocks. 
(FieldNotes, 05110104) 
[At the Heads of Service Away Day] 
We presented the outline of the PBAM exercise which was well received Some 
thoughts ftom those who were present included comments such as; "I'm getting 
quite excited about this -I didn't know I would get this excited about 
economics " and "I think the health service is readyfor this ". 
(Field Notes, 08110104) 
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Indeed, some of the Heads of Service not only committed to the concept of PBMA and 
contributed to the process, but also became emotionally engaged with it. The extract 
below reports the observations of the Information Officer who describes the impact of 
such commitment on one Head of Service, who toward the end of the process, reported 
feeling responsible for the process and the outcomes of it: 
[In conversation with the Information Officer] 
"[a Head of Service] is taking the process very seriously and appears to be very 
stressed and cheesed off with the whole thing. She feels very responsible for her 
business cases, that she'll get the blame if they are not funded Others seem to 
be more relaxed but we need to acknowledge the effort that people have put in 
and that they will require feedback on the process. " 
(Verbatim quote recorded in Field Notes, 01/12104) 
Over the course of the exercise, there was a greater level of commitment from the 
Commissioning Directors as demonstrated through their regular attendance of and 
engagement in the Advisory Panel meetings. However, outside of these meetings, the 
absence of coordinated input into the PBMA process from the Directors, as reported in 
Section 6.2.7, demonstrates a lack of ongoing commitment to the process and 
engagement in the process beyond the minimum required. Similarly although both the 
Heads of Service and the PECs remained actively committed and engaged throughout 
the PBMA exercise, they expressed caution in committing to any future exercise: 
[Comments ftom a Head of Service made at the Heads of time out session, as 
reported by the Information Officer who was present] 
My priorities are to achieve my targets in my areas [service areas for which 
Heads are responsible]. In an ideal world I would like to make the time to learn 
more about health economics, PBAM, and health policy, but my priorities are to 
do Xfirst. 
(Field notes, 13101105) 
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The PEC chairs reported that it had been difficult to carve out the time to meet 
in the PBAIM process but that they welcomed something more objective like 
PBAIM. 
(Field notes, 20101105) 
6.2.3 Control of decision-making and the PBMA process 
Control over decision-making and the PBMA process lay with the CE and reflected his 
status and power in the organisation. Within the Commissioning Consortium, the CE 
adopted a 'hands-on', micro -management approach, overseeing and guiding a lot of the 
activity undertaken (particularly within the early days of the organisation). The extent of 
his control across the organisation is demonstrated the following extract: 
[In a confidential letter that I had sight ofl 
The Chair of one of the Consortia PCTs wrote to the Consortium CE 
questioning the accountability of the Consortium Executive Board and 
requesting that the CEs of the Consortia PCTs to sit on the Board as well as the 
PEC Chairs. 
[On speaking to the CE about this issue] 
The CE stated that his reason for not wanting the other CEs on board is that he 
felt it would compromise his authority if there was disagreement at the meetings. 
He thinks that these disagreements should be (or are best) ironed out outside of 
these meetings. 
(Field notes 12110104) 
The control that the CE demonstrated in the organisation also spilled over into the 
PBMA exercise. As suggested above, this was inevitable given his position within the 
organisation. That the CE took on this role in the PBMA was therefore not necessarily a 
bad thing (as it would have been expected) and, as demonstrated later, the fact that the 
CE did have control over the PBMA process had some advantages. However, the CE's 
control over the PBMA process also meant that he had considerable influence over the 
direction of the PBMA process and thus the outcomes from it. 
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From the beginning, the CE was keen to establish ownership over the PBMA exercise 
and did so by asserting his authority over it, as exemplified in the following extracts: 
The PECs seem to be doing a lot ofprioritisation work ... we shouldfit intoltap into PECs for criteria weights. Though, in a conversation held in my office 
between the DPH and the CE, the CE's take on explicit criteria weighting was: 
CE "do you mean the unofficial weights or the official ones? Who is the 
accountable officer? 
DPH: "you " 
CE: "who makes the final decision as to how we spend millions and millions 
ofpounds? " 
DPH "You " [conversation ends] 
(Verbatim quote recorded in Field notes, 14109104) 
[In conversation with the DPHJ 
The DPH told me he had been "bollocked" by the CE on the previous evening. 
He explained that havingfinished the work plan he had (in the absence of being 
able to meet with the CE before his holiday) pinned the work plan to the wall of 
his office. Apparently he [the CE] had come in, seen it, and torn it down. His 
secretary had told him that the DPH wanted to meet with him urgently and he 
had "stormed" into the DPH's office and said ' ou don't tell me what my y 
priorities are, they are for me to decide' to which the DPH responded that he 
needed his approval to sign off the workplan. The CE said he would sort it out 
when he returnedftom holiday. The DPH explained however that we would not 
be able to deliver on time as 40% of the work is due to be completed by the time 
he comes back ftom holiday anyway. The CE said that this would present him 
with a real problem and he would call the DPH tomorrow night. The DPH 
commented that "I saw a different side to him last night!! ". 
(Field notes, 16109104) 
During the PBMA process, the CE maintained control by chairing the Advisory Panel. a 
responsibility he handed over to the DPH on only one occasion. 
The level of control exerted by the CE influenced the extent to which the Consortia 
PCTs were able and willing to engage with and commit to the PBMA exercise (as 
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indicated in the earlier extract above, and in Section 6.2.5). Additionally.. the control 
over the PBMA process demonstrated by the CE together with his authorlty (as the CE) 
meant that the organisation tended to rely on him to make decisions about the exercise 
and, at times, was unwilling to agree to decisions in his absence. At the beginning of the 
exercise the CE was on annual leave for two weeks and, as a result, Directors within the 
organisation were unwilling to commit to the PBMA process as there was concern that 
the CE had not seen or approved the exercise (6.2.2). Moreover, the level of control 
exerted by the CE was such that there were rumours within the organisation that the CE 
had been able to influence or manipulate the PBMA exercise and hence the results: 
[Speaking to the Information Officer who was present at the Heads of Service 
time out session] 
She mentioned that during the session there was some discussion between heads 
about a rumour - that at the beginning of the PBAIM process the Director of 
Commissioning and the CE had put what they felt would be the priorities and 
needs for investment into a sealed envelope and that it's these things that seem 
to have come out top in the PBMA rankings. The DPH had said that this showed 
that the process was good as it reflected the 'real' decisions that would be made 
(i. e. captured all that was important). However [the information officer] was 
worried that it could be that these powerful people [the Director of 
Commissioning and the CE] could have influenced the process in terms of their 
own preferences. 
(Field notes, 13101105) 
On the other hand, the CE's control of the exercise also presented some advantages, 
particularly with regards to facilitating the exercise. Given his level of control over the 
exercise, the CE ensured that the exercise was approved by the organisation and raised 
the profile of PBMA within the organisation to encourage engagement from within the 
organisation (if not from outside). Additionally, the CE was actively involved in the 
exercise through his role in the Advisory Panel and was able to maintain momentum for 
engagement throughout the exercise: 
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Most of the organisation seems to be well engaged with the exercise. I believe 
(through a conversation with the DPH) that this is mostly the CE's influence i. e. 
he has told them to do this and make it a priority. 
(Field notes, 01112104) 
6.2.4 Leadership of the PBMA process 
Although the CE exerted control over the PBMA process he did not lead it. For the most 
part, the day to day work of the PBMA exercise was conducted by the Working Group 
formed from the Directorate of Public Health,, often in isolation of other activities and 
Directorates within the Consortium. This isolated and fragmented way of working is 
discussed further in Section 6.2.7,, and was not unusual within the Consortium. 
However, this meant that responsibility for the PBMA exercise became invested in the 
Working Group (two members of which were not fulltime employees of the Consortium 
- the researcher and the Public Health Trainee), and specifically the DPH, as the line 
manager of this group. This responsibility was formally embedded through the addition 
of the PBMA exercise to the DPH's work objectives. As such, the DPH had sole 
responsibility for leading the PBMA exercise, though little control which, as discussed 
above, was exerted by the CE. The DPH seemed to be acutely aware of this level of 
responsibility, expressing this in terms of the pressure on him to successfully deliver the 
PBMA: 
The DPH is worried today that it [the PBAIL4] won't work He is concerned with 
perfection. I keep stressing that it is not aimed to be a 'Rolls Royce'PBMA this 
time around 
(Field notes, 15109104) 
Furthermore, investing responsibility for leading the exercise in the work objectives of 
one person meant that no other Directors or Directorates had any formal obligations to 
provide input into and maintain the PBMA process, and there was no explicit link 
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between the PBMA process and the organisational objectives. The implications of 
which were twofold. 
First, when the DPH took annual leave -a routine and reasonable thing for anyone to do 
- it disrupted and delayed the PBMA process. As illustrated in the extract below, when 
the DPH went on holiday over Christmas, the Consortium was unable to continue the 
PBMA exercise in his absence without a detailed action plan and programme: 
[Email sentftom the CE to the DPH, cc researcher] 
"Further to the meeting yesterday and your concluding summary of what needs 
to be done urgently over the next weeks, the meeting of Directors and [the PEC 
Chair] this morning expressed concern to me that there was a lot to be done in a 
short period of time and many were unaware that You were not going to be 
aroundfor the next 2 weeks. My response to them was I assumed that you would 
be directing your team to carry out the agreed actions and that theylyou would 
be issuing a programme to us all over the next 24 hours setting out key dates 
and events. ... It would therefore 
be helpful please if you could email us all 
setting out the action you have put into train during your leave, including the 
production of a programme, within the next day or so. " 
[Email response from DPH, cc researcher] 
"I'll come into workfirst thing tomorrow morning (Saturday) and leave a clear 
set of instructionsfor everybody on email and their desks. Both [the information 
office] and [the researcher] will be on hand but I will leave a detailed action 
plan tomorrow. " 
(Taken verbatimftom the emails recoded in the Field notes, 17,112104) 
In contrast to when the CE went on annual leave (as discussed in 6.2.2), the DPH had to 
ensure that systems were put in place that would enable the PBMA process to continue. 
Indeed, because the objectives of the PBMA process were not aligned with anybody 
else involved in the process, they could not be relied upon to maintain the PBMA 
process without the micro -management of a detailed action plan. This extract also 
demonstrates the extent of fragmentation in the organisation, vvith some colleagues not 
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even aware that the DPH was going on annual leave. The theme of fragmentation is 
further explored below in Section 6.2.7. 
The second implication was that investing the objectives of the PBMA process in one 
person and charging them with leading the process, meant that participants were unable 
to separate the person from the process and, overtime, the process became synonymous 
with the person leading it (in this case the DPH). As a result, the DPH became the target 
for any problems that were associated with the process. Specifically, the extract below 
illustrates an instance where the DPH's character was being blamed for problems 
encountered in the PBMA process: 
[In conversations with Heads of Service] 
They think that the DPH is patronising and that any future PBMA process 
should be led by someone else; that he doesn't understand 1he NHS situation 
and is not realistic enough; and that he doesn't know how to talk to people or 
clinicians. I am worried because if this is how he is perceived I don't want a 
barrier to introducing PBAM into the organisation to be [the DPH] himself who 
is supposed to be an advocate of PBMA. 
(Field notes, 20101105) 
6.2.5 Conflict affecting the PBMA process 
Politics, (with a small 'p') and power struggles between the Consortium and the local 
health economy (particularly the other Consortia PCTs) were evident from the start of 
the PBMA exercise. At one of the first Advisory Panel meetings a lot of discussion 
centred on the need to obtain buy-in or commitment from the Consortia PCTs for 
specific tasks in the PBMA process. This is illustrated in the extract below: 
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The Advisory Panel met to introduce the criteria ... they 
did stress that we need 
to run these by the other two PCTs, stressing that we need bky-inftom the other 
PCTs. This seems strange to me and highlights sensitivities of the role and remit 
of the consortium. The nature and existence of the Consortium is still confusing 
to me. If it is established and it is agreed that it will commission secondary care 
for [the local health economy] then why do we have to run these [the criteria] 
by the other PCTs. Surely they leave it to the Consortium OR the Consortium 
should engage with them?! 
(Field notes, 30109104) 
Given that the Consortia PCTs were committed to the PBMA process, the need to 
continue to ensure their commitment highlighted the tension between the role of the 
Consortium and the role of the Consortia PCTs. The tension between roles is also raised 
in the following extracts: 
[In a meeting with the CE of one of the Consortia PCTs] 
"The Consortia PCTs are paying into the Consortium but we do notfeel like we 
belong to the Consortium or that the Consortium belongs to us. 
(Verbatim quote recorded in Field notes 22112104) 
[In conversation with a PEC Chair] 
"it is not clear who is doing the prioritisation, the Primary Care Organisations 
or the Consortium ". 
(Verbatim quote recorded in Field notes, 12110104) 
Furthermore, given that senior staff in the Consortia PCTs were not visible at the 
executive level in the Consortium and consequently the groups that presided over the 
PBMA process (see Section 6.2.3), efforts to ensure the ongoing commitment of the 
Consortia PCTs seemed somewhat tokenistic and perhaps resulted in exacerbating 
tensions between the organisations. 
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Therefore the context within which the PBMA process was conducted was affected by 
an undercurrent of conflict between the Consortia PCTs and the Consortium. Although 
this conflict stemmed from the context rather than the PBMA process itself, the PBMA 
exercise was nevertheless influenced by it. In particular, because the PBMA exercise 
was primarily associated with the Consortium, it tended to be used by the Consortia 
PCTs as an instrument in the conflict, in order to assert their authority in the 
Consortium. This was manifested in two ways. 
First, consultation with the Consortia PCT PECs had to be conducted through the 
respective PCTs. However, despite approval from the PEC Chairs for the Consortium to 
engage directly with their members, Directors of the Consortia PCTs tried to prevent or 
restrict such engagement by intervening in communications between the Consortium 
and the PECs. In one instance, described in the following extract, the Directors of one 
of the Consortia PCTs delayed the distribution of the criteria weighting exercise 
questionnaires in Stage 4 of the PBMA process to the PEC, citing concerns over the 
methods and relevance of the criteria that had already been approved by the CE of the 
PCT in question, as well as the Consortium and PEC representatives: 
[Extract ftom letter sent to Consortium Commissioning Director from her 
counterpart in one of the Consortia PCTsj 
"this [the criteria weighting exercise] hasn't yet gone to our PEC as we had 
some questions about its scope and methodology which we felt needed more info 
before simply doing the exercise. I think its a methodologyfor deciding on what 
the criteria should be, which it is being suggested should be used by each of the 
PCOs. However this doesn't mean that we will arrive at the same criteria ... 
" 
(Taken i7erbatimftom the letter recorded in Field notes, 12110104) 
In this instance, as discussed in Chapter 5, the Consortia PCT in question failed to 
deliver and return the weighting questionnaires. 
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Second. the Directors of the Consortia PCTs were reluctant to share financial and 
activity data required for compiling the programme budget, often ignoring requests for 
meetings to collect this information, or withholding it from meetings. It was only after 
the researcher met with the CEs of the Consortia PCTs to bring this to their attention 
that the necessary data were released. The unwillingness of a Director of Finance to 
share such financial information is illustrated in the extract below: 
[One of the Consortia PCTs] doesn't really want to share the Programme 
Budget returns outside of the areas that [the PCT Finance Director] thinks the 
Consortium are contracted to provide. 
(Field notes, 12110104) 
Additionally, the PBMA process also revealed the internal conflict that the Consortium 
faced in meeting national and local health service goals. At the start of the PBMA 
exercise, the focus for identifying services for potential investment, disinvestment and 
redesign was restricted to identifying service areas where the organisation was not 
meeting national performance targets and directing resources to these from efficiency 
savings or disinvestments in service areas where performance targets were already 
being met or areas of care that did not have associated performance targets. However. 
by the end of the exercise, investment decisions were made on the basis of other goals, 
not least as described in the following extract, to maintain relationships with key 
stakeholders and avert potential local political tensions: 
The Medical Directors and PEC chair seem to be 'old school' and are aware of 
the wider issues and context around some of the business cases. They are 
politicalýv sensitive stating for example: "we don't want to piss X Qff so lets 
consider it - and ''we have made promises in the past and not delivered so Ive 
should keep it in the process ". 
(Field notes, ]P1204) 
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6.2.6 Confidence in the PBMA process 
Confidence in the PBMA process applied to both the conceptual basis of the PBMA 
process and the results of the PBMA process, and was in part related to the level of 
commitment participants demonstrated toward the process. The more confidence 
participants had in the PBMA process, the more likely they were to commit to it. This 
was evident in some of the extracts presented in 6.2.2. 
In terms of confidence in the PBMA process a number of Directors, particularly those 
who had worked in the health service for a while and had often encountered 'new' 
methods, or had experience of working with academics, were initially sceptical. Lack of 
confidence in the PBMA process is demonstrated below by one Director who compares 
it to a process that was used in the past which had associated problems: 
[Comments a Director during an Advisory Panel meeting] 
"Where we've done this before we've had no follow through and it has been 
difficult " 
(Filed notes, 08110104) 
However, during the course of the PBMA exercise, as the Directors, in their role as the 
Advisory Panel, became more familiar with the PBMA process, their confidence in the 
process seemed to increase. Indeed, such was their confidence in the process, that 
Directors were able to present the PBMA process and defend it to colleagues both 
within and outside of the organisation. This is evident in the following extract which 
shows the Medical Director supporting PBMA against the criticisms of the DPH. and 
then emphasising the importance of using the PBMA principles when reviewing the 
business cases in the latter stages (Stage 6) of the process: 
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[Advisory Panel meeting] 
In a discussion over beneficiary numbers, the DPH describes this as "the 
Achilles heel of PBAIM " the medical Director responds in humour that ''it is a 
manyfooted beast though! ", adding "but seriously I don't think it is though " 
... Later in discussion over measuring current expenditure, the Medical Director 
took charge in reiterating the 'marginal effect' and the importance offocussing 
specifically on this. 
(Field notes, 16112104) 
In contrast, the Heads of Service did display confidence in the PBMA process and were 
thus committed to the process from the outset. In part this may have been explained by 
the fact that some of the Heads of Service were new to commissioning and PBMA 
seemed to offer a potential 'life-line', a tool that could provide the answer for the 
difficult decisions that have to be made in commissioning, rather than a framework for 
conducting commissioning (see the discussion on objectivity in Section 6.3.1). 
However, the confidence initially portrayed by the Heads of Service, seemed to wane 
towards the end of the process. This was related to the extent to which the Heads 
perceived their lack of involvement in the exercise which was essentially centred on the 
production of the business cases in Stage 5. Other than this, they were not involved in 
the Advisory Panel or Stakeholder Group, and the lack of coordination and 
communication in the Consortium (discussed below, Section 6.2.7) meant that the 
Heads of Service were unfamiliar with other aspects of the PBMA process and, despite 
having had an introduction to PBMA in the beginning, were not clear about how their 
input was used in the process: 
[In conversation with a Head of Service] 
[the Head of Scrvicc] said that she feels like she's not inform inglinfluencing the 
planning process which in a Commissioning Consortium she finds a little 
11,01-1. , ving. 
She mentioned that she was very angrýv previously but has calmed 
down a bit now. 
(Field notes, . 
1.1,01 051) 
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Furthermore, some Heads expressed concem that the results from the PBMA process 
were inevitable as they had been manipulated by the CE and other Directors within the 
Consortium (as discussed in Section 6.2.3), and therefore they could not be confident 
about the process or the results. 
6.2.7 Coordination and fragmentation in the PBMA process 
The separate Directorates that made up the Consortium tended to operate as isolated 
groups within the organisation, resulting in a fractured way of working that seemed to 
lack coordination and joined-up thinking. This is reflected in the extract below: 
I started to realise that people aren't quite sure what information is available 
and who has what. There are many groups each of whom collect their own info 
and data - yet I'm not clear how this will relate to the PBAIM or how we will be 
able to use it. 
(Field notes, 14109104) 
This way of working was also reflected in the PBMA exercise. As noted earlier, given 
that PBMA Working Group was made up of the Directorate of Public Health and the 
DPH was responsible for the PBMA process, the process was primarily associated with 
this Directorate. As exemplified in the following extract, the PBMA process was often 
viewed as an activity, a "discrete project", isolated in the Directorate of Public Health: 
[In conversation with the public health trainee] 
Ti- 
ne said he had the impression that PBAM was a loitý, priority. Infact he said that 
he thought that the acute trusts valued it higher than inside the consortium. He 
also said that he thought that people saw this [the PBAM] as a few people 
working on a "discrete project" ftom which we're going to feed them some 
answers at the end of the day, rather than a ftamework that they needed to 
provide input to. This is probably because nobody has really given us allY 
information up to now, nobody has comefiorward to give us any data, 11-e have 
had to go out and searchfor it. 
(Field notes, 20110 04) 
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Furthermore, the extract above also illustrates the lack of coordinated input from other 
Directorates, in particular in providing information and data for the PBMA exercise. As 
exemplified in the extract below. this was explained by the fact that Directorates were 
all responsible for meeting their own objectives with which they were otherwise 
occupied: 
[In conversation with the CE] 
"The PBAIM is not on everybody's agenda. Only the Commissioning Director is 
responsiblefor the LDP. This is as much about managingpeople expectations as 
well as our own about what people can and can't contribute. " 
(Verbatim quote as recoded in Field notes, 21110104) 
This is further highlighted in the following extract which portrays the extent to which 
the objectives of each of the Directorates were often pursued at the expense of any 
overarching organisational aims or objectives. Indeed, in this examPle, rather than 
create aJ oined-up, approach by coordinating and involving different groups in achieving 
the objectives, it is proposed that ajoined-up way of thinking can be imposed: 
[In a meeting with the DPHJ 
The DPH recounts a conversation he had with the Director of Commissioning 
who he described as saying "I've already decided what the rankings are, is this 
[obtaining rankings ftom the PECs] not an academic exercise? One of us has 
got to be at the PEC tomorrow because one of us has got to tell them what their 
rankings are. " My impression is that everybody else is so busy doing their 
objectives that they are grateful that the LDP is someone else's first 
prioritylobjective. There is no joined up thinking even at Consortium Executive 
Board level because everybody is so busy. [emphasis added] 
(Field notes, 11101105) 
The lack of aj oined-up approach presented a particular problem for the PBMA exercise, 
not least because of the problems in gathering inputs from the other Directorates, but 
more so because the Directorate responsible for the LDP process was, in achieving its 
own objectives, compiling the LDP also in isolation which meant that it was difficult to 
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coordinate the PBMA process with the LDP process. In the end the final stages of the 
PBMA process were simply used to inform the LDP process. As such, up until that 
point, the two processes appeared to exist in parallel to one another. This is partly 
reflected in the extract above and explicitly described by a PEC Chair and a Head of 
Service in the following extracts: 
[In conversation a PEC chair] 
" itfeels that there is a general lack of coordination. The LDP is being prepared 
in isolation of the PBAIM process and the financial situation. 
(Field notes, 11101105) 
[In conversation with a Head ofService] 
"I have had the feeling that the two processes [the PBMA and the LDPJ are co- 
existing and have been running separately. 
(Field notes, 13101105) 
In addition to being organisationally fragmented, the Consortium was also temporally 
discontinuous. Established in 2004, the Consortium was a relatively new organisation 
and the PBMA exercise began in parallel with it. The PCTs that formed the Consortium 
had only been in existence for two years prior to this and they and their predecessor 
organisations (primary care groups and, before that, health authorities) had been subject 
to several reconfigurations. As such, many of the staff involved in the PBMA exercise 
had been in post for less a month prior to the start of the exercise and therefore not only 
had to contend with learning to adapt to a new organisational culture, but also had to 
familiarise themselves with their services, and implement the PBMA exercise at the 
same time. 
196 
6.2.8 Deferral of decision-making and impact on the PBMA process 
The ability to defer decision-making was encountered throughout the observation of the 
PBMA process. In the main, such deferral was subtle and intrinsically embedded in the 
organisational culture. In particular. a lot of time at the start of the PBMA processes 
seemed to be spent engaging in tactics like extensive debating and excessive planning 
which were used as diversions from the task of 'doing': 
I returned to work at 6.06pm for the evening shift with the DPH! Met the PCT 
Chair, the CE, and the Director of Performance who were also working late but 
not as late as us! Everybody seems happy to stop and debate the issues but Ijust 
want to get on andfinish! 
(Field notes, 14109104) 
So far we have just spent a lot of time brainstorming, cutting and sellotaping, 
and using highlighter pens! Is this what senior management do?! 
(Field notes, 21109104) 
Later in the process humour was also used in the Advisory Panel meetings. Given that 
these meetings involved reviewing the business cases and making decisions about the 
prioritisation of businesses cases for investment, it is conceivable that humour was used 
to divert attention away from the seriousness of the decisions that they faced in such 
meetings, to boost group morale or, perhaps, to prevent anybody from becoming too 
serious. This use of humour is portrayed below: 
[PBMA Advisory Panel meeting] 
Following a serious debate about the rating of some of the business cases, the 
DPH says "[the CE] is like the major in Fawlty Towers " [all laugh]. The tone 
of the rest of the meeting was generally pally, pally [very ftiendly and jokey]. 
There were a few comments on salaries, pay packets, P45s directed at fellow 
people around the table but it was all done in a jokey fashion (a bit 'old school 
boy tone) 
(Field notes, 16112'04) 
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In addition to these subtle diversionary tactics, more explicit approaches were also 
adopted to defer decision-making. In particular two approaches were adopted. First, 
decisions were often deferred on the basis that the quality of the data used to underpin 
decisions was poor. As a result, the responsibility for decisions rested with the data 
rather than those making the decisions or the organisation more broadly. This is 
highlighted in the following extract: 
I now get the impression of how a small part of the organisation is working It 
appears to be (on the surface) very busy/hectic and certainly there are a lot of 
demands to do things by certain dates. However there is also a lot of 
philosophising and discussion about what might happen if X were to be 
implemented There are a lot of concerns about the implication of new policies, I 
guess rightly so because it will be their heads on the line if things don't go right. 
But paradoxically when you askfor the info that informs the decisions that they 
make it is always accompanied by verbal warnings about the accuracy of the 
data and assumptions used to judge'[their words] the data and 'bring the data 
in line'[their words]. 
(Field notes, 23109104) 
The second approach involved the use and presentation of financial and accounting data 
and information. Depending on how the figures were presented, the financial and 
accounting data revealed a different story of the financial state of the organisation and 
this influenced how decisions were made. This was evident in the final stages of the 
PBMA process when the CE announced that the original financial deficit had been 
revised downwards: 
[In a catch up meeting with the DPH] 
The DPH stated that at a recent Consortium Executive Board meeting 
(12101105) that it was announced that the financial deficit of f 19M had been 
revised since to around 671,000 (including uplift and payouts and pre- 
commitments etc) for the PCT PBAIM investments will only add to this deficit 
and they worked out that the PCT could carry an i. n year deficit of around f5M 
therefore they could afford to spend around ý: 2M on PBAIM list of investments 
without having to making any disinvestment. 
(Field notes, 19 01 05) 
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As a result, despite the fact that the Consortium was still in deficit (though not to the 
same extent) and the original rhetoric of the Consortium to make efficiency savings that 
may have required disinvestments, the decision was made to allocate more resources to 
fund the PBMA investments. As such, by the end of the PBMA process no efficiency 
savings, either through service disinvestments or service redesign, were made and the 
Consortium instead invested more resources and the difficult decisions involved in 
making disinvestments were simply deferred to the following year. 
The themes from observation of the application of the PBMA process were used to 
refine the commissioning process in the revised schematic model of commissioning 
discussed in Section 6.4. 
6.3 Reflections on the implementation of PBMA 
Reflections on the implementation of PBMA were gathered through focus groups with 
participants involved in the implementation of PBMA. Two focus groups were held for 
the Heads of Service (on 02 Feb 2005) and Directors (on 20 Jan 2005) respectively. In 
total six Heads of Service (out of a possible nine) and all five Directors (plus the CE and 
the PEC representatives (3)) attended the focus groups. The focus groups were used to 
evaluate PBMA from the perspective of the user and examine the strengths and 
weaknesses of the process. Each of the focus groups was electronically recorded and 
transcribed. The transcriptions were analysed using thematic analysis to identify 
specific challenges to implementing PBMA and suggestions for refinement of the 
process. The emergent themes are presented below using verbatim extracts from the 
focus groups to illustrate the arguments. The themes covered both the PBMA process 
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and the context within which the PBMA exercise was conducted. Notably, the Directors 
tended to focus on specific issues to do with the PBMA process, whereas the Heads of 
Service focussed on the context. 
6.3.1 Process 
Directors highlighted several challenges with the PBMA process. First, the funding 
arrangements between commissioners and providers did not offer any incentives for 
identifying disinvestments or efficiency savings along the entire care pathway. 
Specifically, Payment by Results (PbR), the tariff system used by the PCT to pay for a 
number of specified services provided within the secondary (acute) care sector, is a 
fixed tariff based on the average costs of providing these services. As a consequence, 
any potential efficiency savings identified for tariff-ed services were not going to be 
realised by the PCT (who would continue to pay for them on a fixed average price 
basis), but by the secondary (acute) care sector. This is presented in the following 
extract: 
"Finding efficiency savings was hard in a diverse health economy i. e. 
efficiencies can be made in the acute sector but there is no control in 
commissioning over releasing those savings - we have to payfor PbR " 
(Advisory Panel Focus Group) 
Second, the benefit/cost ratio used to rank and prioritise business cases in Stage 6 of the 
PBMA process was not considered to be very useful. Indeed, members of the Advisory 
Panel agreed that they tended to focus on the weighted benefit score information to 
compare business cases and judge this alongside the cost data and any other relevant 
information (including, as described by a member of the Panel in the extract below. gut 
feelings), rather than rely exclusively on a single index measure: 
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"It seemed that the final rankings in the meeting were producedfrom a mix of 
gutfeelings based more solely on the weighted benefit. 
(Advisory Panel Focus Group) 
As discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.6, the 3 business cases that were not 
recommended for investment and inclusion in the LDP did not rank lowest according to 
the benefit/cost ratio but did consistently rank lowest on tenns of the weighted benefit 
scores. The incorporation of cost, or indeed, marginal cost was still a difficult concept 
for the Advisory Panel to capture. Though they agreed that they did need to take 
marginal cost into account, the Advisory Panel felt that the ratio approach made the 
information on marginal costs and benefits less explicit and transparent. 
Nevertheless, in general the PBMA method was considered an improvement over 
previously employed methods, providing greater transparency and a more robust and 
explicit approach to identifying and assessing decisions about the allocation of 
resources that was consistent with NHS objectives. Specifically, the development of 
explicit criteria as a method to assess the benefits of business cases was broadly 
welcomed. The use of criteria for weighting and scoring business cases provided a basis 
for deciding what was important when it came to judging the value of business cases 
and made such values explicit. These views are portrayed in the following extracts: 
"It showed promise as a tool to be used in the future as we make more explicit 
decisions on prioritisation ivithin streams and programmes. I would also be 
keen to see how we can link this approach with practice based commissioning. " 
(Advisory Panel Focus Group) 
"The weighting and scoring helpfiocus your mind on what you were trying to 
achievefrom your services " 
(Adviso)ýI, Panel Focus Group) 
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Furthermore, together, the transparency and explicitness of PBMA was presented as 
offering an approach for defending commissioning decisions. As a member of the 
Advisory Panel noted: 
"if we do want to choose to disinvest it [PBAIL4] provides a defensible process. If 
they [business cases for disinvestment from existing services] are considered 
within the full process then you can see how they rank against other 
investments. " 
(Advisory Panel Focus Group) 
In contrast, however, the extent to which the PBMA process was objective was regarded 
negatively by some. In particular, Heads of Service seemed to express frustration that 
the PBMA process did not make the final decision for them, was subject to the 
influence of politics (so called "must-dos ") or individual biases, and did not negate the 
need for judgement. This is reflected in the two extracts below: 
how did they make a non biasedjudgement because to my simplistic way of 
looking at it, ifyou look at the 18 things that have been ranked they are clearly 
the must-do'S for the PCTs. Now, [ ... 
] if you've known that ftom the very 
beginning surely to God that was a complete waste of time for some people... " 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
"I have heard that what is happening now is that people are looking at the 
scores and saying 'well I really don't think that one should be higher than that 
one'and 'something must be wrong here'and it begs the question why on earth 
are we actually using this tool if when we get the results of it we're not actually 
going to take those results. " 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
On the other hand, others argued that the PBMA process had to adapt to the political 
context that permeates commissioning, rather than try to replace it: 
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"I saw the two [the PBM4 and the LDPI as linked but then, what I've said 
before, if there's a political imperative you'll do it whether it's top or bottom of 
the list, you've got the methodology there but there's always going to be an 
element ofjudgement. " 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
"PBAIIA needs to cope with chaos in thefuture. Directivesftom the centre mean 
that things will always take us by surprise and mean we have to make 
investments. " 
(Advisory Panel Focus Group) 
Additionally, some Heads suggested that in order for PBMA to adapt to the political 
context, it should be iteratively implemented, rather than be rejected for failing to 
achieve perfection: 
"I think this was a first stab at it and I think the next time you do it you may 
change the parameters a little. " 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
"it's more of an art than a science, actually prioritising because, yes you need 
the methodology but there's so many other parameters that you need to 
consider. " 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
6.3.2 Time 
The timeframe for the PBMA exercise was imposed by the organisation to mirror the 
commissioning cycle and the LDP process. The exercise was therefore conducted over a 
timescale of approximately 7 months. The time frame for the PBMA was considered by 
many of the Heads of Service to be too tight. Indeed as one Head of Service 
commented: "the time ftames were ridiculous" (Heads of Service Focus Group). In 
particular, Heads focussed on the time frame for the production of business cases in 
Stage 5 of the PBMA process. At this stage Heads of Service were only given around 
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two weeks to identify, complete and submit business cases and were under pressure 
from their Directors to abide by this timescale. As a result of the short time frame, 
Heads were concerned that they did not do the PBMA 'properly' and such, it had failed. 
These views are evident in the following extracts: 
"Most of the business cases were designed around developments to meet service 
targets rather than developing new services or disinvesting in services and I 
think given the time lines it would have beenfoolishfor us to do that. " 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
"I am not saying that PBAIM in itseýf is a waste of time, I am saying that what we 
did in my view wasn't PBAM ... where was the re-channelling of moneyftom this 
to service to that service that was going to make a difference? It didn't happen 
and it couldn't happen in the time scales. " 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
In contrast, some Heads reasoned that the timescales or workload in the PBMA were 
not different to the usual process that they would have undertaken in the absence of 
PBMA: 
"I don't think it was any more onerous than a normal business planning cycle 
[ 
... 
]. I don't know whether it was any more useful ... " 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
"I think I would have to do the same process regardless, you know in terms of 
the business cases anyway. " 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
6.3.3 Engagement and collaboration 
Engagement within the organisation was conducted through the existing line- 
management routes which meant that overall the exercise was conducted from the top- 
down. Bottom up engagement Nvithin the PBMA process was restricted to the PEC 
members who were involved as proxies to represent clinicians and stakeholders as the 
204 
Stakeholder Group. However. the lack of direct engagement with clinicians or other 
service providers was identified as a particular problem for the Heads of Service ývhere 
institutional boundaries were likely to have impacted on their ability to make real 
resource shifts between acute and community services for example. Additionally, it was 
argued that the implementation of commissioning intentions required the active 
participation of those at the frontline of service provision. This is expressed in the 
following extract: 
"the whole exercise this time was entirely subjective because we all wrote our 
business cases from our own perspective. And, for my service, really what 
should have happened is that they should have been written in collaboration 
with the provider organisations because, I could have written what I thought 
was needed but, it could have been a million miles awayfrom the truth " 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
As a result, the Heads of Service were concerned that the exercise simply reinforced 
past commissioning processes and alienated providers from commissioning: 
cc we have got multi-disciplinary, multiagency groups that we meet with but, we 
meet with them maybe say quarterly, and when you have an exercise like this, 
with tight deadlines, we have to make the excuse to them again that 'it would 
have been good to liaise with you and consult with you but we didn't have the 
time "' 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
In contrast however, Heads of Service did not present themselves as willing 
collaborators to providers or Consortium colleagues. Indeed many often referred to 
services and resources as 'my' or 'mine'. Equally, as advocates for their service area, 
they were happy to put forward business cases requesting additional resources, but were 
less so about putting forward business cases for efficiency savings or resource 
reductions that may have been deployed outside of their service area. As such, they 
expressed that they Nvere comfortable about making trade-off and re-allocation decisions 
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implicitly within their own service area. but not explicitly across service areas. These 
points are illustrated in the following extracts: 
" When you're actually reconfiguring within existing resources I couldn't see the 
point ofputting in a business casefor that. 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
"... we cost them [priorities] up and deal with our own laundry before putting 
them into the LDP because I may well be able to recycle some o my own cash )f 
before I askfor LDP money. 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
6.3.4 Data and information 
Poor data and information were exposed through the PBMA process and presented a 
major challenge for future PBMA exercises: 
"consistently goodfinancial and information data is essential if we are going to 
make this successful and that was an absolute nightmare this time. 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
Specifically, the lack of timely and accurate financial data was consistently referred to 
as problematic because of the emphasis in PBMA on the programme budget and the use 
of cost data in the business cases. This is portrayed in the extracts below: 
it as an organisation we lack the most basic financial data [ ... 
]. I have never 
worked with such poor data and that makes a farce of the whole exercise 'cause 
I am pullingfigures out of the air. " 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
"it's difficult having prioritisation systems based on numbers when the numbers 
thatfeed the beast are consistently incorrect. 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
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There was no recognition that, in the absence of PBMA, decisions still had to be made 
and indeed were made using the same data and information. Also it was not clear 
whether the Heads were proposing that the availability and quality of data and 
information should be improved for decision-making purposes or that processes that 
utilise such data and information should not be used for decision-making. 
6.3.5 Communication 
Within the Consortium,, communication on the PBMA process was conducted through 
existing channels, and relied on the Directors (as members of the Advisory Panel and as 
line managers), to communicate directives and progress on the PBMA exercise directly 
to the Heads of Service. However, Heads of Service argued that the PBMA exercise was 
poorly communicated from the outset and they would have benefited from upfront and 
ongoing formal communication and educational support. These views are expressed in 
the following extracts: 
it you've got to get the communication right ftom the start and education about 
what we're trying to do " 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
11 at the very beginning the objectives of the whole exercise should have been 
communicated better and right throughout the process there should have been 
more effective communication '' 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
Consequently, the Heads of Service considered communication on the PBMA process 
to be ad-hoc and inconsistent, with Heads reporting that conflicting instructions from 
their Directors (as their line managers) led to confusion over the PBMA process. As 
described by one Head of Service: 
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"depending on who you spoke to you got a different story. I don't think that 
there was very good communication between the directors ". 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
As result, poor communication and feedback on the PBMA led Heads to question the 
potential of PBMA. In particular Heads emphasised that the lack of communication in 
the PBMA process reflected their experience of past processes. As such, the PBMA 
process was associated with the failures of previous processes. In the extracts below, 
this is expressed in terms of the PBMA having fallen short of their expectations and 
resulted in scepticism about the potential value of the PBMA and the incentives for 
committing to a process that is similar to failed past processes: 
"The sad thing is it reflects what happened before, the historical model of 
people being asked to put bids in and then not hearing and then not getting 
them. And this was going to be different. It was meant to be open, this was meant 
to be transparent, we'd have the criteria, people could see. Well the experience 
that you're [to another person in the focus group] describing is that it's the 
same old thing - we write business cases (a bid) for some money and eventually 
we don't hear and we assume that we haven't got it because we haven't heard " 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
"it [this experience] makes it very hard to support the process because you) re 
sitting there with the clinicians on a regular basis and they're saying 'here we 
go again'... 'what is the point' ... we need to improve 
feedback in the future. " 
(Heads of Service Focus Group) 
The themes from the focus group reflections of PBMA were used to refine 
commissioning performance in terms of the performance of the PBMA process, in the 
revised schematic model of commissioning discussed in 6.4. 
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6.4 Schematic model of commissioning with PBMA 
The empirical evidence generated from the thematic analysis of the observational and 
focus group data was used to revise the schematic model of PCT commissioning 
described in Chapter 4, Figure 4.2. The revised model uses the key themes discussed in 
this chapter to illustrate how the PBMA process impacted on the commissioning 
process and commissioning performance. The model is presented in Figure 6.1. 
In this figure, the commissioning strategy, on the left hand side reflects the 
commissioning strategy promoted by the SHA at the time of this research and the 
strategy upon which the Commissioning Consortium was established. In line with the 
strategy illustrated in Figure 4.2, this strategy highlights the need to make comparisons 
among claims on resources and judge them against a range of qualitative and 
quantitative outcomes in order to achieve efficiencies. 
The commissioning process in the centre of Figure 6.1 captures the PBMA process in 
terms of the stages described in Chapter 5. In this figure the PCT structures are 
illustrated as being central to the process. In this case, these structures fed-into different 
stages of the PBMA process through the Working Group, Advisory Panel, and 
Stakeholder Group. One group that is perhaps not well represented are the Heads of 
Service who were only engaged for a discrete part of the process rather than throughout 
all the stages. However, in contrast to Figure 4.2, this model places the PCT structures 
as driving the process. Additionally, the two way arrows between the PCT and the 
structures external to PCT indicate the potential for engaging xvith external structures 
through the PBMA process. In this exercise this was demonstrated in some ways better 
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than others. For example, the PBMA process was able to capture and incorporate the 
demands from the DH, NICE, and the SHA. However. engagement -ývith providers was 
restricted (although some providers were involved in an ad-hoc way either by Heads of 
Service in the development of business case, or through representation on the PEC and 
thus the Stakeholder Group). Nevertheless the potential for their engagement was 
demonstrated particularly at the stage of developing business cases. Similarly, it is 
feasible that the public or patients can be engaged, though there was no attempt to do so 
in this exercise. The potential for engagement is represented by the broken line in the 
diagram. 
Finally, the commissioning performance on the right of Figure 6.1, as in Figure 4.2, 
illustrates where the commissioning process deviates from the commissioning strategy 
and is defined relative to the commissioning strategy. In Figure 6.1 the PBMA process 
results in better commissioning performance than was depicted in Figure 4.2 (Chapter 
4). In this instance, the PBMA process seems to result in a more transparent, explicit, 
robust, and defensible process, each of which are illustrated as strengths of the process. 
One particular weakness highlighted in the process was the inability to identify 
disinvestments or efficiency savings. Commissioning performance also demonstrates 
the constraints or barriers that impacted upon the PBMA process and limited decision- 
makers' ability to achieve the commissioning strategy. In the main the constraints 
identified in Figure 6.1 are similar to those in Figure 4.2 and focus on the dominance of 
national or political targets in decision-making, organisational fragmentation, and 
restrictions of time,, and data and information. 
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6.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the results from the observation of the implementation of PBMA 
conducted in the second part of the second phase of the PAR, and the results from the 
focus groups conducted in the third phase of the PAR. Observational data were 
collected using field notes which were subject to an analysis of themes. A number of 
common themes were identified and used to build an account of how PBMA was 
applied. Specifically, themes related to the conceptual and methodological 
understanding of PBMA and the context within which it was implemented, including 
the extent to which participants committed to the PBMA process, conflicts that 
impacted upon the PBMA process, and the effect of leadership on the PBMA process. 
The transcripts from the focus groups were also analysed using an analysis of themes. 
Emergent themes were used to identify specific challenges to implementing PBMA and 
suggestions for refinement of the process. Such challenges comprised both process and 
contextual challenges, including time, data and information, and communication. 
These themes, from both the observation of the application of PBMA and the focus 
group reflections on PBMA, were used to inform the development of a refined model of 
commissioning illustrating the role of PBMA in the commissioning process as presented 
in Figure 6.1. In comparison to the model of commissioning presented in Chapter 4. 
Figure 4.2, this model illustrates the PCT structures as central to the commissioning 
process through their engagement in the PBMA stages. Similarly. the potential for 
engaging with external structures through the PBMA process is demonstrated. 
Furthermore, commissioning performance Nvas improved through the PBMA process 
resulting in a more transparent. explicit, robust, and defensible process. A particular 
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weakness in the process was however, the inability to identify disinvestments or 
efficiency savings. On the other hand constraints in the commissioiiing process seemed 
to mirror those in the original model. 
The following chapter presents a discussion of these results alongside the results of the 
previous chapters. The discussion draws on three main strands that cut across these 
chapters. These are: that decision-makers seem to share common principles about the 
allocation of resources, some of which align with economics, but they do not appear to 
adhere to these principles in practice; that decision-making is constrained in a number 
of ways; and that the constraints in decision-making not only create barriers for 
decision-making but are also used to define the identity of decision-makers and justify 
the status quo. 
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Chapter 7 Discussion and conclusion 
7.1 Chapter overview 
Following an overview of the thesis, this chapter presents a discussion of the analysis of 
PBMA prior to, during, and after its implementation in a commissioning organisation. 
The discussion draws on three broad issues that emerged from the results from Chapters 
4,5, and 6. Firstly, decision-makers seem to share common principles about the 
allocation of resources, some of which align with economics, but they do not appear to 
adhere to these principles in practice. Secondly, decision-making is constrained by 
factors such as capacity, capability, and time. Thirdly, the constraints in decision- 
making not only create barriers for decision-making but are also used to define the 
identity of decision-makers and justify the status quo. Each of these points is discussed 
in turn, positioning the findings in relation to the literature. Drawing on the discussion 
points raised, the implications of these findings for policy and practice, and 
recommendations for the future are related to the application of PBMA and economics 
approaches more generally. This is followed by a reflection on the implications for r, 
research , including the contributions to, and 
limitations of, the research, and future 
research directions. 
7.2 Thesis summary 
The research presented in this thesis was generated by the researcher working within 
and alongside an NHS commissioning organisation to identify and understand how 
commissioning was organised and to explore the potential for using health economics. 
Specifically. programme budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA) was used as a 
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vehicle to study how health economics can be mfornied by. and inform, the 
management of scarce resources in the -real-world'. The research s, )ught to answer the 
following questions: 
1. What are the main approaches to maiiaging scarcity in theorv'ý 
2. How is scarcity managed in PCTs ai-id through commissioi-iino practice? 
3. Can economic principles to managiiiý, scarcity be incorporLitect ilito commissioning 
practice? 
In addressing these questions, the aims of the researcli were to: 
identify approaches to managino scarcity in the licalth services research, 
management, economics, and ethics literatures 
examine PCT decision-makers' views on managiný, scarcitv ýind commissioning - 
specifically, how commissioning is understood in pi-incip1c, and how this translates 
into practice 
develop, implement, and observe the application of PBMA as a framework for 
managing scarcity to fit with the oi-ganisational StRIcture of IIC-Fs and account for 
the barriers and facilitators of sucli iiiiplementatioii 
evaluate how the PBMA framework is interpreted and reconstructed by users within 
the PCT and whether the use of the framework results m mil)roved process and 
management of scarce resources. 
In meeting the above aims. the contributions of the rcscarch rcportcd in the thesis have 
been the: 
development of a comprehensivc thick description and a iic\\, conceptual model of 
PCT commissioning in England 
advancement of the use of rigorous qualitative rcscarch in hcýilth economics through 
the unique application of a participitory obscrvation appi- ), ich to study the use of 
economic principles in the contcxt ofPCT con-ii-i-iissioning ii-i Fwdand 
advancement of the PBMA literatLII-C fron-i the Use of PB, \ IA as a method or 'tool' 
for decisioii-making. to the use of' PBMA as a vclucle I'Or Mtroducing economics 11 
into the decision-making process in in iterative and inclusive iiitimer L- 
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development of general lessons for the application of economics and PBMA not 
only with respect to PCT commissioning but in any context that requires the 
management of scarce resources. 
The second chapter of the thesis outlined economic theory as applied to the 
management and allocation of scarce resources and provided the basis from which to 
critique approaches used in practice to managing scarcity identified from the literature. 
Economic theory begins from the basic premise that resources are scarce and therefore 
there is a need to make decisions about the allocation of resources that will maximise 
societal welfare from the resources available. Such decisions are underpinned by the 
principles of 'opportunity cost' and the 'margin', meaning that the costs and benefits of 
the use (and potential use) of health care resources should be compared so that resources 
can be allocated to those which maximise the benefits from the total resources available. 
A review of the literature on managing scarcity in practice identified several approaches 
that could be split into health economic and health service approaches. Health economic 
approaches included economic evaluation, QALY league tables, and PBMA; health 
service approaches included needs assessment, core services, national policy guidelines, 
and balanced score card. The critique of health service approaches argued that such 
approaches do not account for the economic principles of opportunity cost or the margin 
and are therefore likely to lead to the inefficient use of resources. Some economic 
approaches such as economic evaluation (specifically cost effectiveness/utility analysis) 
and QALY league tables were subject to the same criticism as well as additional 
challenges in implementation that meant they were not routinely adopted in practice. 
PBMA was identified as an approach that did adhere to the economic principles 
outlined above. Furthermore, PBMA offered a process for managing scarcity and thus 
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presented a potential vehicle through which economic principles could be utilised in the 
management of scarce healthcare resources. However, in order to study the application 
of economic principles in practice and to develop a better understanding of the use of 
economics in the context and complexities of the 'real world', it was noted that it was 
necessary to adopt an alternative research paradigm, utilising qualitative research, to 
study how PBMA was used, adapted, and refined. 
To address this, the research was conducted using a participatory action research (PAR) 
framework to study PBMA in three phases: before, during, and after its introduction 
into an NHS commissioning organisation. Qualitative methods of data collection and 
analysis were used in each phase of the research. Interviews were used to examine the 
commissioning and organisational context prior to the introduction of PBMA, 
observation was used to observe the application of PBMA as it was introduced into the 
organisation, and focus groups were used to gather reflections for refinement following 
the application of PBMA. Each data set generated through these methods was analysed 
using an analysis of themes to identify and examine emerging concepts. 
The interview results from the first phase of the PAR were used in Chapter 4 to build a 
thick description of the current commissioning context and the constraints inherent in 
the commissioning process in PCTs. Using these results, a schematic diagram was 
developed (Figure 4.2), outlining the commissioning strategy (a set of normative 
statements about what guides commissioning decisions); the commissioning process 
(the structures utilised in commissioning. the methods that drive commissionino, and Cý tý 
the impact of structures external to the PCT on both of these). and the performance of 
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the commissioning process (weaknesses of the process and constraints within the PCT 
that limit their ability to undertake commissioning in line with the strategy). 
The results from the second phase of the PAR were presented in two chapters. The first, 
Chapter 5, described the application of PBMA as a potential framework for 
commissioning as implemented within the Commissioning Consortium which was 
established by three PCTs to undertake commissioning for secondary care. The second, 
Chapter 6, presented the results from the observation of the implementation of PBMA 
within this organisation. A number of common themes were identified and used to build 
an account of how PBMA was enacted. Specifically, themes related to the conceptual 
and methodological understanding of PBMA, and the context within which it was 
implemented. These included the extent to which participants committed to the PBMA 
process, conflicts that impacted upon the PBMA process, and the effect of. leadership on 
the PBMA process. The results from the focus groups (the third phase of the PAR) were 
also presented in Chapter 6. The results drew on an analysis of themes to identify 
potential barriers and facilitators in the implementation of PBMA. Such barriers 
comprised both process and contextual challenges, including time, data and information, 
and communication. The themes from both the observation of the application of PBMA 
and the focus group reflections on PBMA were used to revise the schematic model of 
commissioning presented in Chapter 4, Figure 4.2 and inform the development of a 
refined model illustrating the role of PBMA in the commissioning process illustrated in 
Chapter 6, Figure 6.1. 
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7.3 Overarching findings 
The findings from Chapter 4 (the commissioning context prior to the introduction of 
PBMA) illustrated PCT commissioning in terms of six themes that constituted the 
commissioning, strategy (concepts and principles), the commissioning process 
(structures and methods), and commissioning performance (outcomes and constraints). 
The results showed that PCT decision-makers seemed to share a common conceptual 
understanding of decision-making. Decision-makers acknowledged that resources are 
scarce, claims on resources are competing, and that choices and trade-offs have to be 
made, and even identified a common set of commissioning principles that they 
suggested ought to guide decisions about such choices and trade-offs. 
However, the principles did not seem to translate into commissioning practice. 
Although PCTs comprised a number of structures with roles for identifying, debating 
and validating, and endorsing commissioning decisions, the commissioning process and 
the resulting decisions appeared to be driven by structures external to PCTs (such as 
NICE, the DH, SHA, and the Acute Trusts) through political, historical and clinical 
commissioning 'methods'. As a result it was not clear that the commissioning concepts 
and principles outlined above were realised through the PCT structures or the 
commissioning methods. Indeed, the outcomes of the commissioning process defined 
the process as unsystematic and lacking transparency, and constraints inherent in the 
process were identified as limiting PCTs and decision-makers' abilities to undertake 
commissioning in line with the strategy and used to justify the commissioning 
outcomes. In particular, the commissioning process was depicted by decision-makers as 
controlled by central govemment; hindered by organisational boundaries that created 
and maintained different (and often conflicting) cultures and prevented organisations 
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cooperating with one another; and impeded by a lack of capacity (i. e. numbers of 
people), capability (i. e. skills, data and information), and time. 
The introduction of PBMA in a commissioning organisation described in Chapter 5 was 
applied primarily as a vehicle for embedding the economic principles of managing 
scarcity into the commissioning process, and secondly to attempt to improve on the 
commissioning outcomes and overcome some of the commissioning constraints 
identified in Chapter 4. The findings from the observation of the introduction of PBMA 
(discussed in Chapter 6) were presented in eight themes: conceptual and methodological 
understanding of PBMA, buy-in to the PBMA process, control of decision-making and 
the PBMA process, leadership of the PBMA process, conflict affecting the PBMA 
process, confidence in the PBMA process, coordination and fragmentation in the PBMA 
process, and deferral of decision-making and impact on the PBMA process. 
The observation results provided an account of how the PBMA process was undertaken 
in relation to the application of the PBMA 'method' and the cultural context into which 
it was applied. In terms of the method, the extent of conceptual understanding of PBMA 
seemed to vary between the hierarchies of the organisation. Additionally. 
methodological problems included: problems in making comparisons between business 
cases for public health interventions and (acute) service delivery interventions, the 
concept of the potential number of beneficiaries for public health interventions (which 
may have led to inflating the marginal benefit estimates for these interventions), and the 
lack of a defined scale for rating all business cases. 
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In terms of cultural context, the PBMA process was primarily controlled by the CE of 
the organisation which meant that he was, on the one hand, able to influence the 
direction of the PBMA exercise (perhaps more so than others in the organisation) but, 
on the other hand, raise the prominence of it within the organisation. However, 
leadership of the PBMA process was embedded within one Directorate within the 
organisation and in particular, one individual - the Director of Public Health. As a 
result, the PBMA became the responsibility of one person and meant that it was often 
difficult to integrate and coordinate the PBMA process with other processes (such as the 
LDP or data collection processes) in the organisation. This was further compounded by 
the fact the organisation was fragmented and that there was established political (with a 
small 'p') conflict between the other local healthcare organisations in which the PBMA 
exercise was undertaken. Furthermore, such conflict impacted on the extent of 
engagement in the PBMA exercise with these other organisations. Even within the 
commissioning organisation itself, engagement differed between hierarchies and over 
time, with those engaged regularly in the process committing to and having greater 
confidence in it. Finally, a climate of deferring decision-making influenced the extent to 
which the PBMA exercise was able to explicitly identify disinvestments. 
Reflections on the PBMA following its introduction were detailed in Chapter 6. The 
findings were presented in terms of five themes that reflected on the PBMA process and 
challenges. In terms of process, there were few incentives for identifying efficiency 
savings or disinvestments and the benefit/cost ratio was not adopted in the decision- 
making process. On the other hand, the process was considered to be an improvement 
on previous decision-making processes, providing a robust and explicit approach to 
decision-making that resulted in greater transparency and objectivity. Nevertheless, 
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there were a number of challenges that arose in the PBMA process that impacted on the 
extent to which the process could be considered to be robust, explicit. transparent and 
objective. These included: the short time-frame in which the exercise was conducted. 
limited engagement and collaboration both within and outside of the organisation, the 
unavailability and poor quality of data and information, and the lack of systematic and 
on-going communication of the process within and outside of the organisation. 
In summary, the extent to which the PBMA process was successful can be judged in 
two ways - first, in terms of its success in embedding the economic principles of 
managing scarcity into the commissioning process, and second, in terms of improving 
the commissioning outcomes and overcoming the commissioning constraints identified 
in Chapter 4. With regard to the first of these, the economic principles of opportunity 
costs and the margin were realised in the development and assessment of business 
cases, though the lack of explicit disinvestments prevented further exploration of these 
principles in the decision-making process. However, there was some evidence that 
reinvestment was done implicitly within programme areas. Furthermore, the purpose of 
the research was not on the technical implementation of PBMA, but on offering an 
alternative way of thinking about and approaching managing scarcity using an 
economic framework. As such, the success of the PBMA process can be judged with 
regard to second of these measures. The PBMA exercise enabled the PCT to drive the 
commissioning process (rather than it being driven by structures outside of the PCT). 
Additionally, there was the potential for engaging with external structures through the 
PBMA exercise and the process was able to capture and incorporate the demands from 
the DH, NICE, and the SHA. Hovvever, engagement Nvith providers was restricted, 
though the potential for their engagement was demonstrated particularly at the stage of 
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developing business cases. As a result, the PBNIA process was considered to be more 
transparent, explicit, robust, and defensible than previous commissioning process by 
those who participated in the exercise. However, a significant weakness of the exercise 
was the inability to explicitly identify resource disinvestments or efficiencýr savings. 
Furthermore, the PBMA exercise was not able to overcome the commissioning 
constraints identified prior to its implementation and was subject to similar constraints 
including the focus on national or political targets, organisational fragmentation, and 
restrictions of time, and data and information. Nevertheless, further iterations of PBMA 
(something that was welcomed by the organisation) need to be undertaken to determine 
whether these constraints can be overcome in the long term and whether the economic 
principles of opportunity cost and marginal analysis can be borne out in reality through 
the identification of explicit resource disinvestments. 
7.4 Discussion of findings 
The discussion draws on three main issues that cut across the findings from each of the 
results chapters. These are: that decision-makers share common principles about the 
allocation of resources, some of which align with economics, but they do not adhere to 
these principles in practice; that decision-making is constrained; and that the constraints 
in decision-making not only impede decision-making but are also used to define the 
identity of decision-makers and militate against change. Each point is discussed in turn, 
positioning the findings in relation to the literature. 
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7.4.1 Decision-makers share common principles some of which align 
with those in economics, but they do not adhere to these principles 
in practice 
The interview results, as illustrated in the schematic model of commissioning (Figure 
4.2), showed that decision-makers shared a common conceptual understanding of 
decision-making which was further defined by a common set of commissioning 
principles that decision-makers suggested ought to guide decisions about choices and 
trade-offs. The principles outlined by decision-makers were that: claims on resources 
should be compared and judged against one another, claims should meet a common set 
of objectives which need to be balanced, and claims should achieve value for money. 
What is compelling about the results presented here is that they are based on the 
analysis and interpretation of interview responses from participants who were actively 
involved in making such commissioning decisions. Given the remit of this thesis, it is 
therefore particularly interesting to note that the commissioning concepts and principles 
identified by decision-makers are not dissimilar to those concepts and principles 
promoted within health economics. These are therefore not alien concepts to decision- 
makers, who, on the contrary, seem to be familiar with the rhetoric at least. 
This claim is also backed up by Mooney and Wiseman (1999) who state that: "health 
care policy makers are just as keen as are economists that policies be implemented 
efficiently and equitably". However, they continue that: "something gets in their way at 
least as far as pursuing the objectives as p rceived by economists. " As such, they 
suggest that: "In other words we believe that decision-makers are aware of the 
advantages and desirability of efficiency and equity in health care policy making and 
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indeed are reasonably well aware of the nature of efficiency and equity" (Mooney and 
Wiseman, 1999). 
Although the principles outlined above are visible in or integral to the commissioning 
strategy as described in Chapter 4, these principles did not seem to impact on the 
commissioning process. To recollect Mooney and Wiseman above, "something gets in 
[decision-makers'] way. " The interview results illustrated that the commissioning 
principles identified by decision-makers did not seem to translate into practice. The 
principles were not actively promoted in the commissioning structures which comprised 
the semi-formal planning groups, and the more formal PEC and PCT Board, whose 
roles were synonymised with supporting, debating and validating, and endorsing 
commissioning decisions respectively. Furthermore, the principles were not inherent in 
the methods of political, historic, and clinical commissioning that were driven by 
structures outside the PCT such as NICE, the DH, the SHA, and the Acute Trusts. 
Indeed, these structures dominated the commissioning process. As a result, decision- 
makers perceived the outcomes of the commissioning process as unsystematic and 
lacking transparency. 
The extent to which the process of commissioning is driven by principled decision- 
making has been raised in the literature. Internationally, surveys in various countries 
have found that decision-makers recognise a lack of systernatisation and rigour in 
decision-making (Miller et al., 2006, Hunter, 1993a) and it has been repeatedly shown 
that decision-making, processes often lack transparency and systematic structure 
(Gibson et al., 2004. Ham and Robert, '2003. Bravo Vergel and Ferguson. 2006). 
Specifically, in his study of decision-making in Scottish Health Boards, Hunter (1979) 
showed that the process of allocating growth monies tended to involve "a policy of 
appeasing competing demands" rather than being reviewed against any defined goals or 
objectives. Hunter observed that resources were therefore allocated through a mix of 
precedent and organisational routines which resulted in historical priority setting 
(Hunter, 1979). With respect to the English NHS, reflecting on the problems of 
financial management and the extent of financial deficits in previous years, 
commentators have questioned the extent to which 'robust' commissioning is happening 
in PCTs (National Audit Office and Audit Commission, 2006, Maynard and Street, 
2006, Harding, 2006, Ham, 2006, Smith and Mays, 2005). Recent research conducted in 
Yorkshire and Lincolnshire (Bravo Vergel and Ferguson, 2006) found that PCTs often 
failed to articulate and make the rationale for their decisions explicit and accessible. 
In the PBMA exercise, the process for commissioning was formalised through the 
PBMA stages outlined in Chapter 5. The PBMA process as illustrated in Chapter 6, 
Figure 6.1, placed the PCT structures at the centre, driving the commissioning process 
and demonstrated the potential for engaging with structures external to the PCT as 
opposed to them dominating the process. The PBMA process seemed to result in a more 
transparent, explicit, robust, and defensible process; however the problem of translating 
principles into practice was also evident in the inability of the Consortium to identify 
disinvestments. 
At the outset of the PBMA exercise the organisation was committed to making 
efficiency savings in the face of a large deficit across the Consortium. Hoxvever. by the 
end of the PBMA process no efficiency savings , vere made. either through service 
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disinvestments or service redesign, and the Consortium instead invested more resources. 
There appeared to be several reasons for this. 
First, as described in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1, and Chapter 6, Section 6.2.5, the process 
for identifying the options for investment and disinvestment was based more on 
identifying service developments to meet national targets rather than a marginal analysis 
of the costs and benefits of the current provision of services. Second, the business case 
approach adopted in the PBMA exercise was a familiar feature in the business planning 
cycle of Acute Trusts and the former Health Authorities. Nevertheless,, historically and 
practically, it had tended to be used as a process for bidding for development resources 
rather than to identify resource savings. It is therefore conceivable that the business 
cases continued to be used in the same way in the PBMA process for bidding for 
additional resources. 
Third, as illustrated in Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3, Heads of Service were reluctant to 
make efficiency savings from service disinvestments or service redesign explicit, 
preferring instead to fund investments by making such trade-offs and reallocating the 
efficiency savings implicitly within their own service areas. As such, they did not think 
it necessary to put forward business cases for disinvestments which they could reinvest 
in investments in their own service areas. Fourth, as highlighted in Chapter 6, Section 
6.2.8, towards the end of the end of the PBMA exercise, the forecast for the 
Consortium's deficit was amended and despite the fact that the Consortium was still in 
deficit (though not to same extent) the decision was made by the CE that a small deficit 
could be carried by the organisation in order to fund the service investments identified 
227 
by the PBMA exercise. This negated the need to identify efficiency savings from 
disinvestments though it was not clear how the deficit was 'amended' and whether the 
resources that were used to amend the deficit came from disinvestments made implicitly 
elsewhere in the organisation. 
In the literature, the problem of identifying disinvestments has been referred to as the 
"Achilles heel" of PBMA as scarcity never bites if decision-makers operate in a culture 
of expecting more resources and are not willing to make trade-offs over the allocation of 
resources (Mitton and Donaldson, 2004). Mitton and Donaldson (2004) argue that this 
is in part justified because budgets in healthcare are rarely truly fixed, as has been 
illustrated in the results of this thesis. Alternatively, Mooney and Wiseman (1999) 
suggest that decision-makers may simply be "romantics" in the sense that they fail to 
accept that resources are scarce or fail to take responsibility for making tough decisions. 
This, they argue, is exemplified by the fact that in their experience decision-makers are 
willing to make incremental investments on the basis of the available information but 
will not make incremental disinvestments on the basis of the same information, calling 
for better information before making a decision (Mooney and Wiseman, 1999). 
Additionally, Coast points out that a driving principle in decision-making is avoiding 
the distress of denial (Coast, 2001). In other words, decision-makers may be to be 
reluctant to make disinvestment decisions that may imply the denial of care or services 
to a specific population in order to minimise their own disutility. As such Coast argues 
that the concept of denial disutility results in a lack of decisive or 'objective' decision- 
making (Coast, 2001). 
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7.4.2 Decision-making is constrained 
The interview, observation, and focus group results all identified the presence of 
constraints on decision-making as reasons for the lack of principled decision-making 
discussed above. Constraints were inherent in the commissioning process or 
organisational. context and were defined in terms of barriers that limited the ability of 
decision-makers to incorporate the commissioning principles discussed above in 
practice. Constraints included a lack of control and choice, a lack of cooperation, and a 
lack of capacity. 
First, in terms of control and choice,, the interview results described in Chapter 4, 
Section 4.4.2 and 4.5.2, indicated that decision-making was perceived to be dominated 
by politics, that is, controlled by central government through the implementation of 
national performance assessment targets and national guidelines. The extent of the 
influence of these national drivers was also witnessed in defining the remit of the 
PBMA exercise (Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1) and observed in the application of the PBMA 
process (Chapter 6, Section 6.2.5 and 6.3.1). The Commissioning Consortium was 
performance managed on the basis of meeting the performance assessment targets and 
as such, decision-making ended up restricted to allocating resources to meet the 
performance assessment targets first and foremost, irrespective of whether this would 
maximise benefits. 
The influence of politics in decision-making has been well documented both in UK 
healthcare organisations (though much of this refers to former organisational 
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incarnations of PCTs) and internationally (Fox, 2006, Ham. 2004, Hunter. 1993a, Klein 
et al., 1996, Ham and Robert, 2003, McDonald, 2002, Mitton et al., 2003b, Mitton and 
Donaldson, 2003c, Klein, 2006, Checkland, 1997). In the UK, as far back as 1979, 
Hunter's observations of the allocation of resources in a Scottish Health Board noted 
that one of the constraints over the allocation of resources was the interface between 
health boards and the centre and the fact that the health boards were constrained by the 
need to observe national policy which, he suggested, limited their freedom to 
manoeuvre (Hunter, 1979). Similarly, Ham has stated that local decisions are shaped by 
inherited local commitments and by bargaining between different interests, stating that 
66priority setting is an area in which the politics of the NHS are played out at a local 
level" (Ham, 2004). More recently, a survey of PCT managers in the Health Service 
Journal showed that two-thirds of respondents said that the NHS would not be facing 
such financial problems if it were not for the inflexible government targets (Martin, 
2006). This view is reiterated by a fonner PCT Chair who argued in the Health Service 
Journal that: 
PCTs are led by their noses from the centre, through the delegated power of the 
SHAs. The board became bogged down and frustrated by demands from the 
centre. Board members were advised by the SHA that we had to earn the 
privilege of developing local initiatives. If it wasn't a national target, forget it. 
(Young, 2005) 
Specifically, in relation to PBMA, other authors have noted that politics tends to 
'trump' decisions made within the process and can result in 'crisis' decision-making 
(Mitton and Donaldson, 2003c, Mitton and Donaldson, 2004). 
Nevertheless, as the literature indicates, the influence of politics in decision-making is 
historic and widespread and decision-making is therefore neither neutral nor abstract. 
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As such, it is important to try to explicitly acknowledge politics within the decision- 
making process rather than ignore it. In the PBMA exercise, political imperatives were 
explicitly incorporated into the PBMA process and used to inform the development of 
service investments. Therefore, despite the fact the results of the exercise focussed on 
the national targets, it was not surprising. Though it did raise questions as to vvhy a 
process such as PBMA was used to accomplish the predictable (Chapter 6,6.3.1). 
The second constraint,, lack of cooperation was defined by institutional and temporal 
fragmentation and discontinuity in decision-making. As described in Chapter 6, Section 
6.2.7, the Consortium tended to operate in the 'silos' of Directorates with little or no 
engagement or input from the other Directorates. In turn, the work of the Directorates 
became associated solely with the individual directorates (rather than the organisation 
more broadly) and there was a lack of 'joined-up' working and thinking across the 
Consortium. As a result of this fragmented culture, the PBMA exercise became the sole 
responsibility of the DPH and was aligned with him rather than the entire organisation. 
Institutional fragmentation was also evident implicitly in the PBMA process when 
trying to access information for example. As discussed below. the collection of data and 
information was not coordinated and the availability of and access to information varied 
between the Directorates. This is not unique to this context, but endemic in the health 
service which has been described as duplicating information, lacking systems for data 
sharing, and using information in isolation from the financial systems and other 
processes (Nolan, 2006). 
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This concept of institutional fragmentation has also been illustrated by Checkland 
(1997) who conducted a series of interviews and observational research on contracting 
in the UK health service in the early 1990s revealing that there was little interaction 
between stakeholders within and across healthcare organisations. Additionally, Currie 
(1999) highlighted that middle managers within the acute sector felt that they carried 
out their business planning process in isolation from other directorates. Cot6 argues that 
such fragmentation and isolation is an inevitable consequence of the "silo-effect" which 
stems from decentralised management and results in a department's interest (in this 
case, a Directorate's interests) taking precedence over the well-being of the organisation 
(Cote, 2002). Furthermore, he notes that the "silo-effect" results in a lack of 
cooperation, internal competition, and the breakdown in communication, issues that are 
returned to in the following section (7.3.3). 
The third constraint, lack of capacity, was referred to in the interviews in terms of a lack 
of capacity (i. e. numbers of people), capability (i. e. skills, data and information), and 
time. This was reiterated in the results from the observation and reflection of the 
implementation of PBMA. As described in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.7, the Commissioning 
Consortium was a new organisation and those involved in the PBMA exercise were 
newly recruited. Indeed many of the Heads of Service and some Directors had no prior 
experience of commissioning in the health service and therefore lacked the capacity and 
capability for commissioning. 
With reference to capability, the emphasis on the use of data and information as a basis 
for PBMA exposed the lack of data and information, as well as its poor quality and 
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accuracy (Chapter 6, Section 6.3.4). Though there was a lot of data collected both 
locally within the organisation and from national sources, this was not always translated 
into useful information. Furthermore,, although the Consortium was served by an 
'information service', there was no central repository for any data collected across the 
Consortium and the availability of data and/or information differed between individuals 
and Directorates within the organisation. 
Finally, the timeframe for the PBMA exercise was imposed by the organisation to 
mirror the commissioning cycle and the LDP process. The exercise was therefore 
conducted over a timescale of 7 months. In this time frame some of the later stages of 
PBMA, due to delays in the early stages, had to be completed in a relatively short 
period of time. Specifically, the Heads of Service were only given around 2 weeks to 
identify, complete and submit business cases. These timescales were deemed by some 
Heads of Service as too short, though those with prior commissioning experience, 
whilst not implying that the timescales were ideal, likened the timescales to the standard 
commissioning process. Had the PBMA process and the LDP process been sufficiently 
integrated (Chapter 6, Section 6.2.7), the issue of time may not have been raised. 
However, that they were not may have resulted in duplicating or additional work for 
those involved in the exercise. 
Constraints on decision-makers such as capacity, capability, and time have been widely 
reported in the literature both nationally and internationally. In particular, critical 
capacity (people). capabilitN T (expertise), time constraints. and support tools and 
methods have been highlighted as essential in improving decisioi-i-making (Ham, 2004. 
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Mitton and Patten, 2004, Smith et al., 2004). In the UK. Hunter (1979) identified 
several internal constraints on resource allocation including a lack of information and a 
lack of 'real time'. With respect to information, Hunter found that a lot of information 
was not used and that there were problems of access to information. With regard to 
time, Hunter noted that the use of a rigid timetable in the allocation of resources meant 
that there was little time to prepare cases for funding and also insufficient time in the 
process to review requests for funding. 
In terms of PCTs, most of the literature has focussed on the lack of competencies and 
skills of commissioners for commissioning, illustrating the lack of capability and 
expertise in commissioning (Smith et al., 2004, Ham, 2004). Specifically, it is has been 
claimed that commissioners still lack basic information for commissioning as well as 
the management capacity to deal with it and the analytical skills to be able to interpret it 
(Edwards et al., 2006, Whitfield, 2004, Nolan, 2005). Furthermore, Edwards argues that 
"having information and skills [ ... ] 
is not enough. [ ... ]. There is a lack of focus on the 
detailed operation and the design of operations. In other words, once I have interpreted 
the information, what do I do? We have not equipped people with these operational 
skills" (Edwards as cited in Taylor (2006)). As Edwards suggests, information and skills 
need to be employed within a coherent decision-making process rather than on an ad- 
hoc basis. Similarly, international research has shown that constraints in decision- 
making such as a lack of time and lack of skills need to be tackled through specific 
operational processes, and supported by strong leadership and change management 
(Mitton and Patten, 2004, Gibson et al., 2004, Reeleder et al., 2006). 
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7.4.3 Constraints in decision -maki ng not only impede decision-making 
but are also used to define the identity of decision-makers and 
militate against change 
Several constraints in decision-making have been discussed above. However there are 
broader implications to identifying such constraints. Firstly, interviewees present these 
constraints as 'real barriers' that impede the decision-making process. Secondly, the 
discourse about barriers merely suggests that such barriers are bad because they hinder 
change, which is good, and as a consequence such barriers should be removed. 
However, Checkland et al. (2007) in their study of the implementation of clinical 
guidelines argue that it is unhelpful to simply identify such constraints as 'barriers to 
change', particularly when explaining the effects of an intervention intended to change 
behaviour or systems. Instead, Checkland et al. (2007) state that: 
barriers are constructed by those working within the organisation to justify their 
actions and construct an organisation that conforms to a set of collective beliefs 
about what is acceptable [ ... ] this process of construction is iterative and shapes, 
generates, and reinforces a collective identity. 
(Checkland et al., 2007) 
The following discussion illustrates how the above constraints work in paradoxical 
ways, to help to define the identity of decision-makers as hard working, but as 
struggling to cope with the many demands put on them and powerless to change the 
status quo. Each of the constraints, lack of control and choice, lack of cooperation, and 
lack of capacity are discussed in turn. 
The first of these constraints, lack of choice and control as discussed in the previous 
section, is illustrated throughout the results in terms of the influence of structures 
external to the PCT on decision-making. In particular the emphasis in the interview 
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results was on the dominance of politics and the impact of the national drivers and 
targets (Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2). This was also evident in the PBMA exercise in terms 
of its focus on identifying services for investment in line with the national performance 
targets. Furthermore, it was also observed that resources were allocated in order to avert 
local political tensions by maintaining relationships with key stakeholders for example 
(Chapter 6, Section 6.2.5). In these results, the lack of choice and control portrays 
decision-makers as engaged in reactive, rather than proactive decision-making. 
Reactive decision-making is described by McDonald (2002) as a consequence of 
decision-makers attempting to pursue many objectives and, unable to do so, focussing 
only on what is immediately visible and resorting to reacting to demands or 'fire 
fighting'. The problem with reactive decision-making is that service changes are often 
not evaluated and goals for allocating resources to service changes vague. Instead, 
resources are allocated on the basis of maintaining or building trust with stakeholders - 
so called "buying goodwill" or "more is better" (McDonald, 2002). Similarly, Hunter 
(1979) found that decision-makers tended to cope with what he termed as "puzzlement" 
on their part about what they should be doing and how they should be doing it by 
allocating resources according to "fair shares" (ensuring resources were allocated to 
many service developments rather than simply a few), "who has done alright so far" 
(ensuring resources are allocated to those service developments who may not have 
received resources in previous years), and "something is better than nothing" (Hunter. 
1979). 
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As such, reactive decision-makers, constrained by their external environment, are 
unable to manage resources through disinvestments or reallocation and opt for simple 
'methods' of allocating resources. Reactive decision makers are therefore 
disempowered, unable to make strategic decisions in the management of scarce 
resources that require trade-offs between investments and disinvestments. As Hunter 
(1979) argued, reactive decision-making simply serves to maintain the current processes 
and systems. This is reflected by Currie (1999) whose research on the influence of 
middle managers in the business planning process in an NHS Hospital Trust showed 
that the business planning process was more focussed on the national priorities and did 
not reflect the local clinical and managerial practice - an outcome that resulted in 
middle managers reporting feeling disempowered. Furthermore, this view is reiterated 
by a PCT Chair reporting in Health Service Journal who states that: 
85% of a PCT's expenditure is on sustaining block contracts with local 
hospitals, the GP contracts, prescriptions, all of which only allow the PCT 
marginal scope to drive up efficiency. PCTs may hold the budget but we do not 
control it. We do not make the commissioning decisions. We are not empowered 
to prioritise services against achieving financial balance. 
(McFarland, 2005) 
Reactive decision-making therefore not only positions decision-makers as hard working 
(denoted by fire fighting) but, at the same time, disempowered. The effect of 
disempowerment allows decision-makers to justify focussing on simple methods of 
resource allocation that involve the marginal allocation of additional resources and 
maintaining the status quo. 
The second of these constraints, lack of cooperation, xvas described in the interview 
results in terms of the impact of organisational boundaries in creating and maintaining 
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different (and often conflicting) cultures, which prevented organisations integrating and 
communicating with one another; and generated hostility and conflict between 
organisations (Chapter 4,4.5-2). In the PBMA exercise, organisational fragmentation 
and discontinuity resulted in a lack of cooperation and collective decision-making 
(Chapter 6, Sections 6.2.7 and 6.3.3). 
The lack of collective decision-making in the PBMA process meant that knowledge and 
skills about PBMA were embedded in a single person (in this case the DPH), rather than 
the organisation and, as observed in Chapter 6, Chapter 6.2.4, when the DPH was absent 
from the organisation (on holiday for example), the process stalled. Furthermore, 
because the PBMA exercise was the responsibility of a single Directorate and the DPH, 
there was no incentive for anybody else to take on this responsibility in the DPH's 
absence. In addition, the lack of discontinuity in decision-making meant that there was 
virtually no organisational memory to feed into the PBMA. For example, knowledge 
about the availability of information and data, lessons from previous commissioning 
processes and methods, sensitivity to local political or cultural issues, and established 
relationships and key contacts was limited. 
In addition, the lack of collective decision-making was underpinned by a lack of 
communication and engagement which continued throughout the PBMA exercise. The 
lack of communication influenced how the PBMA was perceived within and across the 
Consortium, particularly by the other Consortia PCTs, and affected the extent to which 
the other PCTs engaged with the PBMA and the significance they placed on it. 
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Furthermore, there was an absence of communication and broad engagement in the 
PBMA exercise,, specifically with frontline clinical providers. 
Lack of communication and engagement is portrayed in the literature as impacting on 
the ability of decision-makers to manage the allocation of resources. In particular, a lack 
of communication within PCTs between commissioning and finance has been attributed 
to failures in financial management (Bamford, 2005), and engagement with frontline 
staff (clinicians) is repeatedly put forward as the solution to achieving better models of 
services with the resources available (McKeon, 2006, Mitton and Donaldson,, 2003c. ) 
Mitton et al., 2003b, Checkland, 1997, Edwards, 2006a). Indeed, as Barrett et al (2006). 
state: 
It is important to remember that clinicians have the ultimate priority setting 
power and therefore the focus for change should be at the clinical coal face. 
Patients are not anonymous, particularly to the doctor treating the patient. It is 
they who have to choose which treatments to give and how to provide care. This 
is the ultimate reality. 
(Barrett et al., 2006) 
Furthermore, Edwards et al. (2006) argue that the responsibility for financial 
management in the NFIS has to be tackled on a whole-system basis, that financial 
problems are "everybody's problems", and that "the stand-offs between providers and 
commissioners are adolescent in the extreme". 
However, as illustrated in the PBMA exercise, enabling communication and 
engagement in a fragmented organisation, let alone between organisations, is not 
straightforward. Lack of communication and engagement in decision-making are 
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manifest in a lack of trust between stakeholders within and between organisations 
(Mitton and Donaldson, 2003c, Mitton and Prout, 2004). Similarly, COt6 (2002) 
contends that a fragmented organisation results in a lack of trust which needs to be 
improved in order to enhance respect amongst peers and allow them to share their 
objectives and those of the organisation within the organisation and across divisional 
structures . 
Moreover, problems of trust are embedded in the relationships between stakeholders 
which are fraught with baggage, vagueness and stereotypes (Edwards, 2004). Research 
by the NHS Confederation cited by Edwards (2004) showed that PCTs thought Acute 
Trusts were bullying, mean with information and resistant to change; whereas Acute 
Trusts thought that there were too many PCTs, and that they were inexperienced, 
indecisive, and poor at commissioning. Although Edwards illustrates these as merely 
stereotypes, breaking the stereotypes required the implementation of strategies to build 
trust between stakeholders and lead to a shared vision, real clinical engagement, shared 
risk management, and clear decision-making through an agreed process (Edwards, 
2004). 
It is easy to see here how tensions between stakeholders arise as a result of these 
stereotypes and the lack of collective decision-making more generally. Furthermore, it 
can be argued that it is convenient for decision-makers to maintain such stereotypes. In 
doing so, problems in decision-making can be externalised to other organisations which 
are beyond the decision-makers' control, and given that decision-makers are unable to 
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control or regulate the terms of their interaction or engagement with other stakeholders, 
the lack of communication and engagement outside the organisation can be justified. 
Finally, the third of these constraints, the lack of capacity, illustrates decision-making as 
lacking adequate capacity, skills and time. Specifically, in the PBMA exercise, capacity 
problems were attributed to a lack of time and a lack of data and information. The lack 
of any coordinated approach to data collection described in the previous sections, meant 
that decision-makers were not aware of what data was available and where, and the data 
that was collected was often duplicated. Additionally, the quality of data was perceived 
by participants to be unsuitable as a basis of decision-making, despite having relied on 
the same data and information for decision-making in the past. Data quality was 
therefore considered to be a challenge for PBMA which, as a process, utilised this data. 
The problem of a lack of time influenced decision-making in several ways. Firstly, the 
timeframe within which the PBMA was conducted impacted upon the extent of 
engagement in the PBMA, particularly with respect to timing and coordinating input to 
the PBMA from organisations outwith the Consortium. For example, the timescale for 
the PBMA was not designed to coincide with scheduled meetings that Heads of Service 
had with service providers, and so when it came to the production of business cases, 
there was little time to organise additional meetings to involve service providers. 
Likewise, the PEC members had to schedule specific PBMA meetings over and above 
their regular monthly meetings in order to provide input to the exercise at the times it 
was required. Second, lack of time compounded problems of lack of human capacity 
241 
and skills (which can be acquired over time). An immature organisation (one that has 
not been in existence long), necessarily lacks capacity for decision-making. 
The use of time to demonstrate a lack of capacity in decision-making is significant. In 
public service discourse it is usual for time to be equated with effort - the amount of 
time spent doing something reflects the amount of effort. Consequently, by emphasising 
the lack of time for commissioning decision-makers are emphasising that they are busy. 
In other words, the problems encountered in commissioning are not as a result of 
decision-makers being lazy. However, time is limited and cannot be controlled or 
manipulated and, as such, the decision-maker is passive. Therefore, singling out time as 
a constraint removes the decision-maker as an agent able to control commissioning and, 
again, justifies the status quo. 
These results demonstrate that the commissioning constraints collectively work to 
define the identity of decision-makers as disempowered in the commissioning process, 
implicitly exculpating themselves from the problems inherent in commissioning and 
thus justifying and sustaining the status quo. 
7.5 Implications for policy and practice 
From this discussion it is possible to draw a number of implications for policy and 
practice. These implications are discussed in the context of PBMA but they apply to aný 
economics based process established and implemented at the level of local decision- 
making. The implications include: the challenge of change, building on ,, N-hat exists, 
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training and ongoing knowledge transfer and exchange, maintaining dedicated project 
management, focussing on programme areas, providing incentives, using care pathways. 
extending engagement, and simplifying methods of benefit assessment. 
7.5.1 The challenge of change 
The findings discussed above suggest that there is a need to empower decision-makers 
in commissioning. Simply attempting to remove so-called barriers to change will not 
actually result in change. As Checkland et al. (2007) argued, these barriers, as well as 
acting as constraints, are also used to define the identity of decision-makers which in 
this case is as disempowered. As such, structures and incentives need to be put in place 
to help empower decision-makers. PCTs will continue to be accountable for managing 
scarcity but actually have very little power to do so unless changes are made. 
However, change in the health service is not straightforward. In his observations of 
Scottish Health Boards, Hunter (1979) claimed that decision-making constraints were so 
entrenched in the operational routines of the organisation, which were themselves a 
response to an uncertain environment, that the allocation of resources consisted largely 
of administering and maintaining a system rather than making fundamental changes to 
it. Furthermore, he pointed out that any discussion about change remained at the level of 
"coffee table chat" which was rarely translated into actual decisions. This view was also 
reiterated in Gerry Robinson's account of decision-making in an NHS Hospital Trust 
which he described as: 
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the psyche was that you discussed it, and you had any number of people saying I well we've been talking about this for two years, or I've brought this up with the 
committee for the last 10 years. There was just a kind of sense that what you did 
was you talked about it; you did everything but actually change it. 
(Robinson, 2006) 
Similar observations were recorded in the PBMA exercise where a lot of effort was 
concentrated around debating change and deferring decision-making (Chapter 6, Section 
6.2.8). 
7.5.2 Building on what exists 
Reflecting on the results, PBMA needs to integrated and embedded in the day-to-day 
running of the organisation and the management structures and processes not only in 
order to ensure they are better aligned with the commissioning process but also to 
improve the organisational memory. Ideally undertaking further iterations of PBMA 
would require relative organisational stability and a long-term strategic planning 
envirom-nent to allow those involved to explore the approach and develop its application 
to suit their needs. However,, instability will likely always be an endemic feature of 
NHS organisations. It will therefore be important to try to build economic principles 
and the PBMA process into the organisational processes and structures, rather than 
simply embody them in individual people. As such, the PBMA should follow the annual 
budgeting and planning cycles, utillse existing organisational working and stakeholder 
groups, and capture routine data and information, not duplicate it. Furthermore, PBMA 
should be promoted as an iterative framework that will require ongoing adaptation and 
further refinement, and not as a quick-fix that can be used to provide the answer to 
difficult commissioning decisions. 
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7.5.3 Training and ongoing knowledge transfer and exchange 
In this exercise the introduction of PBMA was preceded by an introductory workshop. 
Unfortunately, this workshop actually preceded the appointment of some key staff to the 
organisation and further training was delivered sporadically on an ad-hoc basis 
dependent on requests. As such, some participants lacked a basic understanding of the 
process and this affected the value that they placed on engaging with it and their 
portrayal of it. 
In order to develop confidence and expertise in PBMA its introduction should therefore 
be accompanied by ongoing educational and training support. All those involved in 
undertaking a PBMA, including key stakeholder groups, should receive training in the 
key principles underlying PBMA. This is a necessary pre-requisite if the key 
stakeholders are to have ownership of the process. Furthermore, if stakeholders do not 
understand the methods used in the PBMA process, they are less likely to implement the 
outcomes from it. Such training does not need to be delivered technically or by someone 
external to the organisation. Indeed, given the necessity for ongoing training and 
support it would seem appropriate that this could be provided through specific 
individuals from within the organisation who act as partners through which knowledge 
(both technical academic and health service) is transferred and exchanged. 
7.5.4 Maintaining dedicated project management 
In this PBMA exercise, the process was Nvell supported by the working group that 
included a full time public health trainee and a part time researcher (who was familiar 
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with PBMA) as well as two full time employees of the Commissioning Consortium 
including the DPH who had prior experience of PBMA. The researcher and public 
health trainee were able to dedicate time to managing and coordinating the exercise. 
Project management was essential to ensuring that the exercise was kept on track, 
collecting data, and liaising with stakeholders. However, in order for PBMA to be seen 
as a central activity of the organisation, the project management of PBMA needs to be 
taken on internally rather than by someone external to the organisation. Furthermore, it 
is not essential that the project manager is skilled in health economics, rather the role of 
the project manager is to coordinate the process across the organisation, ensuring that 
specific work required for the exercise is undertaken by those who are trained and 
skilled to do so, encouraging responsibility for the work to be shared throughout the 
organisation. 
7.5.5 Focusing on programme areas 
This PBMA exercise was carried out at the macro level (i. e. across all programmes of 
care). Though offering the broad focus necessary for LDP decision-making, it imposed 
significant demands in terms of data and time. Furthermore, focussing on several 
programmes had implications for the identification of business cases for resource 
investment and disinvestment. In particular, decision-makers were wary about 
identifying disinvestments in order to fund services outside of the programme from 
which the resources were identified, preferring instead to disinvest to reinvest within 
their own service areas. 
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As such, PBMA is more likely to be successful in identifying both business cases for 
resource investment and disinvestment if it is conducted at the micro le\, el i. e. within 
programmes of care (spanning both primary and secondary care) defined in terms of 
diseases, client groups, or clinical services. A micro PBMA exercise can be more 
simply and coherently defined as it is relatively self-contained and retains a narrow 
policy focus. Furthermore, it is at the programme level where routine data is collected 
and analysed, where organisational structures are arranged, where there is a historý' of 
collaboration in service planning and delivery, and where resource disinvestments 
(either through technical efficiency savings or service reduction) are evident. 
7.5.6 Providing incentives 
This PBMA exercise failed to identify any disinvestments. As suggested above, this 
may have been due to a lack of confidence in the process and therefore reluctance on the 
part of decision-makers to identify options for disinvesting resources to reinvest 
elsewhere in other services. This could be avoided if the PBMA solely focussed on 
single programmes (service areas). 
However , in order to ensure 
disinvestments are identified it may be pertinent to put in 
place a number incentives which would force disinvestments. Indeed Mitton et A 
(2003b) suggest that incentives need to be put in place in order to encourage 
disinvestment and resource reallocation within service areas and across others. In the 
example they use, they propose that for each $1 released from a service, 70cents goes to 
funding regional (or organisation-wide) options while 30cents remains within the 
service (Mitton et al., 200'33b). In this example, decision-makers are giNýeii the financial 
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freedom to re-invest an agreed percentage of any disinvestments identified from their 
own services back into their own service, with the remainder allocated to investments 
across all services. An alternative option is to simply ensure that all options for resource 
investment are equally matched by options for disinvestment. Either way, it is important 
to ensure that disinvestments can be realised and that it is possible to shift resources 
between different areas of care, stages of care, or organisations. In order to facilitate 
this, a pathway approach (discussed below) which makes these trade-offs explicit may 
be useful. 
7.5.7 Using care pathways 
In addition to focussing on programmes, care pathways provide useful structures around 
which PBMA can be framed. Integrated care pathways involve participation from all 
relevant healthcare professionals, research on good practice, and consultation with 
patients, to build a care pathway for managing clinical care, processes, and patient 
outcomes (Davis, 2004). With respect to PBMA, care pathways can act as a common 
reference point for discussions about investment and disinvestment that engages finance 
staff, clinicians, providers, and commissioners. Pathways can also be populated with 
locally relevant cost, activity, and outcome data. Finally, they can be used to explicitly 
highlight the trade-offs across the entire pathway of care. The use of care pathways 
therefore offers a way to improve organisational integration and engagement in PBMA. 
7.5.8 Extending engagement 
Because of time demands, participation in the PBMA the exercise was intentionaliv 
limited. For convenience, Heads of Service were charged xvith developing business 
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cases though, due to the macro nature of the exercise and time constraints. these were 
developed in relative isolation and based on meeting the national targets (and not 
necessarily the objectives of the service). Additionally, the PECs were used as proxies 
for clinical and stakeholder input. Hence, the exercise was essentially driven from 
within the Consortium, but top-down, with little room for further engagement. 
However,, those engaged in the PBMA exercise recognised the value of their being so 
and those involved welcomed the opportunity to take part. In particular, the Advisory 
Panel meetings proved to be useful in creating a space for a collective, consensual 
approach to commissioning that attempted to break down some of the intra- 
organisational boundaries and allowed the different perspectives of those involved to be 
heard and debated, as well as giving the Panel members a sense of ownership of the 
process. 
Additionally, engagement is more likely to enhance confidence in the PBMA process 
and acceptance of the outcomes of the process, as well as to help to break down some of 
the stereotypes discussed in Section 7.3.3, and thereby develop trust between the 
different organisations and stakeholders involved in the process. It is therefore essential 
that all relevant stakeholders are identified and invited to participate from the outset. 
Rather than establishing new groups specifically for the PBMA exercise, as suggested 
earlier, greater use should be made of existing frontline clinical service and 
management groups, patient and public involvement structures, stakeholder 
representatives, and voluntary organisations, in order to incorporate their N, iews and 
values. 
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Furthermore,, not all stakeholder groups need to be involved at all stages of the PBMA 
process but can be called on to provide their expertise at certain stages, whilst 
maintaining on-going dialogue and communication at other stages. For example. 
clinical and provider input is required in identifying cost data and outcome data for 
services as much of this information and expertise is held by service providers, and the 
implementation of changes to service delivery requires clinical and provider acceptance 
and ownership of those changes. Equally, the public and other stakeholders can be 
included in determining the benefit criteria upon which service changes should be 
judged, and in validating the changes through consultation prior to the actual 
reallocation of resources. 
7.5.9 Simplifying methods of benefit assessment 
In this PBMA exercise it was difficult to ascertain the extent which the benefits defined 
in the business case represented marginal or absolute benefits and thus whether the 
resulting benefit scores reflected the marginal benefits. The calculation of a single 
metric based on the ratio of benefits to costs was therefore not necessarily a useful or 
legitimate means for comparing all cases. Moreover, the Advisory Panel did not rely on 
the ratio as a means for comparison and instead considered benefit and cost information 
alongside each other, as well as additional information such as the number of 
beneficiaries. 
As such, rather than striving to derive a precise value for the benefit/cost ratio, effort 
should be spent on explicitly defining., scoring. and presenting the constituent criteria 
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that comprise the marginal benefit information. Further work should also be undertaken 
to identify more rational and meaningful definitions of different types of patient 
beneficiaries, and more valid ways of estimating the numbers of people who would 
directly benefit from public health interventions. 
7.6 Contributions of the research 
The main contributions resulting from this research are two-fold. First, there are specific 
contributions to the use of qualitative research in health economics. Second, there are 
contributions to the discipline of health economics more broadly. Each of these is 
outlined below. 
7.6.1 Contributions to qualitative research in health economics 
Coast et al (2004) highlight the potential challenges of conducting qualitative research 
within the area of health economics. In particular they argue that the basis of this stems 
from the fact that economics is a discipline driven by theory rather than empirical data 
and thus there is much resistance to the empirical challenges that may result from the 
adoption of alternative research paradigms, and specifically qualitative research. In their 
paper, Coast et al. (2004) suggest that the use of qualitative methods within health 
economics could "challenge the systematic mode of thinking through challenges to the 
basic axioms upon which mainstream economics is built". Hence, for health economists 
doing qualitative research. there is a tension between improving the "systematic mode 
of thinking" of economics (and its application and relevance to health care) and 
threatening the disciplinary basis of health economics. This tension raises issues of 
identity for health economists conducting qualitative researcli, who, Coast et al. (2004) 
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suggest "may feel like they are walking a tightrope between the demands of economics 
and the demands of qualitative research". 
The research presented in this thesis has attempted to walk this tightrope., engaging xvith 
the paradigms of both qualitative research and health economics. However, the research 
presented in this thesis also sought to try to enhance the relevance of economics to the 
real world. In doing so, the research attempted to see how the economic axioms could 
fit into the real world rather than challenge them directly. 
Other attempts to utilise qualitative research within health economics have been 
discussed elsewhere in this thesis (specifically Sections 1.2.1,3.3.2, and 3.4). As noted 
in Chapter 3 (Section 3.4), much of the qualitative research conducted by health 
economists has been used to explore and refine quantitative methods used in health 
economics and study the rationales of respondents to these. To the knowledge of the 
author, there is only one example of a health economist (McDonald, 2002) utilising 
qualitative techniques to understand the application of health economics in the context 
of decision-making in the health service. Other examples of qualitative research 
conducted in this area, notably Williams and Bryan (2007) and Patten et al. (2006), have 
been led by qualitative researchers. 
On reflection, this thesis illustrates the potential for health economists to be able to 
undertake rigorous qualitative research, utilising multiple qualitative methods within 
health economics. Indeed, the thesis has sought to open up the possibility of further 
qualitative work by health economists by demonstrating that it can be done and how. 
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However, this has been no mean feat and has involved various challenges including: 
going back to the classroom to learn about qualitative methodology and methods in 
order to develop a meaningful theoretical perspective, acquiring a different disciplinary 
'language', learning to be self-reflexive, and encountering criticism from colleagues 
questioning the credentials of a health economist using qualitative methods. and the 
value of this research to health economics. 
Nonetheless, the research in this thesis adds to the small but growing body of rigorous 
qualitative research in health economics. If the use of qualitative research in health 
economics is to become more acceptable, it is essential that the qualitative research 
undertaken aims to be high quality. One test as to whether the discipline has evolved in 
its attitude toward qualitative research since Coast's paper in 2004, will be the 
publication of the findings from this thesis in a target journal for health economics. 
7.6.2 Contributions to health economics 
A large amount of research in health economics in the UK is concerned with economic 
evaluations and their use in health technology appraisals. In line with the formation of 
NICE,, there has been a growing trend within economic evaluation (and cost-utility 
analysis in particular) to solve the problem of the lack of use of economics in healthcare 
decision-making by using sophisticated modelling and statistical methods to produce 
ever more precise ICER estimates. At the same time, there has been a need to develop 
new approaches to express these complex results to decision-makers - approaches 
which, to the cynical health economist, let alone a decision-maker. are practically 
unintelligible (Bryan et al., 2006). Moreover most of this research is concentrated at the 
national level. Howex-cr, given that only a small proportion of healthcare services are 
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subject to such economic evaluations, that the uptake of NICE guidance based on these 
economic evaluations is patchy, and that decision-makers at the local level do not utilise 
economic evaluations, the value of this research is questionable. 
The research presented in this thesis attempted to tackle the lack of use of health 
economics in healthcare decision-making from a different angle. The basic premise of 
the thesis argued that although economic methods are seemingly not used in healthcare 
decision-making it does not mean that economics per se has failed. Instead the emphasis 
of the research was on examining the use of economic principles more broadly, in 
managing scarcity in healthcare decision-making and observing the use of economic 
principles (through the vehicle of PBMA) in a real decision-making context. The 
research conducted in this thesis suggests that decision-makers are able to fully 
recognise notions that are central to health economics and their implications, but 
constraints in decision-making and disempowered decision-makers prevent economic 
principles being realised in practice. Nonetheless these are indications of the potential 
for PBMA (or something similar) to empower decision-makers in the management of 
scarcity. 
Health economics still has some way to go if its methods are to be a viable aid to 
decision-making practice at the local level. Economics may provide a theoretically 
valid, 'rational', and systematic set of principles for conceptualising the management of 
scarce resources. But if economic methods are to have an impact on the management of 
scarce resources in 'real-life', the emphasis should be on integrating the principles of 
economics into a management process rather than expecting decision-makers to apply 
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the output of ever more precise, ever more complex health economic evaluations which 
cannot reflect the dominating and driving complexities of the decision-making process. 
7.7 Limitations of the research 
As discussed in Chapter 3, many of the limitations associated with this research can be 
equated with the criticisms aimed at qualitative research more generally. The main 
limitations encountered in this research are discussed below. These include limitations 
of the methods, analysis, and reporting, generalisability and going-native. 
7.7.1 Limitations of methods, analysis and reporting 
The limits of the methods are presented in detail in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.4. In terms of 
the specific limitations in this research, the samples for the interview were, as any 
sample is, self-selecting. Furthermore, participantsý responses within the context of the 
interviews and focus groups represent the views that participants wanted to portray. In 
other words, the data generated through the interviews was constructed through the 
interaction between the interviewer and the participant. To some extent this was also 
applicable in the observation as participants may have modified their behaviour in 
response to the presence of an observer. 
Indeed the large participatory element of this research will have had an impact on the 
data generated and the interpretations made from it. The research ,, vas being conducted 
for submission as a PhD (of which this thesis is the product) and therefore there was 
some effort made on the part of the researcher to ensure that the research would be 
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ýsuccessful'. Moreover, as a health economist. the researcher was also keen to try to 
fully explore the possibilities for the use of health economics in decision-making. In 
addition, the participation of a researcher in the organisation led some participants to 
perceive that the PBMA exercise required academic input (or indeed was entirely 
academic) and was therefore marginal to the other activities of the organisation and 
indeed the organisation. 
The observation was also affected by the relationships between the researcher and those 
being observed. The researcher had a good relationship with the CE and some Heads of 
Service (indeed to the extent that these relationships are ongoing) whilst the close 
working relationship with the DPH, meant that, at times, this relationship became 
strained. Finally, the observation was further limited in terms of the scope of what could 
be realistically observed in the time and what could be recorded in the researcher diary 
at the time, or recalled when the diary was not present. 
In terms of analysis and reporting, the results necessarily represent a single and partial 
perspective. Additionally, aside from the interview results, decisions were also taken to 
withhold some data from which individuals could be easily identified and that may have 
compromised the individuals concerned. There were therefore some restrictions in terms 
of what could be reported in the thesis. 
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7.7.2 Generalisability 
The data upon which these results are based is specific to the north of England. This 
was intentional as the aim of the research was to study decision-making in depth by 
generating context specific data. Nevertheless, as emphasised in Chapter 3, 
generalisations from qualitative research can be made on the basis of theoretical or 
logical generalisations. In other words, concepts developed and inferred theoretically 
from the research can be applied to wider populations. From presenting the results in 
different contexts and to different audiences, and situating the research findings in the 
literature, it seems reasonable to suggest the broad findings from the schematic models 
of commissioning and the overarching discussion themes can be generalised to similar 
contexts where decisions about the allocation of scarce (or fixed) amounts of available 
resources have to be made. Furthermore, the methods and results are presented in depth 
in order to enable the reader to judge whether the findings might reasonably be expected 
to apply in similar settings. 
7.7.3 Going native 
In this research some mechanisms were put in place to prevent 'going native'. These 
included debriefing sessions between the researcher and the research supervisors, and 
working two days a week at the university. Nevertheless, maintaining a participatory 
role involved working long hours and taking part in social events outside of the 
organisation. As a result it was easy to become caught up in the day-to-day 'pressures' 
of working in the health service and lose perspective on the research at hand. In 
addition, the intense working and social relationships xvith some colleagues evolved into 
lasting friendships and ongoing professional relationships. 
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7.8 Implications for future research 
There are a number of areas for future research that have arisen from the work presented 
in this thesis. 
First, the schematic model of commissioning developed in Chapter 4, Figure 4.2, was 
based on the interview data generated from this research. In order to validate the model, 
further research would need to be undertaken in other PCTs to determine whether it 
applies elsewhere. Additional interviews would be needed to confirm or amend the 
themes in the model as necessary. Indeed, future research may wish to consider 
comparing the results and commissioning models generated from PCTs that are 
considered to be performing well with those that are not. Furthermore, it may also be 
interesting to repeat the interviews with the PCTs that initially took part in order to 
assess whether the model of commissioning since the original interviews in 2004 still 
stands. 
Second, the PBMA process conducted in this thesis failed to identify substantial service 
disinvestments. There were a number of reasons put forward for this that are discussed 
elsewhere in this Chapter. However, it could be argued that achieving disinvestments is 
not the sole outcome of a PBMA process. As was illustrated in Chapter 6, elements of 
the PBMA process such as the formation of an Advisory Panel and the Stakeholder 
Group, and the development and weighting of criteria to underpin decision-making, 
were instrumental in achieving a more transparent, explicit and robust commissioning 
process. Nevertheless. the potential success of the PBMA process relies on being able to 
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identify disinvestments. A number of recommendations were discussed above in 
Section 7.4, including the use of incentives, focussing solely on programme budget 
areas, and using care pathways. Further research is required to evaluate these in 
practice. Moreover, this research should be conducted over a number of 'cycles' of 
PBMA in order to determine whether,, as participants become more familiar and 
confident with the process, they are more willing to identify disinvestments. This is 
likely to be of growing relevance in the forthcoming fiscal climate of the NHS, despite 
recent surpluses. 
Third, engagement in this exercise was restricted. However, those groups who were 
actively engaged in the process (the Advisory Panel and the Stakeholder Group) were 
enthusiastic about the process and their contribution to it. Future research should 
attempt to extend engagement to include providers (especially frontline staff) and 
patients or public in the process, the key being to place them in the position of the 
decision-maker acting under the conditions of resource scarcity. 
Fourth, it has been shown in this research that the PBMA process has to be integrated 
with other approaches that PCTs have to adopt in commissioning (such as the LDP 
process as illustrated in this research), in order to avoid being perceived as an additional 
process which simply adds to the plethora of initiatives which PCTs are faced with. 
Such recent initiatives include the DH-led World Class Commissioning (Department of 
Health, 2007), and lean thinking (Jones and Mitchell, 2006). The first of these seeks to 
strengthen capacity and capability for commissioning and has identified a number of 
competencies against which PCTs , vill be assessed. The second, lean thinking, was 
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developed by Toyota and is being promoted within the NFIS to eliminate waste. 
improve quality, and lower costs. There is ongoing work in the Commissioning 
Consortium at the focus of this research (since reconfigured), to utilise lean thinking 
within the PBMA process and future research to explore the extent to which PBMA can 
be used to develop the competencies outlined in World Class Commissioning. 
This research has demonstrated the potential for PBMA as a vehicle for introducing 
economic principles into decision-making but further research, implementing some of 
the recommendations suggested in this thesis, is needed in order to continually develop 
and refine the process over time. 
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AVFhNDIX A. Interview information sheet 
ref. - pct-infosheet 
Date 
Oreffio> oF1rstName>> oLastName>> 
oTitle>> 
<<OrganizationName)) 
oAddress)) 
<(Address 2)) 
<(Address 3)) 
<<City>> oPostalCode>> 
STUDY TITLE: Managing Scarcity 
<<oGreetingLlne)))) 
Having recently received ethical comn-uttee approval, you, along with other members of your 
Trust's senior management team, are being invited to take part in the above research studý,. The 
research is being funded by the Health Foundation and the ESRC and has been reviewed by an 
local PCT Executives as well as by the aforementioned funding bodies. 
Before you decide to take part it is important for you to understand why the research is being done 
and what it will involve. Please take the time to read the following information carefully and 
discuss it With others if you Wish. Please do not hesitate to contact me if there us anything that is 
not clear or if you would like more information. 
This study is designed to address what frameworks for priority setting are currently being used by 
PCTs in the commissioning process and whether a more systematic framework could be developed. 
The aim of this part of the research is simply to observe current decision-making practices within 
your Trust. This will involve face-to-face interviews between the researcher (Angela Bate) and 
yourself. At later dates, focus group sessions With the researcher and other members of the 
management team will take place and we will attempt to evaluate any developments which arise 
from this. All the information that is collected during this research will remain confidential. The 
audio tapes used for the interviews and transcription of these interviews will be kept in a secure 
location and destroyed once the study has been completed. For the purposes of dissenunation, 
data will be aggregated and anonyrnised. Neither the transcribed data nor the results will identify 
participants by their role or PCT. Before you take part in the study you will be given this 
information form and asked to sign a consent form. It is up to you whether or not you decide to 
participate. 
I have attached a calendar sheet for you to highlight the most convenient times when you are free 
to participate. The interview should take no longer than V/2 hours. If you require any further 
information or wish to discuss the project please do not hesitate to contact Angela on 0191 222 
7045 (ext 3813). 
Thank you for taking the time to read this letter. 
Prof Cam Donaldson PhD 
Health Foundation Chair in Health Economics and Public Service Fellow, ESRC Advanced 
Institute of Management Research 
Angela Bate 
Research Associate (Health Economics) 
ao 
r% V r- C 1-4 U 1, & b. vre-interview questionnaire 
Pre-interview information sheet 
This information sheet is designed to make you think beforehand about the some of 
the issues that may be addressed during the interview. It Is also a useful way for us 
to collect certain pieces of information prior to the interview that may be required and 
referred to during the interview which, if otherwise collected during the interview, may 
interrupt the flow of conversation and lengthen the interview time. 
Before the interview, we would therefore appreciate it if you could take the time to 
think about the priority setting process that goes on within your PCT and fill in the 
questions below that refer to specific parts of the priority setting process. Please try 
to give us as much detail as you can. There are no right or wrong answers. Please 
keep this in a safe place and it will be collected from you at the time of your interview. 
For each question, please tick the appropriate boxes (as many as is necessary) and 
fill in any additional information. (continued over the page) 
Q1. What sources of information are currently used in determining/identifying short 
and long term priorities in the PCT? Think about the types of information used to 
support priority setting decisions. 
Key PCT objectives 
Needs assessment 
Other reports 
National or SHA policy 
Epidemiological 
11 
Which ones? 
11 
Please specify 
11 
Please specify 
11 
Please specify 
11 
Published/local? 
LL 77 _nFýll X 11 1 TI I /X 
mtr-rcimum tS. Pre-interview questionnaire 
Economic data 
I Other research studies 
I Medical opinion 
I Public opinion 
I Annual report 
I Utillsation info 
I Demographic info 
Other 
11 
Published/local? 
11 
Published/local? 
El Please specify 
F] 
Please specify 
How used? 
11 
11 
Please specify 
11 
Please specify 
11 
Please specify 
i-tr-rcimum ts. Pre-interview questionnaire 
Q2. How are decisions made to divide up the resources across the communities 
within the PCT (or various services within the community)? 
Historical trends 
patterns 
Perceived 'hot spots' 
Top down decision 
making (i. e. from 
ministers) 
Internal politics of local 
NHS organisations 
Provider needs 
Demands of local 
health care 
professionals 
National policies 
targets / evidence 
0 
Please elaborate 
E 
Please elaborate 
E 
Please elaborate 
E 
Please elaborate 
E 
Please elaborate 
LI 
Please elaborate 
E 
Please elaborate 
P%vrcimum ti. Pre-interview questionnaire 
Other political 
influence 
Human resources 
other logistics within 
the NHS 
Whoever'yells the 
loudest' 
Local opinion 
Other 
0 
Please elaborate 
E 
Please elaborate 
E 
Please elaborate 
E 
Please elaborate 
E 
Please specify 
Q3. Can you please comment on how the current process of setting priorities and 
allocating resources could be improved? 
Needs to be more 
explicit / systematic 
Needs better data 
evidence 
1-1 
Please expand 
11 
Please expand 
m Pre-interview questionnaire 
Needs to take a longer 
term view 
Needs less provider 
influence 
Needs less political 
influence 
Needs to examine the 
margins, not total need 
Other 
11 
Please expand 
Fý Please expand 
11 
Please expand 
11 
Please expand 
1ý 
Please specify 
Q4. How has the public been used in priority setting/ resource allocation processes? 
They are not involved 
There is a regular 
process built into PCT 
structure 
Patient forum groups 
(eg PALs) Input into 
process 
E 
11 
11 
Please expand 
Please expand 
How often? 
Please expand 
i-tr-r-r-NuIA U. Pre-interview questionnaire 
There is an ad hoc, 
one off consulting 
Other 
E 
E 
Q5. Please can you use the following space to record any further information / 
details that relate to the above questions and any other issues that you would like to 
address during the interview? 
Thank you for taking the time to fill out the questions. Please keep this in a safe 
place and it will be collected from you at the time of your interview. 
Yours sincerely 
Please expand 
Please specify 
Anaela bate (research associate in health economics 
P%r-rlt: NUIX Q. interview consent form 
Identification Number: 
CONSENT FORM 
Title of Project: Managing Scarcity. 
Name of Researcher: Angela Bate (Research Associate in Health Economics) 
Please initial box 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and 
have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
2.1 understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason. 
3.1 agree to take part in the above study. 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
Name of Person taking consent Date 
(if different from researcher) 
Researcher Date 
Signature 
Signature 
ne-t -nnc, -nt finim, 
APPENDIX D. Interview schedule 
PCT Interview Schedule 
Words in bold are topic headers. Questions are shaded and represented by Q and 
should be read out to the participant. Words in italics are instructions for the interviewer 
Bulleted points are suggested responses that may require further probing to elicit. 
Introductions. Present participants with information sheet (read out loud) and consent 
form. Reiterate issues of- confidentiality and anonymity, the purpose of the study, study 
funding, what is going to happen with data. Ask them to read and sign the consent form. 
[] tape on 
volume level 
Information on role 
Q1. Can we begin by you telling me a bit about what you understand of the terms 
priority setting and resource allocation? 
Thank you. What I would like to focus on in this series of questions is the actual process of 
priority setting and resource allocation rather than the outcomes or results of the process - 
though examples of these are sometimes useful for illustrating a point, 
Q2. I'd now like to know more about what your role is in terms of setting priorities and 
allocating resources in the PCT? 
" Focus on process of commissioning 
" Encourage them to be as specific as possible 
" Probe for role in relation to priority setting 
Description of current priority setting process 
Q3. Can you describe for me the process that is currently used to identify local 
priorities for the PCT? 
Probe for: 
" Sources of information currently used in determining / identifying short and long term 
priorities in the PCT 
" Types of information used to support priority setting decisions 
Refer to the completed pre-interview sheet. 
Q4. How are resource allocation/re-al location decisions made within the PCT? (i. e. 
how much money goes where? / to different service areas? / or to whom? ) 
Probe for., 
9 Methods used to determine how resources are allocated between competing priorities 
APPENDIX D. Interview schedule 
How are decisions made to divide up the resources across the communities within your 
PCT (or various services within your community)? 
Refer to -the completed pre-interview sheet. 
Q5. In practice, is the identification of priorities in the PCT a completely separate 
function from the production of the local development plan? 
Clarify whether the LDP covers just their PCT or others within the SHA (which ones? ) 
SHA wide / SHA priorities 
What are the implications of this either way? 
Feedback on current process 
Q6. Do you think that the current process of setting priorities and allocating resources 
works well? Can you give examples of when the process has worked 
well/poorly or any strengths and weaknesses of the current process? 
Probe for: 
9 Strengths and weaknesses of the current process 
Q7. Can you describe for me, in your own experience, how national work 
programmes impacted (positively or negatively) upon the local priority setting 
process? 
These are: national services frameworks, NHS plan, NICE guidelines, NICE technology 
appraisals, waiting list and other initiatives, inequality targets, health strategies (e. g. HIV 
and sexual health strategy). 
As much as is possible try to get them to identify specific national work programmes that 
either hinder or help the local process and also specific local prioritiesfinitiatives forgone. 
Probe for: 
9 How the PCT decides between local/national priorities 
Which takes precedence 
Extent to which national policy dictates the local priority setting process. 
To what extent national programmes render impossible the ability to plan locally and 
address local priorities. 
Whether funding and implementation of local priorities/ initiatives have been forgone 
displaced specifically in order to implement nationally identified / dictated priorities. 
Whether local priorities forgone may have been more or less beneficial / worthwhile to 
the communities within their PCT. 
APPENDIX D. Interview schedule 
Improving the priority setting process 
Q8. How can the current process of setting priorities and allocating resources be 
improved? 
Refer to the completed pre-interview sheet. 
Probe for: 
Specific examples. 
How they would result in improving the process. 
Q9. Which types of information (or data or evidence) would you most want to use that 
you feel could improve decision making in setting priorities and allocating 
resources? 
Probe for: 
" The value they see in these pieces of information. 
" How they would use these pieces of information? (i. e. how would these be used/in 
what ways would they improve the decision-making process? ) 
" Capacity to deal with/critically assess information and information systems capacity. 
Barrie rs/i n centives to improving/changing the process 
Q10. What barriers are faced/encountered in undertaking the priority setting process 
within the PCT? 
Probe for 
What barriers they face. 
What barriers the organisation faces. 
Q11. More specifically, what barriers are faced/encountered when re-allocating 
resources from one service area to another? 
Probe for: 
What barriers they face. 
What barriers the organisation faces. 
In both cases focus on: 
" Organization and professional boundaries / and / or barriers 
" Time to make decisions 
* Recording and presenting of financial information 
APPENDIX D. Interview schedule 
Q1 2. You are probably aware that recent discussions in the literature have centered 
around the importance of incentives in engaging decision makers in an explicit 
priority setting process. What specific types of incentives could be put in place 
that might improve participation in an explicit priority setting process [which has 
at its core the notion of re-allocation of resources]? 
Probe for 
" Organisational level incentives at a general level and specific to their organisation. 
" Personal level incentives. 
" Engaging at the across the primary / secondary care interface 
Engaging the public/incorporating community values 
Q13. How has the public been used in priority setting/ resource allocation processes in 
the past? 
Refer to the completed pre-interview sheet 
Q14. What information is important to get from the public? 
How do you deal with / handle this information 
What about patient forums - where do they fit into the process? 
Q15. Ideally, how would you want the public to be involved in the priority setting/ 
resource allocation process? 
Reflection on overall process 
Q1 6. Overall, is the current process of setting priorities and allocating resources fair 
and transparent? 
Q1 7. Academics working in the area of priority setting in Canada have developed a 
framework for evaluating priority setting decisions called accountability for 
reasonableness. The premise of this framework is that an institution's priority 
setting decisions may be considered fair if they satisfy four conditions- publicity, 
relevance, appeals and enforcement. 
Hand the participant card 1. 
How do you think these concepts relate to the current priority setting process undertaken 
within the PCT? 
APPENDIX D. Interview schedule 
Final remarks 
Q18. Is there anything else you want to add that we haven't covered? 
" Role of the SHA 
" Role of the PEC 
" Impact of new initiatives (foundation hospitals bill, patient choice agenda, financial 
flows) on local process 
Close interview. Thank respondent. Offer reassurance that all responses will be held in 
confidence and neither the role of the participant nor the name of the PCT will be 
identified in dissemination of results. 
APPENDIX E. Plan of PBMA research and timetable 
THE COMMISSIONING CONSORTIUM: INTRODUCING PBMA 
SUMMARY: 
The remit for the Commissioning Consortium PBMA is outlined below: 
Overall aim: 
o To develop and implement a priority setting framework for the commissioning consortium 
Specific objectives: 
o To prioritise options for investment in services to meet national, consortium and local PCT 
targets 
0 To prioritise options for resource release in order to reduce the financial deficit across the 
consortium 
o Using the above to inform the development of the consortium LDP and SLAs for 2005/6 
In order to achieve the above, the PBMA exercise has been developed into 7 stages to be completed 
between September 2004 and January 2005. 
Stage 1: determine and define the scope and boundaries of the exercise. 
*1- Form PBNIA Advisory group 
* 2. Agree scope of exercise 
* 3. Agree focus and data inputs 
Stage 2: construct a programme budget (PB). 
* 1. Data collection for PB matrix 
* 2. Assimilate PB data 
* 3. Construct first draft of PB matrix 
* 4. Finalise PB matrix 
Stage 3: determine locally relevant decision-maldng criteria. 
0 1. Identify sample criteria and weighting methods 
0 2. Assimilate and agree draft criteria 
0 3. Consult advisory panel 
0 4. Consult PEC chairs 
0 5. Advisory panel to finalise criteria 
0 6. Undertake weighting exercise with PEC members 
0 7. Finalise weights 
0 8. Construct business case template 
Stage 4: advisogy panel to identify ranked options. 
0 1. Identify services within PB (scoping) matrix 
o 2. Gather supporting evidence 
0 3. Construct (identify) business cases to be submitted in standardised form 
0 4. Advisory panel meeting to produce ranked short lists 
Stagre 5: initial validity check. 
* 1. PECs to undertake own scoring exercise 
* 2. Advisory panel scores to be presented at CAG meetings, Board meetings for comment and 
suggested revisions with justifications to be subrrutted 
Stage 6: adviso1y panel to finalise resource shift recommendations. 
0 1. Finalise revision of ranked shortlists (based on PEC scoring and feedback) 
0 2. Combine investment and resource release shorthsts 
0 3. Produce final balance sheet maintaining financial balance and reducing deficit 
0 4. Produce implementation plan Nvith timescale 
Stage 7: validi1y checks and final decisions. 
0 1. Consultation with relevant stakeholders 
* 2. PCO Boards appro-, -, -d 
* 3. Incorporation into and submission of LDPs 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consortium and SHA Tision' documents outline a 'whole system' approach to commissioning and 
service delivery which incorporates notions of 
value for money; 
cost-effective solutions; 
having to make significant investments which imply 'efficiencies' and, perhaps, reductions in 
some services; and 
treating all proposed developments and reductions fairly 
This requires a commissioning prioritisation framework which recognises that resources are scarce and 
not all health care needs can be met, will lead to an efficient and integrated system, while having the 
flexibility to engage clinicians and incorporate public Views and political considerations. Programme 
Budgeting and Marginal Analysis (PBMA) offers such a framework. This document outlines how 
PBNLA, fits with the Consortium and the steps involved in a PBMA-supported commissioning process. 
WHAT IS PBMA 
In Theory 
The approach embodies two fundamental econorrUc principles central to the notion of 
resource scarcity: opportunity cost and marginal analysis. 
Opportunity Cost - the benefit lost from choosing to invest resources in one option over the 
next best opportunity. Every time we choose to use resources to meet one need we give up 
the 'opportunity' to use those resources to meet some other need. The aim. of econon-ucs is to 
ensure that we choose to invest resources in those activities whose benefits outweigh their 
opportunity cost. The primary goal of priority setting should be to maxiMlze the benefits 
gained by choosing to do the most beneficial things with the resources at our disposal or, if in 
a deficit situation, MInimize the benefits lost when cutting back or re-deigning services. 
Marginal Analysis = the additional cost associated with producing an additional unit of 
output. The marginal benefit is the additional benefit gained from this additional unit of output. 
In shifting resources between options, examining the marginal costs and benefits provides 
insight into whether the changes will result in overall increases in benefit and therefore whether 
they should, in theory, take place. 
Incorporating these principles, the starting point for the framework Is to identify how 
resources are currently used and then assess whether changes in the mix of services provided 
could potentially result in improved overall benefit to the population. This involves, as far as 
possible, assessing the costs and benefits of proposed changes in the delivery of health care 
and, on the basis of this information, changing the way services are delivered if it is thought 
that benefits to the community will be increased. 
In Practice 
PBNIA is a framework that assists decision-makers in directing resources in order that the 
impact of health care on the health needs of the local population is maximised. 
It can aid decision-making in terms of identifying which services to fund by explicitly 
comparing alternati-,, e uses of the limited resources available. 
It is a hands-on approach that does not take place in isolation ftorn other managerial activities 
and processes. It can be carried out alongside needs assessment and involves examination of 
APPENDIX E. Plan of PBMA research and timetable 
published evidence (including of relevant literature; research projects), the input of local data, 
the views of the public and local knowledge and expert opinion of managers and clinicians. 
It is not a static template but an evolving process, implemented I %V1 order to fit the 
organisational structures of PCOs. 
HOW TO DO PBMA 
In Theory 
The PBMA framework poses 5 key questions: 
1. Whatis the total amount of resources available? (PB) 
How these resources are currently spent (and how does the pattern of spending fit with acm-itý, 
and objectives)? (PB) 
3. What services are the main candidates for receiving more resources ('Wish-fist' of [new] [chiUcal] 
service developments and changes) (and what are the costs and benefits associated with these 
expansions)? (NLk) 
Can any existing services be provided as effectively with fewer resources (thus becoming more 
technically efficient) in order that some of the 'wish-hst' items can be realised? (NtA) 
5. If technical efficiency improvements are not possible or are saturated, are there aný- sen-ices 
that should receive fewer resources because they are less effective per ý spent than some 
services on the 'Wish-list' (thus rmn=**slng opportunity cost)? (NLý) 
The first two questions are the focus of the programme budget (PB), the prermise of which is 
'how can we know where we are going if we don't know where we are? ' The level at wl-ýich tl-ýs 
is produced can be either within 'care streams'/'programmes of care' or across 'care streams' 
(e. g. macro - alloc ations across the consortium). 
The remaining three questions form the process of marginal analysis (NLA, ) which examines 
whether/how mar inal changes in health gains can be acl-ýieved through changes in the waý 91 
resources are spent. Altering the mix services to improve both efficiency and equity in the 
chosen care stream or service area may enable the top priority initiatives to be implemented. 
The depth of detailed data required for the PBMA process will vary. The pragmatic approach 
adopted within PBMA is to use multiple sources of information (including both published 
evidence and the knowledge and experience of local managers and providers). At the core of 
the process an expert panel working group is responsible for making comparative judgements 
between development options and proposing recommendations for maxin-ýising benefit for the 
given population. 
In Practice 
The reant for the Commissioning Consortium PBMA is outlined below: 
Overall aim: 
o To develop and implement a priority setting framework for the commissioning 
consortium 
Specific objectives: 
" To priontise options for investment in services to meet national, consortium and local 
PCT targets 
" To prioritise options for resource release in order to reduce the financial deficit across 
the consortium 
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Using the above to inform the development of the consortium LDP and SLAs for 
2005/6 
In order to achieve the above, the PBMA exercise has been developed into 7 stages to be completed 
between September 2004 and January 2005. 
Stage 1: determine and define the scope and boundaries of the exercise. 
Steps: 
* 1. Form PBNIA Advisory group - completed 
* 2. Agree scope of exercise - agreed 
* 3. Agree focus and data inputs - agreed 
(1) The PBNIA exercise is to be conducted at the macro level of the coninussion-ing consortium. 
The advisory group steering this exercise for year one should therefore be the Consortium 
CorflMlissionIng Board (CCB). 
(2) (3) Since the consortium is the focus of the exercise it follows that the boundaries sliould be 
confined to its comn-nssioning functions i. e. conu-nissioning in relation to secondary care excluding 
the Ambulance Trust, and Primary Care. The scope for the programme budget is therefore the 
progranu-ne budget data from all 3 PCOs and any appropriate local authorit-y data and commitments. 
The scope of the marginal analysis is primarily to look at performance target areas as areas for 
investment and redesign (how target areas are currently perfornling and what the new national 
targets are - where targets are not being or likely to be met, where they are (or maybe) being met but 
inefficiently, and where they are (or maybe) being met efficiently and in excess) and focus on non- 
target areas for possible resource release through service reduction or redesign. \X'e also need to take 
into account any current implications for future spending such as possible future targets (Inequality 
targets, GMS/Dental targets), Local PCT priorities, and LDP commitments for investment: year 3 
of the current LDP, and new policy (national tariff/payment by results). 
Stage 2: construct a programme budget (PB). 
Steps: 
o 1. Data collection for PB matrix (15109104 - 08110104) 
* 2. Assimilate PB data (11110104 - 15110104) 
* 3. Construct first draft of PB matrix (18110104 - 19110104) 
* 4. Finalise PB matrix (21110104 - 22110104) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) The PB is a map of current activity and expenditure. This should draw together cost 
data based on 23 programme budget statutory returns (activity driven) and incorporate activltý- data 
(primarily admissions). Any other relevant information (payment by results matching exercise, 
Stuart Wooler's exercise, SLA review? ) should also be reviewed and included. 
Stage 3: determine locally relevant decision-making criteria. 
Steps: 
0 1. Identify sample criteria and weighting methods (15109104 - 20109104) 
0 2. Assimilate and agree draft criteria (21109104) 
0 3. Consult advisory panel (22109104) 
0 4. Consult PEC chairs (23109104 - 28109104) 
0 5. Advisory panel to finalise criteria (29109104) 
0 6. Undertake weighting exercise with PEC members (04110104 - 08110104) 
0 7. Finalise weights (before 1" advisory panel meeting) 
0 8. Construct business case template 
(21110104 - 22110104) 
APPENDIX E. Plan of PBMA research and timetable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Criteria are to be generated from discussions with PCT c. ommissioners and PEC 
chairs, previous local PCT prioritisation exercises, any other priority setting exercises (identified 
from the literature/service examples), and other PBMA exercises. 
(6) (7) Once they are agreed they need to be weighted - assigned a nurnerical weighting that denotes 
the relative importance of each in prioritisation decisions. Ideally the weighting exercise would be 
conducted with all relevant stakeholders however given time hrr ts the we ghts for s st years; I thi fir 
exercise will be obtained from PEC members for all 3 PCOs. The average weights obtaiined from 
this exercise will be finahsed by the advisory panel. 
(8) The criteria will form the basis of a standardised business case used to support service 
developments and changes. 
Stage 4: advisoty panel to identify ranked options. 
Steps: 
* 1. Identify services within PB (scoping) matrix (25110104 - 12111104) 
* 2. Gather supporting evidence (25110104 - 12111104) 
* 3. Construct (identify) business cases to be submitted in standardised form (12111104) 
* 4. Advisory panel meeting to produce ranked short lists (TBC: 01112104) 
(1) PECs, PCTs and advisory panel members will be asked to individually identify options for 
prioritisation. Options should be identified in terms of areas for investment, areas for redesign (i. e. 
resource release through efficiency savings), and areas for resource release through scaling back 
services. This is primarily done by 'eyeballing' the PB matrix that may highlight specific areas, and 
by focussing on the target and non-target areas (as set out in the scope above). 
(2) Each option (including PEC/PCT-generated options) needs to be accompanied by any 
supporting information (gathered from projects and other materials papers or projects that Within 
the organ1sation, Medline, Government publications and relevant Royal College Publications, expert 
opinion etc), and accompanied by a breakdown of the associated costs (or cost savings) and an 
outline of the specific benefits (as judged against the pre-defined criteria). A support pack containing 
some relevant information and links to appropriate sources will be provided. 
(3) Each option needs to be presented in a standardised format (using the standardised business case 
template). It may be that business cases already exist for some of the options that will be identified in 
which case these will need to be translated into the new standardised business case. These should 
then be submitted to the Director of Epidemiology who will be responsible for collating these and 
incorporating any other relevant information prior to the 1s, advisory panel meeting. 
(4) The advisory panel meeting will serve as a forum for discussion of each of the options put 
forward in the business cases. The group should brainstorm for any additional options and review 
each one to assess whether there is realistic potential for these to be implemented and (in the case of 
a resource release option) resources released. Each option should then be ranked to produce ranked 
lists of options for investment and options for resource release. Ranking of options should be 
conducted using the pre-defined weighted criteria and costs which can be used to calculate 
cost/benefit ratios. Where rankings are over-ridden, the reason is noted, and may form a new 
criterion to be used in the process in the future. The aim of stage 4 is to identify costed options 
which are of highest prioritýý through to those of lowest priority, in a rank order. Ranked shortlists of 
potential options for investments and resource release along with their associated costs and benefits 
(or consequences) should be produced at the end of this stage. 
.e5: 
initial vahdiiy check. Stag 
Steps: 
o 1. PECs to undertake own scoring exercise 
o 2. Advisory panel scores to be presented at CAG meetings, Board meetings for comment 
and suggested revisions '%vith justifications to be submitted 
APPENDIX E. Plan of PBMA research and timetable 
(1) Each PEC will be asked to consider each of the Business Cases With reference to the . -Wvison, Panel scorings and score them to produce their own ranked shordists (sin-ýIar process as illustrated 
above). 
(2) Clinical Advisory Groups and Boards will be asked to review the ranked shortlists noting the 
costs and benefits (consequences) of the options to ensure that the options proposed are reasonable 
and/or achievable. Any revisions made to the ranked shorthsts must be justified. 
Stage 6: advisogy panel to finalise resource shift recommendations. 
Steps (all to be undertaken at Advisory Panel meeting 2): (TBC 15112104) 
* 1. Finalise revision of ranked shortlists (based on PEC scoring and feedback) 
* 2. Combine investment and resource release shortlists 
* 3. Produce final balance sheet maintaining financial balance and reducing deficit 
* 4. Produce implementation plan with timescale 
(1) (2) The panel will consider the funding of options for investment through new resources (though 
this may not be possible), funding options for investment through resources released from options 
where efficiency savings have been identified, and finally funding options for investment ftom 
resources released from options where there may be opportunity to scale back or stop services. 
Following any revisions to the lists, each option for investment should be considered separately and 
explicitly weighted against each resource release option. This process (of considering the investment 
options in turn) should continue until it is thought that no more reallocations from potential options 
for resource release to options for investment are worthwhile. 
(3) An overall summary table should be produced with recommendations either for service delivery re- 
design or maintenance of the status quo, in the form of a balance sheet (i. e. showing how planned 
developments and releases maintain financial balance in the organisation). 
(4) An irnplementation plan for actioning these changes should be produced, With n-ýIestones. 
Stage 7: validi1y checks and final decisions. 
Steps: 
o 1. Consultation with relevant stakeholders 
* 2. PCO Boards approval 
* 3. Incorporation into and submission of LDPs (31101105) 
(1) The recommendations and implementation plan should be discussed with the relevant stakeholders 
to determine if some items cannot stand for potential release (and the factors and steps to MItigate this 
must be identified). 
(2) (3) Recommendations should be made to the relevant boards for approval and linked to LDP sign- 
off With each PCO Board, and these should be then incorporated into the relevant LDPs- 
APPENDIX F. Focus group schedule 
Heads of Service Focus Group 
01/02/05 Commissioning Consortium 
[] tape on 
volume level 
Explain reason for the focus group: 
to try to pick up any positive and negative issues or concerns around: 
completing the business cases 
the future of PBAIM or other prioritization processes in the organization 
e Reiterate issues of confidentiality and anonymity, the purpose of the study, 
study funding, what is going to happen with data. 
9 Explain the rules of the focus group 
* Ask everybody to introduce themselves for the 
Experience 
Q. What were your expectations of this process? 
Q. Were these expectations met? 
Engaging with and improving the PBMA experience 
I Q. What were the positives and what were the problems? 
" Barriers 
" Does it achieve its objectives? 
" Information (what are the information requirements) 
0 What about support? 
0 Process of filling in business cases - specific problems relating to these (title, 
information required, costs data, benefit scoring, criteria) 
0 Process more widely - integration with LDP 
01 nteraction/integ ration feedback from senior members 
0 Can this work? 
I Q. What about the extent of any patient/clinician involvement? I 
APPENDIX F. Focus group schedule 
PBMA and the future 
I Q. What needs to be done to make the whole process easier/work? 
" How would they see this developing in future - ideally and practical 
improvements/changes 
" How would they do things differently? What would they keep? 
" Do they have a final message for me/for the CE Final/any body who is thinking 
of implementing something similar? 
Final remarks 
Is there anything else you want to add that we haven't covered? 
Close conversation. 
Thank participants. 
* Offer reassurance that all responses will be held in confidence and neither the 
name nor specific role of the participant will be identified in dissemination of 
results. 
Pulling conversation back on track: 
" How do you think that this relates to X? 
" So, do you perceive X to be a barrier ... ? 
Use of round robin: 
9 If some people are talking too much - formulate aQ and ask everybody for their 
response 
To break the pace or direction of the conversation 
To get conversation started 
Eliciting different opinions (rather than 'group speak') 
Does anybody have a different experience of X ... 
? 
Is there another way of thinking about this / can you think of it differently? 
During and After: 
" Write notes about what has gone on during the FG: note any power relationships, 
conflicts, oddities. 
" Try and get a sense of who is saying what 
" Sanctioning of transcript: allow participants the opportunity to look over the transcripts 
as an accuracy check. At this point if there are any phrases or statements that they 
said that, in retrospect, they wish they hadn't, give them the opportunity to delete these. 
mr-r, timuix U. Transcription notation 
Transcription notation for the rough transcription 
SYMBOL SIGNIFICANCE 
Slight rise (more is expected) 
Pause of less than .5 of second 
... Pause of more than .5 of a second 
Overlap 
Unclear word 
(did) Guess at unclear word 
[clears throat] non-speech, vocal and non-vocal, which interrupts speech 
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COMMISSIQNI NG CONSORTIUM 
Programme Budget Categories Code ACUTE TRUST A 
APC A DMISSIO NS NAPC 
COST % EL NOWEL DC I COST % 
Infectious disease. Lcta/ E1,769229 40 556% 74 1351 2741 274 E2 191 72 01% 
Infectious Diseases - PWV A AIDS 
- A 
E91,81 1.81 1000% 4 216 5 5 5 E0ý00. 00% 
Infect)QU., Disea"s - 00's' X El. 677,417,59 54,3% 70 1325 
k 
9 E1. W 17 0 1%, 
Cancers & Tumouý; X E17.359.798.34ý 67.2% LO31 M3 115092 5092 15092 E11,378,64 00% 
3- Wood Disordgss X E1.079.113.34 603% _ 177. 1 443 11350 350 1350 E4 068,04 - 0. 
4 
, 
Endocrine, Nutritional and 
Mstaboll,, Problems 
Total 
E1.577.065.14 61.3% 342 
ý 
732 615 E475.22 0,0* 
- 
Endocrine), Nutritional and 
Mlitaboloc Poblems - Diabetes I 
- A 
- 
E41e. 645.84 e2.1% 32 253 251 EO, 00 0. 
I 
Endocrine, Nutritional and 
Metabolic Problems - Other 
X 
E1.160.219.30 01.0% 10 310 
_ 
479 5901 F400.32 0.0%] 
Mental Health Problems Total E886.414,11 7.3% 69 322 9 E102.89 0.0%1 
Mental Health Problems- 
Substance Abuse 
A 
E205.563.78 26.0% 
1 
55 130 1 EO 00 0.0% 
Mental Heafth Problems - 
Dementia 
B , 
E434.330.57 63,9% 3 87 0 EO 00 0,0% 
Mentall Health Problems - Other X E246,519 76 Z3% 11 11 105 8 E86 74 0.0%1 
Leamina Disabliltv Problems X E14.13WOO 59,5% 0 4 19 V 53 0,0% 
7 Neurological System Problems X M242 877 93. 65.5% 838 2902 1783. E4.890 70 0 1% 
8 EveiVision Problems X E5,007.485,02 986% 565 272 6534 E3.102 46 01% 
9 Hearing Problems X C904.099.10 74.8% 441 171 579 E759 72 01% 
10 Circulation Problems Total E20.109,574 30 = 
V25 
03 5707 1859 ET842.96 LO 0/6 
Circulation Problems - CHO A E6ý916 095 71 77.0% 1033 1033 1815 671 EO 00 
ý ý 00% 
Circulation Problems - 
Carebrovascular Disease 
B 
E2.881.029.3 58.9% 135 135, 1294 42 EO 00 00%. 
Circulation Prob/eims - Olher X E10,312.449 27 71.8% 1335 2598 1146 E6.612,03 Oý0% 
11 ResDiratory System Problems X El 1,231,754 03 53.6% 2153 3 1 7933 955 E3.893 71 0.0% 
_J2_ 
Dental Problems X E629.949.38 58.8% ý 145 _ 69 582 E1.7-41.20 0,2% 
13 
_ 
Gastro Intestinal System 
Problems 
X 
E`14,230.862ý56 48.8% 1916 6005 8016 f2,793.94 0.0% 
JA. Skin Problems X 0.543.046ý05 64.2% 432 1534 1953 f2,967.32 01% 
15 Musculo Skeletal System 
Problems (excludes Trauma) 
X 
E10.597.487.50. 55.2% 2SIA409 1 1493 1993. E4.780.10 0.0%. 
16 Trauma & Injuries (includes 
bums) 
Total 
E7,889,890.85 49.3% 177 4827 149 E4.368.36 0.0 %Y0 
Trauma & Injuries (includes burns) 
Falls 
A 
E4.028,759.82 100.0% 40 1946 16 J10.00 O, O%y 
Trauma & Injuries (includes bums) 
Other 
X 
E3.861,131.03 32.3% 137 2881 133 E3.682.99 0.0% 
17 Genito Urinary System 
Disorders lexceot InfertillIvI 
Total 
E9.160.934.79 1 62.3% 2019 . 2696 5678 . C8.126.17 01%. 
Genito Urinary System Disorders 
(except infertility) - Genital &W 
Problems 
A 
C5.812.620.25 57.6% 1397 1309 3366 EO. 00 0.0% 
Genito Urinary System Disorders 
(except infertility) - Renal 
Problems 
B 
E299.553,78, 95.8% 65 93 137 EO. 00 0.0% 
Genito Urinary System Disorders 
(except infertility) - Chronic Ronal 
Failure 
C 
C309,517.4 91.6% 72 
1 
97 370 E0.00 u%l 
Genito Urinary System Disorders 
(except infertilitv) - Other 
X 
E2,739,243.28 69.2% 485 1197 1805 E6.85213 0.2% 
Is Matemity & Reproductive Health X 
E6,903,539.52 35.9% 802 6428 925 E2.768 91 0.0% 
19 Neonate Conditions X I E315,347 58 74.1% 0 552 28 E3.046,54 03% 
20 Poisoning X E3,941,698.03 68.2% 494 2353 208 E649.53 0.0% 
21 Healthv Individuals - Total E3.500.741 ý37 
66,6% 1280 401 3074 E847.21 0.0% 
Healthy Individuals - NSF 
Prevention Prowarnme 
A 
E31.087.9 98.4% 
19 15 
10 
1 
EO, 00 00% 
Healthy Individuals - NSF Mental 
Health Prevention 
- B 
co 00 0.0% 0 2 0 EO. 00 0.0% 
Healthy Individuals - Other X E3,469,653,44 66.4% 1271 394 3064 
E713.91 0.5 */Q 
ZL Social Care Needs X C6,587 14 21.0% 1 4 0 E459.58 1.5% 
- 23 Other Areas of 
. 
SDond/Cond'tlons 
X 
E1 074,506 70, 534% 58 480 149 E7.359.33 0,4% 
rTo 
JaI cost (relating rJ I E126.976.868.21, 1332.5 2098 4896 5182 IE78 
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COMMISSIONI NG CONS ORTIUM COM MISSIONING CONSOR TIUM 
ACUTE TRUST B M ENTAL HEALT H TRU ST 
A DMISSIC NS NAPC APC AD MISSIO NS NAPC 
% EL I NljN-EL DC [ COST 
_ 
% COST % Ip DC COST % 
El 410 470.29 44,3% 161 1676 43 E1778,55 01% EO. 00 0,0% 0 0 0 0 0 E0.00 00% 
co ()o 0. (Y% 01 0 0 Eoqoo 0.0% EO. 00 0.0% 0 
1 
0 0 0 E0,00 0,0% ý41 0Vý; ý ; 45.6% 161 1676 43 E807.95 0.0% EO. 00 0.0% 0 0 0 0 0 EoqoO 0 D% 
-L8_457&15 15 32.7% 12521 1531 8433, 
E3.430A7 0.0% C0400 , 0,0% 0 0 co. 00 0,0% 
-LZ 
UR-142,13 39.3% 1241 433 621 E2,706.03 0.2% Eo ()o 0 0% 0 0 0 0 0. EO. 00 0 0% 
LO9L35 
-2-m e% 380 621 e721 252 E4.153. e3l O. 2% EQý00 0.0%. 0 ol 0 EO. 00 0. 
8 54 E254.187.48 37.9% 3 215 7 E"ol 0.0% EO-00 0.0% 0 0 0 E0.00 0,0% 
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APPENDIX J. Benefit criteria weighting questionnaire 
Weighting the Relative Importance of Different Criteria for Assessing 
Priorities for NHS service developments 
Introduction 
[The Commissioning Consortium] have agreed to develop their commissioning arrangements as 
a logical transformation for delivering the NHS Plan and the SHA strategic direction in the era of financial flows, choice and foundation status. 
A new commissioning approach is based on an integrated and unified commissioning process 
supported by a dedicated commissioning infrastructure under the title Commissioning 
Consortium which will start to operate in full from Ilst October 2004. The consortium will cover 
the services provided by: 
Nowhere NHS Trust 
Nowhere NHS Trust 2 
Nowhere Mental Health NHS Trust 
Nowhere Ambulance Services 
Nowhere NHS Trust 3 
The Commissioning Consortium function includes: 
" Analysis of need, outcomes and priorities based on local LDPs and collective 
consideration 
" Development of service specification encompassing for example external guidelines, 
access criteria, treatment protocols, standards, NICE appraisals/guidance 
" Development of a commissioning approach focussed on integrated care pathways in 
response to the SHAs vision for services in the future 
Development of binding contracts including risk sharing arrangements 
Performance management of those contracts 
Service review 
In order to fulfil its function, the Commissioning Consortium is developing a priority setting 
framework. The first step in developing this framework involves agreeing a set of criteria by 
which different options for service investment, re-design, and reduction can be assessed. 
Proposed criteria 
In drawing up a draft set of criteria, the following sources were used as a starting point: 
Criteria developed by other health authorities and agencies in the UK and abroad 
Criteria developed by local government agencies in the UK 
0 Local criteria used in the recent past by [the Consortia PCTs] 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the common aims shared by most public sector agencies, four 
key types of commonly used criteria emerged: 
1. Policy & strategy criteria 
2. Feasibility & practicality criteria 
3. Quality of life & length of life criteria 
4. Quality of service criteria 
A total of 18 separate sub-criteria were identified within these four main headings. 
APPENDIX J. Benefit criteria weighting questionnaire 
Using the criteria to assess different options for service investment, re- 
design and reduction 
When deciding on the priorities for commissioning, the consortium will need to consider four 
broad kinds of options for change in existing services: 
1. Commissioning more of a service which will require investment 
2. Commissioning a new service which will require investment 
3. Re-designing a service (or services) which may require investment or may 
release resources 
4. Commissioning less of a service which will release resources 
In order to prioritise any of these different kinds of options for change in services, whilst 
remaining in financial balance, commissioners will need to ask two questions of each option: 
1. What is the marginal cost requirement (or cost saving) from the option for 
change? 
2. What is the marginal benefit gained (or lost) from the option for change? 
Weighting the relative importance of different criteria for assessing 
priorities 
In order to assess the marginal benefits gained (or lost) from different proposed service 
options for change, the consortium is seeking the judgements of various stakeholder 
groups on the relative importance of the four main criteria headings and the 18 sub- 
criteria. 
In the pages which follow, you are asked to 'spend' points to indicate what you consider 
to be the relative importance of these different criteria in deciding how to invest NHS 
resources. 
APPENDIX J. Benefit criteria weighting questionnaire 
1. Weighting the relative importance of four main criteria for 
assessing priorities for NHS service developments 
Please 'spend' 100 points to indicate the relative importance you attach to the 
following four main criteria for assessing priorities for NHS service 
developments. When spending the points please ask yourself the question- "If I 
were to invest more resources in developing NHS services, how important 
are each of these four criteria in helping me decide where to invest? " 
Spend more points on criteria you consider to be more important. You can 
spend all 100 points on one area if you wish. You cannot spend more than 100 
points in total: 
Spend 100 points 
1. Policy& Strategy 
Does the service development help to meet 
National or local policy objectives/targets? 
Does it have local support from politicians 
and the public? 
2. Feasibility & Practicality 
Is the service development affordable, and easy 
to implement. Does it offer reasonable risk? 
3. Quality & Length of Life - 
Does the service development improve life 
expectancy, physical, mental or social well-being, 
or life circumstances? 
4. Quality of Service 
Does the service development improve equity 
of access, waiting time, physical or human 
resources, or sustainability of the service? 
Total must add up to 100 
APPENDIX J. Benefit criteria weighting questionnaire 
2. Weighting the relative importance of sub-criteria of Policy & 
Strategy 
Please 'spend' 6 points to indicate the relative importance you attach to the 
following three sub-criteria of policy and strategy for assessing priorities for 
NHS service developments. When spending the points please ask yourself the 
question: "How important are each of these sub-criteria in relation to the 
overall criterion of Policy & Strategy? " 
Spend more points on sub-criteria you consider to be more important. You can 
spend all 6 points on one area if you wish. You cannot spend more than 6 
points in total: 
Spend 6 points 
1. Meeting local policy 
objectives and/or targets 
Existing LDP Commitments; Key targets 
or balanced scorecard targets (PCT and 
Acute, Mental Health Trusts); SHA vision and 
strategy e. g. integration of primary and secondary care 
2. Meeting national policy 
objectives 
NHS Plan; National Standards; Public Health White 
Paper; Patient choice 
3. Support from local politicians and 
the local community 
Compatible with strategic partners' policies; has 
support of local MPs, has support of the public 
and local community groups 
Total must add up to 6 
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3. Weighting the relative importance of sub-criteria of Feasibility & 
Practicality 
Please 'spend' 8 points to indicate the relative importance you attach to the 
following four sub-criteria of feasibility & practicality for assessing priorities for 
NHS service developments. When spending the points please ask yourself the 
question: "How important are each of these sub-criteria in relation to the 
overall criterion of feasibility & practicality7"' 
Spend more points on sub-criteria you consider to be more important. You can 
spend all 8 points on one area if you wish. You cannot spend more than 8 
points in total. 
Spend 8 points 
1. Overall affordability 
The overall cost is not prohibitive 
2. Ease of implementation 
Will get clinician (primary and secondary), provider 'buy-in' 
3. Implementation within required timescale 
4. Risk of being implemented to plan 
Reasonable risk of option being implemented to plan 
and delivering anticipated benefits 
Total must add up to 8 
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4. Weighting the relative importance of sub-criteria of Quality & 
Length of Life 
Please 'spend' 10 points to indicate the relative importance you attach to the 
following five sub-criteria of Quality & Length of Life for assessing priorities for 
NHS service developments. When spending the points please ask yourself the 
question: "'How important are each of these sub-criteria in relation to the 
overall criterion of Quality & Length of Life? " 
Spend more points on sub-criteria you consider to be more important. You can 
spend all 10 points on one area if you wish. You cannot spend more than 10 
points in total: 
Spend 10 points 
1. Life expectancy 
2. Physical well-being 
3. Mental well-being 
4. Social well-being 
5. Life circumstances 
Total must add up to 10 
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5. Weighting the relative importance of sub-criteria of Quality of 
Service 
Please 'spend' 12 points to indicate the relative importance you attach to the 
following six sub-criteria of Quality of Service for assessing priorities for NHS 
service developments. When spending the points please ask yourself the 
question: "How important are each of these sub-criteria in relation to the 
overall criterion of Quality of Service? " 
Spend more points on sub-criteria you consider to be more important. You can 
spend all 12 points on one area if you wish. You cannot spend more than 12 
points in total: 
Spend 12 points 
1. Accessibility &Waiting Time 
Ability for an individual to obtain needed healthcare 
within an acceptable timeframe; considerations include 
availability, cost of service, location, hours of operation, 
transportation, etc. 
2. Equity& Health Inequalities 
Accessibility to socially excluded, ethnic or other 
minority groups, meeting inequality targets 
Human Resources 
e. g. capacity, skill mix, training 
4. Physical Resources 
Quality of buildings, furnishings, equipment, food 
5. Patient/Carer Satisfaction 
Adequate information, appropriate patient-focus, 
patient involvement 
6. Sustainability of the Service 
Likelihood of long term survival of the service 
Total must add up to 12 
APPENDIX K. Standard business case template 
Title: 
Service Area: 
Is this an investment option, a resource releasing option, or resource neutral? 
Investment F-1 Resource neutral 1-1 Resource releasing Fý 
Responsible Commissioner: 
1. Introduction and strategic context of proposal: 
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APPENDIX K. Standard business case template 
4. Expected costs incurred/saved in 2005 - 06 
Capital 
Revenue 
Staff 
Non-staff 
Net surplusl 
Net cost 
5. Expected costs incurred/saved in 2006 - 07 
Capital 
Revenue 
Staff 
Non-staff 
Net Surplusl 
Net cost 
6. Additional Comments 
Number of beneficiaries 
